SAYING GOODBYE TO THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND WELCOMING TRUMP'S …Out with the old, in with the new

 IDF Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror -1-13-17

http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=39549

President Barack Obama eroded the U.S.'s superpower status and is leaving behind a far more dangerous world than the one he inherited * A Trump administration gives Israel reason to be optimistic, although we must remember he is a very shrewd businessman.

We cannot help but admire the American public, which eight years ago elected Barack Obama as the United States' first African-American president. The elation in the streets in New York City, where I was when he was sworn in, reflected the change American society had undergone, and the joy there was genuine.

Obama assumed office with a very solid worldview. He believed many of the challenges the U.S. was facing globally stemmed from its forceful conduct and its ability to impose its will on other nations, and that many of the failures the U.S. had experienced in the international theater stemmed from the fact that it did not try to improve ties with its adversaries.

This drove him to visit the Middle East -- though he skipped Israel -- in 2009 and give his famous Cairo speech. He believed addressing the people from the heart would be met in kind. This was also the logic that drove his attempt to promote a new rapport with Russia.

Eight years later, it is hard to say the world has repaid Obama in kind. The world is not a better, more democratic place, nor does it favor the U.S. in any way. This is especially true in the Middle East, but the sentiment is shared elsewhere as well. Moreover, the U.S. rollback on its role in different regions had only made its allies wary of their aggressive neighbors. So much so, that in some countries, there has been talk of replacing the dwindling American nuclear umbrella -- by which the U.S., as a nuclear power, guarantees the protection of its non-nuclear allies -- with independent atomic abilities. Should that become reality, it would spell a horrific nuclear race.

Obama is leaving behind a world far more dangerous than the one with which he was entrusted as the leader of the most powerful country in the world -- a title he managed to seriously compromise.

A bumpy road

As far as Israel-U.S. relations go, the eight-year Obama administration has painted a complex picture.

On the one hand, Israel enjoyed a sympathetic ear with regard to its security needs. The landmark, $38 billion defense aid package signed with the U.S., and the fact that Israel, of all nations, was the first to receive the state of the art F-35 fighter jet, speaks to the American commitment to the Jewish state's security for decades to come.

The relationship between the Israeli and American intelligence agencies are excellent, and given the system of government in the U.S. that would not be possible without direction from the White House. Israel has also received vital U.S. backing in the international arena more than once.

Still, Washington and Jerusalem were at odds on four important issues:

The first issue was nuclear nonproliferation: In 2010, the administration failed to keep its promise to Israel and gave in to Arab demands for supervision of Israel's alleged nuclear capabilities. This was done as part of the U.S.'s efforts to maintain a consensus in that year's nuclear nonproliferation conference in Vienna.

The Americans may not have explicitly admitted that they broke a promise to Israel with this regard, but they understood it was perceived that way by Israel and the world, and judging from the limited foreign reports on the issue, Israel's complaints were justified.

Later on, the U.S. acted to help Israel overcome the difficulties incurred as a result of that mistake, but the "dent" left by that blatant breach of promise has left its mark on Israeli consciousness, even if its overall effect had dimmed over time.

The second issue is the settlement enterprise: The outgoing administration turned settlement construction in Judea and Samaria into the key issue with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process -- nothing less than an obsession, and the issue by which any progress will rise or fall.

Washington refrained from pressuring Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in any way, even when he failed to agree to the 2014 U.S. framework to reignite the talks. The U.S. deemed Abbas too politically weak to pressure, while any Israeli construction, in Judea and Samaria or Jerusalem, was denounced as an obstacle to peace. This is why the administration probably lost an opportunity of historic proportions to advance the peace talks, while the Israeli government -- a Likud government -- was more willing than ever to promote it.

The dissonance in the administration's responses was so jarring that it eroded the effectiveness of U.S. condemnation, as the majority of the Israeli public, and some around the world, perceived it to be one-sided, unjust and unwise. Moreover, the way in which the Obama administration handled the issue of settlements made Abbas climb up a very tall tree, from which it would be hard for him to climb down toward future negotiations.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 2334 denouncing the settlement enterprise, passed in the last month of Obama's presidency, has only made things worse, and it is likely to stall negotiations further. It seems as if the outgoing president decided to hinder his successor as much as possible, even at the expense of an interest he allegedly wanted to promote. For those seeking to promote the peace talks, Resolution 2334 is counterproductive. If anything, it will be remembered as a low point, the "revenge" of an administration purporting to be analytical and calculated.

Outgoing Secretary of State John Kerry's Middle East vision speech, warning that Israel's settlement policies placed the two-state solution in "serious jeopardy," only exacerbated the feeling that the administration's obsession with the issue has lost all proportion, to the point of clouding common sense.

