Will Iran Get a Bomb—

Or Be Bombed Itself—This Year?

EXTRACTS (AND MY COMMENTS )…

 The Atlantic  August 1, 2013

Author: Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School 

Placing a bet on today's biggest foreign policy issue

"Will Iran Get a Bomb—Or Be Bombed Itself—This Year? "is an excellent paper. I appreciate your calling it to my attention. Graham Allison  estimates the probability of "yes" by the end of 2013 is slightly less than 50%. The scenario that I sent you to evaluate postulates a crisis in 2014.

 Allison does an excellent job.  Please note that his paper was delivered at Aspen and was published in the Atlantic. Thus,this represents the maximum position of those who  urge President Obama to restrain Israel and that negotiations  with Iran be given more time and "yet another chance".

 The operational intelligence people in Israel are not opposed to countering the  Iranian capability. The public appearances of former intelligence and operating leaders is not unusual since they have been well represented in those opposing the attack on the Iraqi reactor, those opposing the attack on the Syrian reactor, and those opposing Israel's current strikes into Syria to neutralize weapons that were destined for Hezbollah. What they and US planners do is to specify a maximum mission to emphasize its difficulty, its high "probability of failure",both short-term and long-term and it's possible negative blowback consequences.

I have examined and re-structured Allison's paper in order to highlight some of his points for our discussion.

Relating  to our possible  activities, Allison's paper shows that the probability of an unwanted and unneeded conflict is high and  that time is short to prevent it. AS I HAVE TOLD YOU, THE CLOCK IS TICKING MORE RAPIDLY AND THE BALL IS IN YOUR COURT. 

Full text of this publication is available at: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/will-iran-get-a-bomb-or
-be-bombed-this-year/278253/

GA:That Iran's nuclear challenge poses the most urgent threat to peace and security today is widely agreed across the national security community.

There can be no question whatsoever that in 2013 Iran could get a bomb; there is also no question that Iran could be bombed. Both are real possibilities; either could occur without violating any laws of science and engineering or observed political behavior. But my best judgment is that in 2013 Iran will not get a bomb, and Iran will not be bombed.To be precise, I am prepared to bet $51 of my money against $49 of those who want to bet that by December 31, 2013, Iran will either have a nuclear weapon or have been the target of a major bombing attack.

 

My conclusion is not meant as a counsel of complacency. Anyone who believes that there is a 20 percent chance that Iran could either get a bomb or be bombed within the next year should recognize that the consequences of either outcome drive this issue to the top of the foreign policy agenda, not only for Israel but for the United States. 

HL: When I query groups they regard a 10% probability as being extremely risky. Here,GA limits his prediction to 2013 (next 6 months) and sets the odds at near 50-50.

GA: When will Iran get a nuclear weapon?

My unambiguous answer is: it depends. Specifically, it depends on 1) Iran's decision to do so; 2) the path Iran chooses to a bomb; 3) the obstacles Iran faces along each path to a bomb; and 4) the costs and benefits to Iran of acquiring a bomb versus stopping at a base camp on the path to a bomb. 

HL: This is not the best formulation of the question. The concern is  when will Iran reach a point (at which it might stop) where it could make a breakthrough run to achieve nuclear capability before it can be detected AND stopped? Iran  plans to add additional and more efficient centrifuges. In the past, US detection of Iran's facilities was delayed. There is no reason why the centrifuges cannot be placed in existing facilities.

GA:On the first point, I agree with the assessment of the U.S. intelligence community, as stated by Director of National Intelligence Clapper in March 2013: "We assess Iran is developing nuclear capabilities ... We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons."

Where does Iran stand on the road to a nuclear bomb?

As a technical fact,it has done 90 percent of the work required to produce the highly enriched uranium (HEU) needed for an explodable nuclear bomb. In a football metaphor, Iran has marched down the field into our red zone and now stands just 10 yards away from our goal line.

On the current path, using the known facilities, when is the earliest that Iran could get a nuclear bomb?

Today, Iran has accumulated seven bombs' worth of low- and medium-enriched uranium. Today, Iran is operating more than 10,000 centrifuges, producing an additional 230 kilograms of LEU and 15 kilograms of MEU monthly. When it brings all of its installed centrifuges into operation, it will triple its MEU production rate. It has also announced the installation of several thousand more advanced centrifuges, at least three times more efficient than the current generation.

From where it stands today, using known LEU or MEU at known facilities, Iran would require several months to build a bomb.   From today my best judgment is that it would take Iran at least one to two months to produce the material for its first bomb, using its declared facilities, and at least another month to fabricate this material into a weapon.

The more important related question is: could Iran produce enough HEU for its first bomb using its known facilities before the U.S. discovered it? U.S. intelligence believes that the answer is clearly no. IAEA inspectors visit these facilities every week or two. Moreover, from press reports, it is evident that they are not governments' only source of information about Iran's program. The U.S. would know about diversion of material or operation of facilities to produce HEU well before that effort was completed. 

As the U.S. Director of National Intelligence noted in March 2013, they "could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of HEU before this activity is discovered." As long as this is the case, the risk of a sudden, undetected "break out" to the bomb is low.

HL: The US intelligence community claimed to have very complete and specific knowledge concerning the location of the Syrian chemical weapons storage facilities. Subsequently, the US military claimed ,when they were  pressed to present plans to neutralize and/or control these facilities ,that they ,in fact, were not sure that they had sufficient  awareness to do so. Their history with the Syrian nuclear reactor does not give the US and/or Israel any basis for confidence in their knowledge and/or in their willingness to acknowledge the actual developing situation.

