Cuba’s Backtracking Is the Rule, Not the Exception

Michael Rubin  1-7-15

https://www.commentarymagazine.com/2015/01/07/cubas-backtracking-rule-not-exception/

 The logic behind President Barack Obama’s outreach to Cuba is that it is easier to address problems between countries ranging from terrorism to human-rights violations when governments talk directly and countries maintain normal relations. That claim is already in doubt given Cuba’s apparent backsliding on its reported commitment to release 53 prisoners. If Cuban President Raúl Castro calculated that once the United States began a diplomatic process, it would be loath to end it and forfeit promised trade just because Cuba had backtracked on its commitments, he would be right.

Jonathan Tobin is correct to observe that totalitarianism trumps capitalist engagement. The simple fact is that “critical engagement”—diplomacy geared to bring rogues in from the cold and simultaneously address tough issues they are reticent to address—has seldom if ever worked. Former German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel first conceptualized critical engagement in the context of Iran. On May 18, 1992, he became German foreign minister, trumpeting human rights as his top priority. At the same time, the German government sought to expand trade with the Islamic Republic. While the U.S. government promoted a policy of “Dual Containment,” European governments argued that Iran was simply too important to isolate.

On December 12, 1992, the European Union endorsed Berlin’s proposed “critical dialogue,” in which greater European trade with Iran would be correlated toward Iranian improvements on human rights and Tehran’s greater conformity with international norms of behavior. The European Council declared, “The European Council reaffirms its belief that a dialogue should be maintained with the Iranian Government. This should be a critical dialogue which reflects concern about Iranian behavior and calls for improvement in a number of areas, particularly human rights, the death sentence pronounced by a Fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini against the author Salman Rushdie, which is contrary to international law, and terrorism.” The Council continued, “Improvement in these areas will be important in determining the extent to which closer relations and confidence can be developed.” Weapons of mass destruction received subsequent mention. European officials assumed that increasing trade, meanwhile, would strengthen the hands of pragmatists against more hardline elements.

European officials saw the designation of “critical” as important because it emphasized that the engagement would tackle contentious issues. Iranian officials appear never to have taken the new approach to heart. Over subsequent years, Iranian authorities arrested German citizens in Iran, more often as bargaining chips to influence negotiations than on any evidence-based charges. Initially, Kinkel and his cohorts continued to pay lip service to human rights, but as Iranian diplomats signaled Tehran’s annoyance and suggested further queries could impact commercial ties, Kinkel backed off. By 1995, German exports to Iran had increased to $1.4 billion, more than twice the level of any other country.

Meanwhile, European Commissioner Hans van der Broek met Rushdie to assure him that Iranian respect for human rights, the lifting of the fatwa, and greater respect inside Iran for international law would be preconditions for the establishment of closer EU-Iran ties. They weren’t. The EU-Iran rapprochement continued, even without progress on Rushdie’s case. The following year, the EU sought again to have the fatwa lifted but failed to win written Iranian assurances and, in 1995, Iranian Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi reiterated that Tehran would not lift the call for Rushdie’s murder.

European trade meanwhile flourished. By 1996, economic and trade relations between the European Union and the Islamic Republic reached $29 billion. With trade in the balance, European leaders dropped any pretense of demanding improvement on critical issues. When, amidst low oil prices, the German government had the opportunity to utilize its economic leverage to force concessions on issues of concern, the German government and German banks declined and instead agreed to reschedule Iran’s debt. European governments followed suit, rescheduling $12 billion in credit.

While Iranian President Mohammad Khatami entered office in 1997, executions increased alongside trade. Rushdie remained under constant threat: even after Iranian diplomats promised to waive the execution order so as to enable the British government to return their ambassador, the Iranian regime simply re-imposed the death sentence the following day. Iran’s military nuclear program continued apace. Indeed, reformists brag that they deserve credit for the nuclear program which advanced against the backdrop of the European and subsequent Clinton administration initiatives.

The same held true with Clinton-era American diplomacy toward the Taliban. Once diplomats began their initiative, no matter how much the Taliban reneged on agreements and promises, there was no reversing the process–that is, until nearly 3,000 American lost their lives. And the idea that money can buy responsibility has been behind the logic of aid to the Palestinian Authority and Gaza Strip. But even with the Palestinians receiving more per capita than any other people on earth, radicalism and terrorism has only increased.

Critical engagement—and the belief it never hurts to talk to enemies—has been a diplomatic mantra for decades. But such diplomacy has never reformed an adversary’s behavior; it has simply let them off the hook. Rogues know talk of human rights is simply the West posturing to its own domestic audience. Until Washington or other Western countries show a real willingness to walk away from the table and re-impose and augment sanctions when a country backtracks from its commitments, rogues will calculate correctly they can get away with murder, and get paid for it.