The third issue of discord between Jerusalem and Washington was the Iranian nuclear program. Some would say this disagreement culminated in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's speech to Congress in March 2015 -- perceived as an affront to Obama on his own turf -- but truth be told, the crisis was of the administration's making.

Contrary to how things are handled between allies, the White House made a conscious choice to deceive Israel and conceal the fact it was holding intensive nuclear negotiations with Iran -- an issue directly speaking to the very existence of the State of Israel.

This move was especially grating as it involved a dramatic shift in U.S. policy, which resulted in a very bad deal. Even those who believe the deal is solid have a hard time justifying the winding road walked by the U.S. administration to reach it -- even more so when some top officials within the administration itself thought it was wrong to hide the talks from Israel.

Choosing this path cost the U.S. Israel's trust, good will and, to an extent, the professional assistance Israel could have offered, which in turn could have reduced the scope of error inherent in the agreement. The American claim that things were kept a secret for fear of a leak on the Israeli side does not hold water, as nothing had been linked from the intimate Israel-U.S. talks on the issue prior to the U.S.'s deviation off course.

The new reality presented by the administration required Netanyahu to outline Israel's position in the clearest possible way, especially before the American public, which is Israel's most important friend. Israel's existence allows for issues pertaining to the fate of the Jewish people to be stated out loud, and doing so in the most prominent seats of power is the right thing to do. As Kerry himself said, friends must tell each other the truth.

Netanyahu had to consider that the bad deal inked between world powers and Iran may one day require Israel to use force to stop the Islamic republic's nuclear program from developing possible military dimensions, and he had to lay the moral groundwork that would justify such potential extreme measures.

This need stemmed from the change in U.S. policy, which went from demanding Iran relinquish any nuclear ability, to deferring the development of such abilities by 15 years at most, and allowing Iran to continue developing the next generation of centrifuges and missiles uninterrupted.

Top U.S. officials stress that the quality of defense ties is proof of the Obama administration's strong support of Israel, but to the president's opponents, this sounds more like an effort to justify undercutting Israel on the Palestinian issue and Iran's nuclear program.

The fourth issue at odds is the chaos in the Middle East: This was particularly evident after the 2011 ousting of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, when the Obama administration favored the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi as the representative of authentic sentiments among the Egyptian people, over the military's countercoup.

Israel preferred Egypt not be ruled by the radical ideology propagated by the Muslim Brotherhood, even of the alternative was Gen. Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, who as president maintains an iron grip on Egypt. So here, the lack of consensus between Washington and Jerusalem over the dangers of political Islam was at the heart of the dispute between the two.

The American approach is ideological, and it basically refuses to recognize that radical Islam is one of the authentic sides of Islam. This is why even the term "Islamic terrorism" has been stricken from the politically correct vocabulary used by Washington during the Obama administration.

Pursue a breakthrough

As far as one is able to understand the new administration's positions on these issues, it is clear that with regard to settlement construction and Iran's nuclear program, Israel is likely to find a far more sympathetic ear.

Many of Trump's advisers understand that it is not the settlement enterprise that has prevented Abbas from resuming negotiations with Israel, and therefore there is no point in locking horns over an issue of little practical importance. Instead, efforts should focus on whatever measures that could reignite the peace talks -- if that is even possible. As they see it, Abbas will have to walk the walk, not just talk the talk; and he will have to take concrete steps, from halting the Palestinian Authority's financial support of terrorists' families, to eliminating the incitement encouraged by Ramallah.

In this context, it is very important that Trump fulfills his campaign promise to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This would be a clear signal of the U.S.'s commitment to Israel, and recognition of Jerusalem -- or its west side at least -- as its capital. After the outgoing administration's stunt at the Security Council and Kerry's settlement speech, the decision to move the U.S. Embassy to the Israeli capital carries even greater importance.

As for Iran, it seems many in the incoming administration believe the nuclear deal is as bad for the United States as it is for Israel, so it is expected to pursue three paths of action: exhausting measures outside the framework of the agreement, such as imposing sanctions on the Iranian missile program and over the fact that it supports terrorism; holding Tehran to the letter of the agreement far more adamantly than before; and collaborating with Israel on exploring options by which Iran would be unable to pursue nuclear weapons even after the deal elapses, even if that means reopening the deal.

For the sake of Israel-U.S. relations, it is not up to Israel to push for the annulment of the poor Iran deal the outgoing president had committed to -- the U.S. must do so to serve its own interests.

Moreover, Iran is a dynamic force in the Middle East, one in the midst of the process of cultivating its control over an axis stretching from Tehran to Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut. Unless it is stopped, most of the Arab nations in the region, east of the Mediterranean Sea, will fall under Iran's influence in one way or another.

