FROM:Dr. Martin Sherman http://www.martinsherman.org/
Martin Sherman is the founder and CEO of the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies. Dr. Sherman holds degrees in Physics and Geology (B.Sc.), Business Administration (MBA) and Political Science (PhD) .
He served for seven years in operational capacities in the Israeli intelligence community. From 1990-91 he held the post of ministerial advisor to the Israeli government, and has testified as an expert before the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of US Congress, in a hearing on economic and security trends in the Middle East.
He was a research fellow (2003-2014) at the International Policy Institute for Counter- Terrorism (ICT) and acted as the academic coordinator of the internationally renowned Herzliya Conference in 2001 and 2002. From 2003-2010 he was the academic director of the Jerusalem Summit.
He writes extensively on security political and economic issues in the Israeli national press in both English and Hebrew.His academic publications include two books, The Politics of Water in The Middle East, and Despots, Democrats and the Determinants of International Conflict, (Macmillan); articles in numerous journals ; numerous chapters in edited volumes and policy papers on a range of strategic and foreign policy issues
IISS - Assertive, Resolute, Unapologetic Zionism
1. For the only non-coercive (or at least non-“kinetic”) approach that can ensure the long-term survival of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people – see:
2. For preparing the necessary conditions for implementation of the above - see
3. Also see: DAVID SUISSA: Impossible Man jewishjournal.com/opinion/79941/
1. Rethinking Palestine: The Humanitarian Approach By Dr. Martin Sherman
http://www.strategic-israel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Pal-prog-short.pdf
1. If Israel is to continue to exist as the permanent democratic nation-state of the Jewish people, it must adequately address two imperatives:
(a) The Geographic Imperative: It cannot make the territorial concessions in Judea/Samaria necessary for a viable Palestinian state without critically compromising its minimum security requirements and rendering itself geographically untenable; and
(b) The Demographic Imperative: It cannot incorporate the Palestinian Arabs resident in these areas into its society as enfranchised citizens, without rendering itself demographically untenable.
2. Israel must therefore maintain control over the territory while inducing the relocation and rehabilitation of the Palestinian Arab population elsewhere. The only non-coercive way to achieve this is with positive inducements – chiefly generous economic incentives.
3. However, there is strong international support for the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea/Samaria. What fuels this support is the perceived legitimacy of the Palestinian narrative, according to which the Palestinian Arabs are a distinct people, comprising a cohesive national entity that strives to exercise national sovereignty in a defined homeland. As long as the perceived validity of this narrative persists, the international pressure for Palestinian statehood will also persist.
4. Clearly then, if the intellectual fuel that drives international pressure for a Palestinian state is the perceived validity of the Palestine narrative, forestalling this pressure requires the deconstruction of this narrative. Such deconstruction should – and can – be based principally on the deeds, declarations and documents of the Palestinians themselves.
5. This narrative-deconstruction must be attained by an assertive public diplomacy offensive, adequately funded and appropriately energized. Without achievement of this objective, there will be no conceptual space in the discourse to advance Zionist-compliant alternatives to the TSS (two state solution).
6. Deconstruction of the Palestinian narrative will obviate the need to deal with the Palestinian Arabs as a cohesive national entity, and instead facilitate addressing them as an amalgam of fate-stricken individuals who, for decades, have been disastrously misled into their current unenviable position by cruel, cunning and corrupt cliques.
7. Approaching the Palestinians Arabs on the individual, rather than on the collective, level makes way for policy paradigms that call for:
(a) The de-politicization of the context of the predicament, and the nature of its resolution; and (b) The “atomization” (individualization) of the implementation of that resolution.
8. This enables the formulation of crucial elements of actionable policy that do not require reaching agreement with any Arab collective or political entity –something increasingly implausible in the post-“Arab Spring” climate – but rather the accumulated acquiescence of individuals seeking to enhance their well-being.
Humanitarian instead of political
Depoliticizing the context of the Palestinian Arabs’ predicament will not, in itself, dissipate that predicament, or render the need to do so any less pressing. But what it will do is provide a totally new dimension along which to pursue policies to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, and new methodologies by which to do so.
Thus, rather than strive for an unattainable political solution, energies should be channeled along humanitarian lines.
This will lead --almost inexorably--to the formulation of a policy prescription based on the eminently liberal (as opposed to “illiberal” rather than “conservative”) principles of:
1. Eliminating ethnic discrimination toward the Palestinian Arabs as (a) refugees and as (b) residents in the Arab world.
2. Providing individual Palestinian Arabs the freedom of choice to determine their future and that of their families.
These principles translate into a comprehensive tripartite proposal, whose constituent components should be seen as a mutually interactive, integrative whole:
1. Dissolution or radical restructuring of UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency) to bring the treatment of Palestinian refugees into line with universal international norms.
2. Resolute insistence on the cessation of ethnic discrimination against Palestinian Arabs in the Arab world and of the prohibition on their acquiring citizenship of countries in which they have resided for decades.
3. Generous relocation grants provided directly to individual Palestinian Arab breadwinners/family heads, resident in Judea/Samaria (and subsequently, in Gaza) to allow them to build better futures for themselves, and their dependents, in third-party countries of their choice.
Evidence of feasibility
Strong anecdotal and statistical evidence exists indicating that there is widespread desire among the Palestinians to emigrate if given the opportunity. This opportunity could be afforded them by providing relocation finance.
Withholding financial "artificial respiration" for the dysfunctional Palestinian authority –thereby letting it collapse –will also provide a powerful disincentive to remain and suffer the economic consequences of such a collapse.
Who will accept them?
Since the Palestinians will not be arriving as penniless refugees but relatively wealthy émigrés, in terms of average global GDP per capita, there will be considerable economic benefits for the host countries, whose economies will receive large influxes (potentially billions) of capital. Absorption can be made more palatable by offering host countries additional benefits (for example the funds currently funneled to UNRWA).
How much will it cost?
I estimate the total cost –spread over about a decade and a half –at about US$ 200 billion. This might appear an excessively high sum, but several things need to be kept in mind:
First, the absolute cost is largely irrelevant and must be compared to the cost of other alternatives – such as the establishment of a Palestinian state – which also carry a multi-billion price tag.
Secondly, it will entail a fraction (around a quarter) of the cost that the US incurred in its largely unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Thirdly, spread over a decade and half Israel could shoulder most the cost itself, with the burden being around what the defense budget was in the 1980s. If other OECD countries were included, the entire program could be executed at an imperceptible cost in terms of their GDP.
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2. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MARTIN SHERMAN Feb 16, 2017
a. IF I WERE PRIME MINISTER…
The first order of business would be to devise and deploy a political “Iron Dome” to protect Israel from the incoming barrages of delegitimization and demonization…
Into The Fray: If I were prime minister...