GA: How else might Iran get the bomb in 2013?

Knowing that that any attempt to "break out" to a bomb using its declared facilities would (HL: might) be discovered and interrupted decisively by the U.S. or Israel, Iran's leaders are certain to have considered alternatives. The next path they must have considered is to "sneak out" using secret, undeclared facilities.

 Iran's current declared enrichment facilities were previously secret -- until they were exposed by foreign intelligence services.

(HL: Inside opponents of the regime AND Israeli intelligence which for a long time was rejected by the US.)  

GA: Had they not been discovered, one or both of them could already have produced the HEU for Iran's first bomb.

(HL: What does that say about US intelligence, who for many years claimed that Iran had discontinued it's nuclear development program?The Iranians practiced watchful waiting. Some of their activities were closed down because they had succeeded in their objectives. Others were closed down since they were perceived to be  dead ends. Others were reoriented. This was a “Wait and See" period. The US intelligence  assessment of 2003 bailed them out  since it reported that they had actually terminated their nuclear development program been rather than just taking a pause.)

GA:Many argue that Tehran must be wary of constructing further secret facilities, fearing that it could be caught by foreign intelligence services yet again. But it is certainly possible that they have done so and thus have an additional path to the bomb.

 As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously said, North Korea has demonstrated its readiness to "sell anything they have to anybody who has the cash to buy it." Unfortunately, North Korea has already established a precedent for such a deal. It sold Syria a plutonium-producing Yongbyon-style reactor that would by now have produced enough plutonium for Syria's first bomb -- if Israel had not bombed it in 2007. If the Iranian Supreme Leader concluded that nuclear weapons were the only way to guarantee the survival of his regime, buying a bomb for a billion dollars could be an attractive bargain.

 Is a deal that stops Iran short of a bomb possible? Is it possible to identify the terms of a deal that would be better for both Iran and the United States than either attacking Iran or acquiescing in an Iranian bomb?

My answer is unambiguously yes.

 Potential terms of an agreement (and include credible threats to impose catastrophic costs on Iran if the agreement were violated.) :cap all enrichment at 5 percent; stop expansion of facilities for enriching to 20 percent; swap current materials enriched to 20 percent for fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR); provide maximum transparency.

HL: These terms have been rejected. Iran has been demanding relaxation of sanctions as a precondition. What they will accept as part of a deal, and live up to is a matter of great speculation.  Professor Meshkati, what is your opinion on this matter?

 When will we come to the crossroad at which a president will be forced to choose between attacking and acquiescing?

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu will continue to press for an early decision, arguing that sanctions are ineffective and only give Iran more time to expand its nuclear program. Expect President Obama, key members of the Israeli national security establishment, and others to continue arguing that sanctions and covert actions must be allowed more time to work, and that new sanctions and covert actions will be even more effective.

The  truth is that there will be little material change in the  risks Israel faces from Iran in the near term if Iran continues its current, careful, cautious, deliberate but steady advance toward the nuclear goal line. Nor will there be significant material change in the impact Israeli airstrikes can have on Iran's nuclear facilities in the months between today and December 31, 2013.

Iran's long-delayed reactor at Arak may become operational in late 2014, providing Iran a plutonium path to a bomb. Once it is loaded with fuel, which on the announced schedule will be in early 2014, an attack on the reactor would spread radioactive materials. Iran's accumulated stockpile of MEU and deployment of advanced centrifuges will also continue shortening the timeline for a dash to a bomb. Nonetheless, neither is likely to have material consequences in 2013 for the calculus of risk described earlier.

This fall, if and when negotiations fail to produce a breakthrough, expect Netanyahu to reject the Obama administration's (and much of his own security establishment's) arguments and press vigorously for a U.S. attack, threatening to act unilaterally otherwise. At that point, unless a major diplomatic initiative shows promise, I predict that there will be a more intense exploration of options short of attack for slowing or stopping Iran's nuclear progress. 

What would trigger an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities?

For perspective, recall Prime Minister Menachem Begin's decision to attack Iraq's nuclear facility at Osirak in 1981. In that case, the principal trigger was not a change in the facts on the ground in Iraq, but Begin's fear that he would no longer be Prime Minister. He believed that he would be succeeded by Shimon Peres, and that Peres would not have what it took to do what was required, when it was necessary. The runner-up in the last Israeli election, Yair Lapid, has already declared that he will be the next Prime Minister. In assessing prospects of an Israeli attack, power shifts in Netanyahu's cabinet will be more important than the latest IAEA report.

Were the U.S. to discover unambiguous evidence that Iran had begun breaking out on a timetable that could be stopped by an American attack, an attack would be likely.

 (HL:Ambiguity is a tool of the US intelligence community  and the military community when they want to drag their feet. Thus, I would expect ,based upon past performance, that even ironclad evidence would be held up by some as being ambiguous. For example ,the Syrian nuclear reactor.) 

GA: A more likely trigger of U.S. military action against Iran would be an Israeli airstrike prompting an Iranian response that threatened U.S. interests, including the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz or Saudi Arabia itself. The U.S. has made clear to the Supreme Leader that any attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz would cross a "red line" and invite an American military response.