Iran’s History of Cheating Iran’s long history of cheating on its international nuclear commitments raises doubts that it will comply with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). From violations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), to non-compliance with United Nations SECURITY Council resolutions, Iran has repeatedly failed to fulfill its obligations.    Iran has repeatedly violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran committed not to undertake nuclear-weapons related activities But in direct violation of the NPT, Iran has carried out extensive nuclear work with no civilian purpose, including tests on nuclear triggers and technology used to simulate nuclear explosions, ACCORDING to a Nov. 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report. Iran committed not to seek or receive any ASSISTANCE that could be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. But in violation of the NPT, it clandestinely sought and received substantial assistance in the development of key technologies needed to produce nuclear weapons, as confessed to the IAEA in 2004. Iran committed to provide design information to the IAEA for any new nuclear facilities “as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced…” But in violation of the NPT, it has repeatedly built secret nuclear sites, including the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom. Iran only notified the IAEA about Natanz in 2002 and Qom in 2009, after they were already revealed to the press. Iran committed to report the import of nuclear material and place the material under IAEA safeguards. But in violation of the NPT, in 1991 Iran clandestinely imported uranium from China without declaring it to the IAEA. Iran committed to provide the IAEA with information “concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards…and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material.” But in violation of the NPT, Iran has since acknowledged that BEGINNING in the early 1990s, it carried out uranium conversion experiments without notifying the IAEA and allowing for monitoring. Iran has not complied with United Nations SECURITY Council Resolutions.  In violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 and subsequent resolutions, Iran CONTINUALLY denied IAEA inspectors access to the Arak heavy water reactor. In violation of Resolution 1737 and subsequent resolutions, Iran refused inspectors access to documents, individuals and locations needed to carry out their duties. And it refuses to grant IAEA inspectors access to the Parchin military facility where work on nuclear explosives is believed to have been conducted. In violation of Resolution 1737 and subsequent resolutions, Iran enriched uranium and acquired enough low-enriched uranium that—if further processed—would be sufficient to build at least eight nuclear weapons. In violation of Resolution 1737 and subsequent resolutions, Iran failed to ratify the NPT’s Additional Protocol and refused to abide by its provisions, including unfettered no-notice nuclear inspections and the prompt delivery of design information for new facilities. In violation of Resolution 1737 and subsequent resolutions, Iran CONTINUED construction of a heavy water reactor at Arak. In violation of Resolution 1737 and subsequent resolutions, Iran enriched uranium and acquired enough low-enriched uranium that—if further processed—would be sufficient to build at least eight nuclear weapons. In violation of Resolution 1929, Iran developed an operational arsenal of ballistic missiles with constantly increasing ranges. Iran CONTINUES to test ballistic missiles and undertake banned research and development ACTIVITIES, including for intercontinental ballistic missiles, according to reports by the U.N. Panel of Experts on Iran. In violation of Resolution 1747, Iran continues to export weapons to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah, Hamas and other proxies. Since the July announcement of the JCPOA, Kuwait and Bahrain have intercepted Iranian arms shipments. Iran has violated the Joint Plan of Action and IAEA Requirements. In violation of the Nov. 2013 Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), the IAEA caught Iran feeding uranium into a new, advanced IR-5 centrifuge. In violation of the JPOA, Iran failed to meet its requirement to oxidize its increased production of low enriched uranium. Iran was required by multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions to cooperate with IAEA requests regarding its nuclear PROGRAM. In violation of these requirements, Iran repeatedly refused to provide access to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA. In May 2014, Iran AGREED to implement five practical measures with the IAEA by Aug. 2014. Iran met the deadline for just one of the measures. Further, Iran refused the IAEA’s request to propose new practical measures to resolve outstanding issues.