The first order of business would be to devise and deploy a political “Iron Dome” to protect Israel from the incoming barrages of delegitimization and demonization.
The State of Israel, the country that represents Jews throughout the world as much as its citizens, is slowly but surely abdicating its role by its action or perhaps better said inaction vis-a-vis public diplomacy. What has happened to the leadership of the past, men and women who were not afraid to state their minds and fight for what has always been rightfully ours? We are no longer respected and are at the mercy of a leftist faction and media who will stop at nothing to help in our destruction. – Naomi Romm, in a Facebook response to my previous column, “Dereliction of Duty”
Israel cannot expect the world to be concerned if Israel does not regard itself, its existence and its rights with urgency and determination. This is the true and profound reason that the Israeli message about Iran did not touch the hearts of the world’s leaders, and the guilty party is we ourselves, the collective Israeli, we, the Right and the Left together, each one because of its acts of commission and its acts of omission. – Dr. Mordechai Kedar, “Survival Skills for Israel – 101,” 2013
If Israel intends to regain its legitimacy, it must advance its historical claims aggressively and forcefully. The Jewish state cannot permit others to define its identity or distort its past. It is necessary to discredit the fraudulent claims of the other side and expose its lies. Such an effort should include a long-term campaign of relegitimization. Israel must defend its sovereignty and take its rightful place in the community of nations. These are the responsibilities of nationhood. – Dr. Joel Fishman, The Relegitimization of Israel and the Battle for the Mainstream Consensus, 2012
I concluded my previous column with a promise, subject to breaking news, to provide a to-do list detailing the practical measures I would undertake to address/redress the abysmal failings in the conduct – read, misconduct – of Israel’s public diplomacy.
So despite the great temptation to invoke the “subject to breaking news” clause, and devote this week’s column to excoriating the egregiously inexplicable, inexcusable, incomprehensible release of convicted murderers in exchange for nothing, nada, zilch, zip, I will hold firm to my pledge.
After all, such disastrously counterproductive decisions as the prisoner release are largely a result of the catastrophic collapse of Israel’s public diplomacy strategy, which leaves the nation’s policy-makers hopelessly vulnerable and prone to outside pressures.
First week in office
Clearly, in a single opinion column I cannot provide a persuasive presentation of all the measures I would undertake were I to assume the role of prime minister. Constraints of time and space compel me to prioritize.
The most urgent item on the agenda is not difficult to identify. It is clearly reflected in the preceding introductory excerpts, which succinctly diagnose the chronic malaise eating away at the fabric of the nation: The total failure of the national leadership to defend Israel on the international stage as the nation-state of the Jewish people.
Whether this is due to a lack of will or a lack of ability makes scant difference. What matters is that this failure has eroded Israel’s capacity to resist external pressure or rebuff external demands, no matter how absurdly unjustified or outrageously hypocritical.
It is because of the breakdown of the ability to resist pernicious initiatives that, last week, I likened Israel’s diplomatic debacle to the contraction of an HIV virus that destroys the immune system, while likening the danger of Iran’s nuclear program to that of being run over by a truck.
Of course, some might protest that the most pressing issue on the national agenda that must be given priority over others is the Iranian threat. This is, without doubt, a matter of utmost gravity, but even “Iran-firsters” will be compelled to concede that it is, as Mordechai Kedar aptly alludes, greatly exacerbated by ineffectual Israeli diplomacy.
For as is becoming disconcertingly obvious, especially in recent weeks, Israel’s ability to contend effectively with this peril is being considerably constricted by its failure to adequately convey to the world the severity and urgency of the problem. This undermines its ability to rally a reluctant world to employ sufficiently harsh measures to terminate Tehran’s nuclear endeavor, as well as its efforts to acquire international legitimacy for a preemptive strike of its own to disrupt that endeavor.
Accordingly, upon entering the Prime Minister’s Office, the first order of business will be the repair of Israel’s broken diplomacy – especially its public diplomacy.
The Bamba syndrome?
This will require no less than a total overhaul of Israel’s current doctrine of the theory and practice of diplomacy. As Kurt Lewin, widely considered the founder of social psychology, observed, “There is nothing so practical as a good theory.”
The first step in generating a practical operational metamorphosis is generating an attitudinal one.
The current governmental attitude of utter disregard for diplomatic endeavor is reflected in the pitiful amounts allocated for diplomacy, in general, and for public diplomacy, in particular. If the resources allotted for the achievement of a given objective is a gauge of the importance assigned that objective, and of the resolve to successfully attain it, then we are forced to conclude that the Israeli leadership has hitherto assigned virtually no importance to diplomatic objectives – and demonstrated commensurately little resolve in attaining them.
This distressing truth is reflected in the dismayed remark by former minister Michael Eitan several years ago in Haaretz: “It is dreadful to hear that the [popular children’s] snack Bamba has a promotional budget two to three times the size of the total state budget for public diplomacy.”
To contend with this debilitating condition, which might be termed the “Bamba syndrome,” there is a pressing need for a radical restructuring, reformulating and reinvigorating of the intellectual and material infrastructure that have hitherto determined the conduct of Israeli diplomacy.
Diplomacy as air power
Readers will recall that last week, I cited former prime ministerial adviser Ra’anan Gissim, who bewailed “the inability of Israel to prepare strategically with public diplomacy as a tool of war,” while Michael Eitan warned that “the results of the war in the media directly affect the results of the war in the field.”
This is precisely the message conveyed by these sentiments that must be – and would be if I were PM – incorporated into Israel’s foreign policy, both in terms of the mode of its conduct and the resources allotted for its conduct.
As I have pointed out elsewhere, the function of diplomacy should be perceived as essentially similar to that of the classic role of the air force. For just as the latter was traditionally tasked with creating freedom of action for ground forces to achieve their objectives, so should diplomacy be seen as charged with facilitating freedom of action for the nation’s strategic decision-makers, to allow them to achieve the objectives of strategies they formulate.
But if this is the perception of the role of diplomacy, it must be provided with commensurate resources to discharge functions that derive from this perception.
Accordingly, among my very first decisions would be to direct my finance minister to dramatically increase the budget allocation for diplomatic warfare – for promoting Israel’s case abroad, repudiating the accusations of its adversaries and repulsing assaults on its legitimacy.
And by “dramatically,” I mean up to $1 billion.
Diplomatic Iron Dome?
A billion dollars!? I can almost hear the gasps of disbelief and the dismissive snorts of derision. They would be sorely inappropriate and unfounded – detached from any factual foundation. For a billion-dollar public diplomacy budget might sound wildly exorbitant – until you compare it with the sums laid out for other purposes – like the air force or Israel’s anti-missiles system.
“Israel to invest $1 billion in Iron Dome missile defense system,” proclaimed the headline of a Haaretz report, citing the director- general of the Defense Ministry, Udi Shani: “In addition to Iron Dome there are plans to invest another $1 billion in the continued development of a medium-level missile interception.” Commenting on the purpose of this expenditure, Shani stated: “These batteries, when they are deployed, will provide decision-making space.”
But this of course is precisely the perception of the purpose of diplomacy that would prevail in the PM’s office were I to occupy it. The resource-allocation to fulfill that purpose would, therefore, be a top priority.
After all, and without engaging in a discussion of the relevant wisdom or foresight of one security-related expenditure or another, two things appear almost axiomatically obvious:
(a) Defensive weapon systems, however, sophisticated and effective, inflict no cost on determined adversaries and hence can never deter them from attempting to devise methods to circumvent or overwhelm those defenses.
(b) Offensive weapons systems, that can inflict dissuasive costs, are of little value if political constraints prevent/limit, their use. Thus even the sleekest super-duper modern combat jets with the latest hubba-dubba avionics and awesome destructive capability will be of little value if diplomatic pressures prevent policy-makers from allowing them to take off.
Where will the money come from?
For Israel, then, it is a strategic imperative to devise and deploy an apparatus that will not only protect Israel from the debilitating effects of the unrelenting barrages of malevolent delegitimization, to which it is continuously subjected, but generate the legitimization for the effective use of its military might to deter and/or eliminate threats to the national security of Israel and personal safety of Israelis – whether these emanate from Iran, Gaza, Judea/Samaria, south Lebanon or elsewhere.
Finding the funding is hardly an insurmountable challenge – as the subsequent figures clearly demonstrate. The miserly amounts allotted in the past for a strategic diplomatic initiative do not reflect a scarcity of resources, but a grave lack of awareness and resolve.
To provide a sense of proportion, consider the following: Israel’s GDP today is almost a quarter of a trillion dollars, while its state budget is over 100 billion dollars.
Accordingly, to amass a billion dollars for the historic imperative of defending the legitimacy of Jewish national sovereignty, the lofty ideals of Zionism, and the practical policies to preserve them, would require less than 0.5 percent of GDP, or about 1 percent of the state budget.
All that is called for is shaving off infinitesimal amounts from other budget items to generate the necessary resources, which would still only total a small fraction of the defense budget – whose efficacy is, as argued, greatly impacted by the efficacy (or the lack thereof) of diplomacy.
This is surely a task that should not be beyond the capacity of any prime minister worth his/her salt.
More to come...
I realize that some readers might be disappointed that I did not provide more “red meat” and elaborate in greater detail on the nuts and bolts of the practical measures comprising my prospective policies as prime minister.
This is understandable – but allow me two closing comments:
(a) I would urge them not to underestimate the enormous transformational impact this single allocative decision taken in my first week in office is likely to have.
(b) Next week, again subject to breaking news, I will begin to specify how these allocated resources are to be mobilized to contend with questions such as: Who is to benefit from these newly allocated resources; what messages they should be used to convey; what organizational structures and personnel are required; how to counter the highly detrimental domestic sources of delegitimization; how to counter canards such as “no amount of PR will help” and “It’s useless to try and fight anti-Semitism with PR.”
That will be the agenda to be broached in my second week in office.
Abject apology: Last week in a moment of (what I hope was uncharacteristic) carelessness, I inadvertently attributed an excerpt from an article on public diplomacy written by Prof. Eytan Gilboa of Bar-Ilan University to Brig.-Gen. (res.) Amos Gilboa. I humbly apologize for this unfortunate lapse to Prof. Gilboa, whose continuous and commendable efforts have made him one of Israel’s best known authorities in the field of public diplomacy.
b. MY BILLION-DOLLAR BUDGET: IF I WERE PM (CONT.)
Perhaps the most important lesson the pro-Zionist advocates of today should learn from the Palestinians is this: “If you will it, it is no fantasy.”
I met with one of the Israeli UN representative ambassadors some time back. The condescending, sleepy replies he gave when – in plenum with leading professors present – I asked him: “Why so slow from Israeli state and diplomacy when it comes to counter the war on info?” shows the lack of interest in the war of information. They just don’t get the point and don’t see the urgency. – Norwegian author, Hanne Nabintu Herland, a concerned Facebook friend.
[Israel’s] enemies are so ridiculous, corrupt, unreasonable, perverse that it would be an ad man’s delight to make them into figures of worldwide opprobrium, and sarcastic humor. The world reprobation at corrupt behavior, at child abuse, and sexual perversion can be easily used against Arab [adversaries]. Israel is just so incompetent. The mind boggles. – Jonathan Engel, a perplexed Facebook friend, Paris
One of the penalties for refusing to participate in politics is that you end up being governed by your inferiors. – Plato
Readers will recall that I have criticized the abysmal performance of Israeli public diplomacy (PD) and its failure to present its case assertively and articulately to the world.
To recap briefly
I likened the effects of this failure to those of the HIV virus that destroys the nation’s immune system, leaving it unable to resist any outside pressures no matter how outlandish or outrageous. Given the gravity of the threat, I prescribed that, as prime minister, my first order of business would be to assign adequate resources to address the dangers precipitated by this failure.
To this end I stipulated that up to $1 billion should be allotted for the war on the PD front, and demonstrated that this sum was eminently within Israel’s ability to raise, comprising less than 0.5 percent of GDP and under 1 percent of the state budget.
Given the crucial importance of this issue it would be ludicrous to suggest that the required resources could not be procured – especially in light of the diplomatic devastation left by the display of impotence and incompetence, reflected – among other things by the hopelessly inadequate amounts assigned to the PD endeavor in the past.
I argued that, much like the air force and missile defense, diplomacy is a strategic imperative whose function is to facilitate decision-making space for national leadership to pursue national interests.
Personally painful illustration
This week provided dramatic validation of my HIV-analogy that demonstrated just how pervasive the breakdown of Israeli resistance to outside pressures has become.
Somewhat unexpectedly it occurred at the ceremony to mark the departure of National Security Adviser Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror. Amidror warned: “It is clear to everyone that handling international pressure depends on the progress of the negotiations [with the PLO], and if the talks fail, it will give everyone interested in boycotting us every reason to do so.”
This is an appalling statement for a high-ranking government official to make, and is antithetical to how Israeli positions should be presented.
It causes me personal pain to find myself in a position where I feel compelled to reproach someone like Amidror, with whom I have had an very amicable, and largely like-minded relationship, over more than a decade, in the course of which I learned to respect him greatly, personally and professionally.
However, despite my private esteem for him, public figures must be judged publicly for their public statements. He must be taken to task, in the hope he will not begrudge me discharging my journalistic duty.
Even under the – one hopes dubious – assumption that Amidror is right, it is difficult to imagine a declaration that could be more counterproductive. For it almost guarantees the outcome it warns of – the failure of the talks.
After all, in the wake of Amidror’s statement, Palestinian intransigence is virtually assured. In effect, it is an invitation to them to insist on perilous demands of Israel that undermine its vital security interests. Should Israel resist, all they need to do is wait for the talks to fail, and push for the imposition of sanctions – with the implicit endorsement of the former national security adviser.
Thus, Israel will be left with one of two options: It can capitulate to save the talks, and jeopardize its vital security interests; or resist, and risk the imposition of sanctions for refusing to undermine those interests. Even countries that might have been loath to initiate sanctions, will find it more difficult not to. The justification/ legitimization for them would have been provided by none other than Israel’s national security adviser.
His statement can only increase the chances of such punitive action against the country. Or induce it to adopt policies he has long warned against.
Helpless and hopeless?
The Amidror episode underscores how Israel’s PD debacle has created a pervasive sense of defeatism among the nation’s senior policy-makers, which seems to convey that the country’s future, or at least, as The Jerusalem Post’s Caroline Glick recently observed, the “viability of our economy is dependent on the PLO’s willingness to sit at a table with us.”
This expression of hopelessness and helplessness is particularly distressing when it comes from someone like Amidror, who has long been considered one of the country’s leading hawks on the Palestinian issue. Indeed, when he was appointed to the position, he was described by one well-known left-wing website as “an ultra-hawk,” whose “views seem to reflect the most extreme wing in Netanyahu’s coalition.”
Amidror authored numerous articles and studies advocating the retention of secure, defensible borders that entail Israel maintaining control over the highlands of Judea-Samaria, the Jordan Valley and the air space over the “West Bank.”
He concluded one of his policy papers, titled “Israel’s Requirement for Defensible Borders,” with an enthusiastic endorsement of a citation from Yitzhak Rabin: “Our evacuation of the West Bank would create the greatest threat we can possibly face.”
Clearly, Israeli insistence on anything remotely resembling its minimal security requirements, as stipulated by Amidror in the past, would result in the failure of the current talks – and hence, according to Amidror of today, must be forgone to forestall the imposition of highly detrimental sanctions.
This then has been the cumulative impact of years of dereliction and neglect of Israeli PD: The total inability to resist external pressures however pernicious – and the capitulation of some of the most stalwart advocates of resistance.
Back to the budget
The depth of the malaise clearly demonstrates the imperative of committing large-scale resources to remedy it.
But of course the mere availability of resources cannot ensure their efficacy. This requires thought and effort as to the “hardware” and the “software” of the endeavor: Designing a suitable organizational structure, identifying appropriate strategic objectives, formulating the substantive content to be conveyed, enlisting suitable personnel.
In approaching the construction of my $1b. “battle formation” for the PD war, several principles would apply, including:
• It would be organizationally separate from the Foreign Ministry and under my direct control as PM – similar to the National Security Council – in the form of a national authority for the conduct of strategic diplomacy.
• It would interface with Zionist NGOs and help finance their pro-Israel activities, enhance their impact and expand their reach – as a counterweight to the massive funding that post- and anti-Zionist NGOs receive from foreign governments.
• Its activities would be assertively offensive, geared to uncompromisingly attacking and exposing the mendacious and malicious nature of Israel’s adversaries – a necessary condition for international understanding of Israel’s policy imperatives.
• Its staff would not be professional diplomats but articulate and committed intellectual ideologues, neither bound by the constraints of diplomatic protocol nor versed in the niceties of diplomatic etiquette but rather adept in the mechanism of mass media, cyberspace and social networks (see my “Intellectual warriors, not slicker diplomats”).
• Their task would not be to interact with foreign counterparts but to wage diplomatic warfare, at home and abroad, with a $1b. budget at their disposal to saturate the Web with polished, professional Zionist content – on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and by means of fullpage “infomercials” in the leading printed media.
Delegitimizing the source of delegitimization
There can be little doubt that the origins of the assault on Israel’s legitimacy are rooted in the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the Palestinian narrative and the acceptance of the Palestinians as an authentic national entity. However counter-intuitive this might appear, the chain of reasoning is clear and compelling – almost algorithmic:
• If the Palestinian narrative which portrays the Palestinians as an authentic national entity is acknowledged as legitimate, then all the aspirations, including Palestinian statehood, that arise from that narrative are legitimate. Accordingly, any policy that precludes the achievement of those aspirations must be considered illegitimate.
• Thus, if the legitimacy of a Palestinian state is accepted, then any measures incompatible with its viability are illegitimate. However – in the absence of wildly optimistic, and hence irresponsibly unrealistic, best-case assumptions – any policy that is designed to secure Israel’s minimal security requirements will preclude the establishment of a viable Palestinian state.
• Consequently, as Amidror’s latest declaration underscores, any endeavor to realistically provide Israel with minimal security will be perceived as illegitimate. By accepting the admissibility of a Palestinian state, one necessarily admits the inadmissibility of measures required to ensure Israeli security.
• Conversely, measures required to ensure minimal Israeli security necessarily negate the viability of a Palestinian state.
The conclusion must therefore be that for Israel to secure conditions that adequately address its minimal security requirements, the Palestinian narrative, and the aspirations that flow from it, must be delegitimized.
This then, will be the principal focus of the new authority for strategic diplomacy and the formidable resources at its disposal: The delegitimization of the Palestinian narrative and the re-legitimization of the mutually exclusive Zionist narrative.
No amount of PR will help
Many will consider this an impossible challenge. Some because they feel that the Palestinian narrative has become too deeply imbedded in the international psyche to be uprooted; some because they feel that anti-Israeli sentiment is rooted in perennially endemic hostility across the world and is merely a reflection of visceral anti-Semitism that is impossible to eradicate.
These are serious objections and I do not want to dismiss them with a perfunctory rebuttal in the final section of this column, which I once again I am compelled to end without addressing all the issues I had hoped to.
I will, however, leave you with some food for thought until I take them up again.
1. Don’t underestimate the impact that an annual $1b. PD offensive could have over the four years of my incumbency on editors, opinion-makers and other politically engaged publics.
2. There are huge sources of support for Israel across the world (e.g. 4:1 advantage in support over the Palestinians among the US public) that have gone untapped and unmobilized due to diplomatic indolence and incompetence.
3. Imagine how the Palestinians must have felt in the late 1960s after the crushing IDF victory, and the global adulation Israel enjoyed in its wake.
How remote their goals must have seemed then. Yet they did not despair. Their political achievements of today seemed inconceivable then.
So perhaps the most important lesson the pro-Zionist advocates of today should learn from the Palestinians is this: “If you will it, it is no fantasy.”
c INTELLECTUAL WARRIORS, NOT SLICKER DIPLOMATS
Israel’s greatest strategic challenge, its gravest strategic failure, its grimmest strategic danger is the (mis)conduct of its public diplomacy.
War is a continuation of politics by other means. – Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 1832
Politics is war conducted by other means. – David J. Horowitz, The Art of Political War, 2000
Frederick the Great, who reigned as king of Prussia (1740-1786), famously remarked that “Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments.” Today, over two centuries later, it would appear this relationship has been entirely reversed, and that “Arms without diplomacy is like music without instruments.”
Arms without diplomacy
In a recent opinion piece (Jerusalem Post, January 7) titled “Why Jews are so bad at PR,” Shmuley Boteach asks, with evident exasperation, “What good is having Apache helicopter gunships, or Merkava tanks, to defend your citizens against attack if you can’t even use them because the world thinks you’re always the aggressor?”
The last several weeks have seen a spate of similar articles, berating the dismal and dysfunctional performance of Israel’s public diplomacy – reflecting, one hopes, growing public discontent at the deplorable state of affairs that has prevailed in this sphere for decades.
Regrettably, it appears that these – richly deserved – rebukes have been largely limited to the nation’s English-language press. A Google search I conducted on major Hebrew media outlets showed that far less attention seems to be allotted to discussion and analysis of this critically important component of Israel’s strategic capabilities – revealing what appears to be an alarming lack of awareness of, and/or interest in, the topic among the Hebrew-reading public.
Difficult to overstate the gravity
It is difficult to overstate the gravity of Israel’s public diplomacy debacle, and to grasp the ongoing official disregard of the strategic dangers that its continued neglect is creating.
Indeed, well over half a decade ago, in an article called “Public diplomacy: the missing component in Israel’s foreign policy,” published in a well-known scholarly journal, Prof. Eytan Gilboa issued the following ominous warning: “The lack of an adequate PD [public diplomacy] program has significantly affected Israel’s strategic outlook and freedom of action.... Any further neglect of PD would not only restrict Israel’s strategic options, it would be detrimental to its ability to survive in an increasingly intolerant and hostile world.”
While nearly all the recently published critiques did a good job in their diagnosis of the malaise, I fear the prescriptions many of them suggested for its remedy are hopelessly inadequate, and reflect a serious underestimation of the depth and the scale of the problem.
Right diagnosis, wrong prescription
For example, one ardent and articulate advocate for Israel, who for many years has been a sterling stalwart in defending the country against unfounded defamatory attacks at home and abroad, suggested measures with which many might concur. He prescribes that “Israel must appoint a DIPLOMAT, rather than a politician as our next foreign minister,” and that “Israel needs a friendly, cooperative, rapid response PR team that will PROMPTLY supply helpful CREDIBLE information whenever needed about government, IDF or police actions that are liable to be criticized in the international media.”
I would prefer not to get ensnared in a discussion as to whether it is practicable in the current or foreseeable future political realities to expect that a plum political position such as foreign minister could be conferred on a non-political figure; or whether the problem with information provided by Israel is its promptness and credibility rather than the editorial prejudices of the major media channels, both domestic and foreign.
So while I might concede that such suggestions should not be dismissed out of hand as unfeasible or irrelevant, I have no doubt that even if implemented, they would have little more than marginal impact.
There is no quick fix for this prickly predicament. The abysmal situation we find ourselves in took years to develop.
It is the result of decades of gross negligence by both the political and the professional echelons responsible for the formulation and execution of the nation’s diplomatic strategy. It will take years to redress, and is far more a problem of overall structure, than of specific personalities.
System-wide failure
As such, it cannot be rectified by the appointment of this or that individual to the post of foreign minister and/or information minister – to be replaced after a maximum of a four-year tenure. It cannot be resolved merely by putting a more polished ex-post spin on events, or a more articulate after-the-fact presentation of recent incidents.
For what we are facing is nothing less than a deeply troubling system-wide failure of the entire complex of diplomatic “machinery,” allegedly designated to advance Israel’s cause abroad.
In his “How not to win friends and influence people” (Jerusalem Post, January 11), Barry Shaw fires off this caustic – but largely justified – condemnation of Israeli officialdom: “It is the total dereliction of duty, public diplomacy duty, at the heart of the decision-making process. The foreign office, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Government Spokesman’s Office, or the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs – all have proven themselves to be incapable of addressing the urgent need to present Israel’s position on leading issues, particularly the Palestinian issue.”
Regrettably, I find it difficult to dispute this withering accusation.
Comprehensive intellectual effort required
Indeed, combating the growing delegitimization of Israel requires a far greater, wide-ranging and concerted intellectual effort – much of which the government can only help facilitate but not execute, certainly not on its own.
A radical restructuring and revamping of Israeli diplomatic strategy, infrastructure and doctrine is called for. The requirements for such a metamorphosis go well beyond the individual appointment of personnel, or the efficiency of transmission of information to an innately antipathetic press.
The full elaboration of what is required – and the rationale as to why it is required – extend beyond the limits of a single opinion column. Accordingly, I will confine myself to a skeletal tour d’horizon of the principle parameters that such an enterprise must comprise.
Its underlying foundation must be a fundamental change in the perception of the role of public diplomacy in the strategic arsenal of the nation. As I have written in several columns, the function of diplomacy – particularly public diplomacy – is akin to the traditional function of the air force. For just as the classic role of the air force is to provide ground forces the necessary freedom of action to attain their objectives, so the classic role of diplomacy is to provide national policy- makers the freedom of action they require to attain the objectives of that policy.
Intellectual warriors, not slicker diplomats
Adoption of this perception of diplomacy as an operational arm of national strategy has inevitable operational consequences.
The first of these involves the realization that the effective conduct of strategic diplomacy cannot be left to official diplomats, for as soon will become clear, it requires activities which state representatives, bound by the formalities of protocol and the niceties of diplomatic etiquette, are unlikely to be able to undertake.
These are tasks that must be assumed by nongovernmental organizations, comprised of resolute and focused civil society elites, dedicated to the defense of their country and with the appropriate attributes and resources to engage its adversaries in intellectual combat, unfettered by the constraints that limit the freedom of response (and initiative) of the official organs of state.
It is these “intellectual warriors” who must comprise the front-line shock troops in the ongoing battle against Israel’s international delegitimization.
Intellectual warriors (cont.)
The second consequence relates to resources.
Winning a war requires a war chest. No matter how well formulated the message, and how intense the motivation of its conveyors, the impact will be limited to the size and range of the “megaphone” that civil society intellectual warriors have at their disposal. This clearly requires funding. Israel has been incredibly miserly in allotting resources for its public diplomacy efforts and for the fight against its delegitimization.
As I have pointed out in previous columns, this frugality is not due to a lack of resources. Were Israel to apportion a fraction of 1 percent of its GDP (around a quarter of a trillion dollars), for this purpose, this would amount to hundreds of millions of dollars that could be channeled to engage, inform and educate large swathes of the public who have fallen prey to its detractors’ defamatory deception. They could be channeled to help confront, curtail and counteract the unwarranted delegitimization of the Jewish state and the Zionist ideal.
Inexplicably, while foreign governments finance a myriad of NGOs dedicated to besmirching Israel’s reputation, the government of Israel extends virtually no support to NGOs seeking to defend it.
As this parsimony is unlikely to disappear in the near future, and until the government bureaucracy can be coaxed/convinced into amending its current self-obstructive budgetary priorities, Israel’s intellectual warriors will have to seek funding from like-minded private benefactors, who have the necessary insight – and foresight – to grasp the urgent imperatives of the hour.
Question of context
For the intellectual warrior, the primary challenge is not to change the way in which current events are reported but rather to change the context in which that reportage is conducted.
For a given incident will be interpreted entirely differently, depending on the context in which it is perceived. Thus, no matter what events are to be reported, it matters greatly whether Israel is portrayed as a beleaguered democracy, a bastion of civil liberties and democratic governance, valiantly defending itself against a sea of tyranny and theocracy, or as an avaricious expansionist rogue state, coveting the lands of others and trampling the rights of the defenseless.
Clearly, any civilian casualties resulting from IDF operations would be judged very differently, depending on which of these contexts apply: Regrettable but understandable “collateral damage,” in the former; unacceptable victims of colonial aggression, in the latter.
Changing the context in which Israel is perceived is a task of mammoth proportions – particularly in light of the decades of neglect that have passed since the dramatic transformation from its pre- 1967 status of a David-like underdog to its post-1967 status of a Goliath-like oppressor. It is a task that cannot be left to the country’s official diplomatic corps.
The ‘poodle-rottweiler’ syndrome
For international understanding of Israeli policy and IDF actions, Israel must portray its adversaries – particularly the Palestinians – as they really are.
Unless this is done, such policy and action may well appear excessive.
To employ a rather stark metaphor – and without wishing to impute canine qualities to humans of any kind, if one insists that one’s antagonists are “cuddly poodles” rather than “vicious rottweilers,” one cannot expect others to understand why “rottweiler” action is appropriate.
Clearly, however, Israeli diplomats cannot portray Palestinian society in its true light: as a cruel, brutal society where women are suppressed, gays are oppressed and political dissidents are repressed; a society where journalists are harassed, press freedom is trampled, political opponents are lynched, honor killings of women by their male relatives are endorsed or at least condoned, and homosexuals are hounded.
That must be left to civil society intellectual warriors.
Going for the jugular
Only civil society intellectual warriors can identify and articulate the raw truth as to the true origins of the delegitimization of Israel. Only they can “go for the jugular” and underscore the inconvenient fact that if the Palestinian narrative which portrays the Palestinians as an authentic national entity is acknowledged as legitimate, then all the aspirations, such as achieving Palestinians statehood, that arise from that narrative are legitimate. Accordingly, any policy that precludes the achievement of those aspirations will be perceived as illegitimate.
But – in the absence of wildly optimistic, and hence irresponsibly unrealistic, “best-case” assumptions – any policy that is designed to secure Israel’s minimal security requirements, will preclude the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. Consequently, any endeavor to realistically provide Israel with minimal security will be perceived as illegitimate.
The inevitable conclusion must therefore be that for Israel to secure conditions that adequately address its minimal security requirements, the Palestinian narrative, and the aspirations that flow from it, must be delegitimized.
This is something that only civil society elites can express and convey.
Israel’s greatest strategic challenge
Israel’s greatest strategic challenge, its gravest strategic failure and its grimmest strategic danger is the conduct – or rather misconduct – of its public diplomacy.
Unless new battalions of intellectual warriors are formed and mobilized, the challenge will go unanswered, the failure will remain unaddressed, and the danger will continue to intensify.
d. DERELICTION OF DUTY
Continued impotence and incompetence in the (mis)conduct of Israel’s public diplomacy is becoming not only strategic threat to the country but is beginning to imperil Jewish communities abroad.
Today I saw the Israeli [consul] to Canada being interviewed. I cringed. He was trying to explain how Israel could counter the negative propaganda. He not only was clueless, but almost incomprehensible. He said that Israel should ignore negative criticism because that would make the general public seem that Israel is too combative.
When asked by the interviewers why shouldn’t Israel assert its rights, like referring to the San Remo Convention, he demurred and said that would damage Israel’s image. I was aghast at his utter incompetence. This an official representative of Israel. This is who Israel sends to fight the propaganda war.
When asked by the interviewers why shouldn’t Israel assert its rights, like referring to the San Remo Convention, he demurred and said that would damage Israel’s image. I was aghast at his utter incompetence. This an official representative of Israel. This is who Israel sends to fight the propaganda war.
– Walter44, an exasperated Jerusalem Post talkbacker, October 1.
Sad but true; witnessed similar incompetence in Australia
– Rafi, a dismayed Post talkbacker, responding to exasperated Walter44
What good is having Apache helicopter gunships, or Merkava tanks, to defend your citizens against attack if you can’t even use them because the world thinks you’re always the aggressor?
– Shmuley Boteach, “Why Jews are so bad at PR,” The Jerusalem Post, January 7.
The ongoing debacle of the (mis)conduct of Israeli public diplomacy (PD) is emerging as one of the country’s greatest strategic failures and gravest strategic dangers.
It is not only endangering the nation’s security, it is imperiling the safety of Jewish communities across the globe.
Pervasive and pernicious
It is difficult to understate how pernicious and pervasive the consequences of this inexplicable fiasco of impotence and incompetence are. They permeate all walks of national life, corroding the very fabric that binds the Zionist enterprise together.
While I do not wish to downplay in any way the danger of the Iranian nuclear program, the dangers inherent in Israel’s abysmal PD performance outstrip virtually any of the other threats that confront the Jewish state as a Jewish state.
While the former is more tangibly kinetic, the latter, although admittedly less cataclysmic, is no less lethal. As will be seen a little later, it intensifies the menace emanating from Iran.
In many ways, it would be apt to liken the danger of the Iranian bomb to one of being run over by a truck, and the dangers inherent in Israel’s PD catastrophe to those of being afflicted by an HIV virus that destroys one’s immune system.
For the failure or – perhaps more accurately – the virtual absence, of Israeli PD strategy goes beyond the problem of what it is not doing for Israel in presenting its case and promoting its image. No less damaging is what it allows others to do to Israel in undermining its case and perverting its image.
Detrimental, disruptive and divisive
The consequences of the PD debacle are myriad. Here is a partial catalogue.
On the security level:
• It diminishes Israel’s deterrence posture.
• It facilitates demonization of the IDF and of Israel’s security services.
• It restricts the scope of actions that Israel can undertake to defend its citizens.
On the international level:
• It facilitates the vilification and hence delegitimization of Zionism, its ideals and goals.
• It facilitates the promotion of the accelerating BDS campaign against Israeli merchandise and institutions.
• It endangers Jewish communities across the globe – because of their imputed affiliation with a “reviled and loathsome” Israel.
On the policy-making level:
• It constricts policy-maker’s perceived freedom of action.
• It promotes an exaggerated sense of isolation and vulnerability, which results in poor, not infrequently disastrous policy choices.
• It leads to a sense of resignation as to the inevitability of acquiescence to Arab demands – no matter how perilous this might be.
On the domestic level:
• It undermines the morale of the population by promoting an unjustified sense of beleaguerment and isolation.
• It generates a dysfunctional and defeatist domestic discourse on national policy.
• It creates divisive and disruptive fissures in Israeli society that undermine the resilience/stamina of the nation.
All this merely acts to erode the faith in the justice of, and the imperative for, the maintenance of Jewish national independence – and hence, the will to sustain it.
In the ensuing paragraphs I will illustrate, elaborate on, and corroborate these far-reaching allegations.
Diminishing deterrence
The introductory excerpt from Shmuley Boteach’s Post column earlier this year succinctly encapsulates the malaise – some might say, paralysis – that Israel’s diplomatic failure has inflicted on Israel’s military.
In its last three military encounters – the 2006 Second Lebanon War and the Cast Lead and Pillar of Defense campaigns in Gaza – the IDF emerged un-victorious – at least on the strategic level. In each case, despite its massive superiority in manpower and firepower, it was unable to curtail the fighting ability of small, lightly armed militias, even after weeks of combat.
Following each of these campaigns, its adversaries, Hezbollah (in Lebanon) and Hamas (in Gaza), despite the damage inflicted on them, ended with its political stature enhanced and its arsenal more than replenished.
(True, both have been arguably weakened recently, but this was due to the internal upheavals in Syria and Egypt – events totally unconnected to the military clashes with Israel, whose eventual outcome is neither certain nor predictable.)
It would be a grave error to believe that the periods of calm that follow these military engagements reflect successful deterrence of Hezbollah/Hamas. Their will to fight remains undiminished – as the recent discovery of the strategic tunnel in the South clearly underscores.
It merely indicates that they have been forced to regroup, rearm and redeploy – and to wait, with greatly improved capabilities, for the next opportune moment.
Diminishing deterrence (cont.)
Bewailing Israel’s feeble public diplomacy, former minister Michael Eitan warned: “The results of the war in the media directly affect the results of the war in the field.”
He is absolutely correct. These recent highly unsatisfactory military outcomes were incurred not because Israel lacked the military prowess to achieve victory and rout its far more feeble foes. It was because of perceived political constraints that prevented the IDF from making full use of the operational options available to it. These constraints were, in large measure, due to the inefficacy of Israel’s PD performance.
As Prof. Eytan Gilboa, in his “Public Diplomacy: The Missing Component in Israel’s Foreign Policy,” aptly noted: “The lack of an adequate PD program has significantly affected Israel’s strategic outlook and freedom of action.” Echoing this sentiment in a piece written immediately after the Second Lebanon War (Summer 2006) on the critical importance of PD in war, former prime ministerial adviser Raanan Gissin lamented: This war is a symptom of the inability of Israel to prepare strategically with public diplomacy as a tool of war.
Israel’s adversaries are well aware of the efficacy of these political constraints. Since they bolster their belief that their actions will not be met with unacceptable severity, and embolden them with the confidence that their aggressive initiatives will not entail “disproportionate” consequences, these constraints gravely undermine Israeli deterrence.
The removal of these political constraints is precisely the function of diplomacy, a function which Israel’s diplomatic effort failed entirely to discharge.
Prescient prognosis
“Demonstrators cry ‘Nuke Israel’... at US anti-Israel rallies,” blared a headline in Haaretz.
The article continues: “Comparisons of Israel to Nazi Germany and signs depicting the Star of David as equal to the swastika have been a recurring feature at rallies in the United States.”
This example highlights another sinister consequence of Israel’s PD failure.
By allowing the ongoing international delegitimization/ demonization of Israel to continue unabated, this failure is contributing toward intensifying the threat from Iran. For not only does this serve to discredit – and hence stymie – Israeli efforts to rally the world into taking effective action against Teheran’s nuclear ambitions, but the portrayal of Israel as an increasingly delegitimized entity fosters the perception of it as an increasingly legitimate target.
In a remarkably prescient caveat, Eytan Gilboa, in his aforementioned article cautioned: “Any further neglect of PD would not only restrict Israel’s strategic options, it would be detrimental to its ability to survive in an increasingly intolerant and hostile world which thinks sacrificing Israel’s vital interests or even the state itself would be a small price to pay for ending the global confrontation between the West and Islamic fundamentalism.”
Sadly, this ominous forecast seems to be materializing before our very eyes.
Recently, The New York Times, in a piece titled “Netanyahu Takes a Lonely Stance Denouncing Iran,” attempted to denigrate the Israeli premier in his resolute opposition to Tehran’s nuclear program, describing him as “increasingly alone abroad and at home” and “out of step with a growing Western consensus toward reaching a diplomatic deal that would require compromise.”
This, together with the manifest eagerness of many in the West to succumb to the threadbare credibility of the charm offensive by the newly elected Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, are chillingly reminiscent of Gilboa’s warning that the world would consider “sacrificing Israel’s vital interests or even the state itself a small price for ending the global confrontation between the West and Islamic fundamentalism.”
Jeopardizing Jews
One of the gravest consequences of Israel’s virtual abdication from the public diplomacy front is the effect this is having on Jewish communities across the world, and on the personal safety of Jews in the Diaspora. Perversely, instead of being a protective shield for Jews, it is exposing them to dangers by making them a focus of anti-Israeli hostility because of their imputed affiliation with the mendaciously maligned Jewish state.
A recent Post editorial (October 17) quoted a 2011 study of public opinion across seven EU countries, which found that “more than 40 percent of citizens 16 years and older... agree with the statement that Israel is carrying out ‘a war of extermination’ against Palestinians.”
As the editorial points out, “an astounding number of Europeans feel a tremendous amount of opprobrium for anything connected to Israel... And since visibly identifiable Jews are connected with Israel,” this anti-Israel animosity translates into anti-Jewish animosity.
From Scandinavia through Scotland and Spain to South Africa, throughout France and Hungary and across campuses in North America, Jews are being besieged and harassed largely because Israel has failed to convey its eminently conveyable case to the world. It has allowed itself to be portrayed as a dangerous pariah – and any association with it carries a price.
This is vividly illustrated by the fate of Sweden’s Jewry – particularly in the city of Malmo.
Consider the following excerpt from a report by Haaretz: “[An] Israel solidarity demonstration in central Malmo ended in violence as participants were pelted with eggs, bottles and fire crackers.... [Mayor Ilmar] Reepalu suggested Malmo’s Jews could avoid anti- Semitism by condemning Israeli policy.”
The message is clear: Disavow Israel, or pay the price.
Bordering on betrayal
This is a far from exhaustive analysis of the problems precipitated by Israel’s abandonment of the public-diplomacy front. It has been principally a diagnosis for a malaise which has a remedy. It is a remedy that requires resolve, resources and resourcefulness.
The failure of Israeli leadership to mobilize these elements comprises a grave dereliction of duty, bordering on betrayal of Israelis and of Jews in the Diaspora.
The claim that because of the prevalence of visceral anti-Semitism in the world, “no amount of PR can counteract anti-Israeli acrimony,” is canard that must be summarily dismissed.
Defeatism and dereliction go hand in hand. After all, a necessary condition to win a battle is to participate in it. With regard to public diplomacy – this is something Israel has refrained from doing with any efficacy.
Subject to breaking news, I will take up the challenge of comprising a “to-do” list in next week’s column, to be tentatively titled “If I were prime minister…”
*****
David Suissa is President of Tribe Media/Jewish Journal, where he has been writing a weekly column on the Jewish world since 2006. In 2015, he was awarded first prize for "Editorial Excellence" by the American Jewish Press Association. Prior to Tribe Media, David was founder and CEO of Suissa Miller Advertising, a marketing firm named “Agency of the Year” by USA Today. He sold his company in 2006 to devote himself full time to his first passion: Israel and the Jewish world. David was born in Casablanca, Morocco, grew up in Montreal, and now lives in Los Angeles with his five children.
Martin Sherman is a hard man to figure out. Is he a street-smart Zionist or a liberal academic? Sherman, who is just finishing his stint as a Schusterman Visiting Scholar of Israel Studies at University of Southern California and Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion (HUC-JIR), looks like your classic scholar. He has a doctoral degree in political science and international relations from Tel Aviv University, where he has been teaching since the late 1980s.
But dig a little and you’ll see some weird stuff.
For one thing, he speaks in clear, simple English. You won’t hear any obscure academic jargon designed to impress you from this guy.
But the thing that makes him really weird — and even a little threatening to some of his liberal colleagues — is that he has found a scholarly way of challenging something you never challenge in polite company: the two-state solution.
That’s right, the man doesn’t believe in that hard-rock truism of international discourse: the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In today’s world, that’s like saying you don’t believe in feeding hungry babies.
Even for skeptics like me, the furthest we would go is say that a two-state solution is not realistic at the moment; never that it is not desirable.
Sherman makes the case not only that it is not desirable, but that it is impossible.
In a 60-minute PowerPoint presentation that never mentions God, he starts by quoting Sherlock Holmes: “When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”
Why is a two-state solution impossible? He offers an in-depth analysis centered on this simple question: How can anyone guarantee that a Palestinian peacemaker won’t be toppled and that a radical terrorist regime won’t take his place? And with 80 percent of Israel’s population within striking distance of terrorist rockets from the West Bank, who would be willing to take that risk?
To buttress his case, he pulls old quotes from famous peacemakers like Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin and Yossi Beilin. There’s not a whiff of right-wing ideology in his presentation. In fact, there’s no ideology at all.
The man bludgeons you with facts, charts, polls, quotes, satellite photos, analyses and logic — lots of logic.
Usually, when a Jew makes a case against the two-state solution, it’s either a right-wing ideologue quoting the Bible or a post-Zionist who believes in “one state for all its citizens.” But a soft-spoken, secular academic who’s a defender of liberal values like freedom of speech, abortion and gay rights? Like I said, weird.
Sherman, who gave me a private viewing of his presentation last week, eventually has to deal with this knotty question: If a Palestinian state is impossible, then what’s the future? An Israeli state without a Jewish majority? What about Palestinian national aspirations?
Again, he uses facts and logic to address every question. He uses the U.N. definition of refugees to reframe the refugee problem. He quotes Palestinian polls showing the absence of enthusiasm for a Palestinian state, contrary to conventional wisdom. He promotes citizenship rights for Palestinians already living in Arab countries, and generous incentives to alleviate the refugee problem.
What is needed, he says, is a new mindset that will “de-politicize the context from the political to the humanitarian.” He says the whole debate has been hijacked by “culturally biased truisms rather than scientifically based truths.”
He doesn’t pretend that his proposal is a perfect solution; only that it’s better than the current path, which he says has “failed history” and has zero probablility of success.
In fact, his whole argument lives or dies on whether you buy into his premise that a two-state solution is impossible. If you buy into it, you will be more open to his so-called humanitarian approach and the many ideas that follow.
Did I buy into it? It’s true that his presentation was compelling, but I don’t have the chutzpah to stand alone and say that a two-state solution is impossible or undesirable. I still need to get my kids married.
But whether one buys into his case or not, it’s hard to conclude that he should be shut out of the debate. He showed me an e-mail from a prominent Reform rabbi on the West Coast who is a major proponent of the two-state solution, and who was quite taken by Sherman’s presentation.
Since I love a good debate, I’d love to see what would happen if his presentation started to spread. This newspaper has already published one of his articles on the subject. Now Sherman wants to get his message out to places like The New York Times and other mainstream media, as well as to opinion leaders and policy makers.
His goal is to raise $5 million to establish at Tel Aviv University an “alternate center of academic wisdom based on factual correctness, not political correctness.” Because he would have the credibility of being nestled in a leftist institution, he says such a center could really reframe the debate on the peace process.
If ever there were long odds on anything, this would be it. He does have a couple of things going for him, though, besides his deep knowledge and an ability to speak clearly.
One, the conventional approach to peacemaking keeps failing. And two, his kids are already married.
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