This would be a historic change that would seriously undermine the U.S.'s traditional allies, pushing many Sunnis into Islamic State-style radicalism. This is another issue where collaboration between the U.S. and Israel would be key, and it could involve the Sunni Arab states seeking regional stability. It may even be possible to pursue a more far-reaching move that would see the Palestinians enter negotiations as well.

As a guiding principle, ties between Israel and the new U.S. administration will have to be based on Israel-U.S. relations dating back decades, and the two will have to think and devise what new areas of collaboration would prove most beneficial for both.

Understandings would have to be reached to bring about a breakthrough in the ties between the two countries, and the cyber sphere is likely to one area in which such understandings are reached. This will not be the only area, of course, but Israel should focus its efforts on improving the issues most important to it, and refrain from scattering its interests.

It is generally believed that once in office, Trump will break the rules, abandon politically correct practices, and act from his gut, in stark contrast to his predecessor. Last month demonstrated that the outgoing president was not about following emotion rather than logic. For now -- although it is too soon to judge -- the incoming president's instincts seem more Israel-friendly, but we would be wise to remember that he is also a shrewd businessman.

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror is a distinguished fellow at JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy. He is also the Greg and Anne Rosshandler Senior Fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and former national security advisor to the Prime Minister of Israel. He served 36 years in senior IDF posts, including commander of the Military Colleges, military secretary to the Minister of Defense, director of the Intelligence Analysis Division in Military Intelligence, and chief intelligence officer of the Northern Command.

French Court of Appeal rules that Israel is the legal occupier of West Bank

By Jerry Gordon

h/t Imre Herzog. Here’s a stunner. M. Jean Patrick Grumberg of the French blog Dreuz made a useful discovery and somehow the Israel and world media didn’t cover. The PA brought suit in France against French companies building the light rail system in Jerusalem. The PA lost in a decision that ruled that Israel is the legal occupant of Judea and Samaria.

So, why isn’t the Israeli and world media hopping all over this? Perhaps because they are intimidated by the threat of Islamic violence as their god Allah granted possession of any conquered lands in perpetuity. Which will never be held up in a Western court that doesn’t recognize sharia law ruling based on fiction rather than fact. But then the pack of Israel’s enemies gathering in Paris for tomorrow’s hatefest doesn’t care about the facts and law. That would include that self -promoting ‘stalwart defender of Israel’, Secretary of State Kerry. Read this important French court case findings in this Dreuz blog post by the estimable M. Grumberg.

Grumberg, a French lawyer by training wrote:

In a historical trial carefully « forgotten » by the media, the 3rd Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Versailles declares that Israel is the legal occupant of the West Bank*.

When I first learned that the Court of Appeal of Versailles ruled that West bank settlements and occupation of Judea Samaria by Israel is unequivocally legal under international law, in a suit brought by the Palestinian Authority against Jerusalem’s light rail built by French companies Alstom and Veolia, that received no media coverage, I decided to put to work my years of Law Studies in France, and I meticulously analyzed the Court ruling.

To my astonishment, pro-Israeli media did not cover it either. The few who mentioned the case did not have any legal background in French law to understand the mega-importance of the ruling, and, as a few lefty English speaking Israeli websites reported it, they thought that it was a decision strictly pertinent to the Jerusalem light rail. It’s not.

To make sure I did not overestimate my legal abilities and that I wasn’t over optimistic – as usual-, I submitted my analysis and the Court papers to one of the most prominent French lawyer, Gilles-William Goldnadel, President of Lawyers without borders, to receive his legal opinion. He indeed validated my finding. Then I decided to translate it to English, and it will soon be submitted to Benjamin Netanyahu thru a mutual friend.

First and foremost, the Versailles Court of Appeals had to determine the legal rights of Palestinians and Israelis in West Bank. Their conclusion: Palestinians have no right – in the international legal sense – to the region, unlike Israel, who is legitimately entitled to occupy all land beyond the 67 line.

The context :

In the 90s, Israel bid for the construction of the Jerusalem light rail. The tender was won by French companies Veolia and Alstom. The light rail was completed in 2011, and it cross Jerusalem all the way to the east side and the « occupied territories » (more about this term later).

Following this, the PLO filed a complaint with the High Court (Tribunal de Grande Instance) of Versailles France, against Alstom and Veolia, because according to PLO, « the construction of the tram is illegal since the UN, the EU, many NGOs and governments consider that « Israel illegally occupy Palestinian territories ».

The quest for the International Legislation to establish the rights of each party.

In order to rule whether the light rail construction was legal or not, the court had to seek the texts of international law, to examine international treaties, in order to establish the respective rights of the Palestinians and the Israelis.

And to my knowledge, this is the first time that a non-Israeli court has been led to rule on the status of the West Bank.

Why is this an historical ruling: it is the first international case since the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948

It is the first time since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 that an independent, non-Israeli court has been called upon to examine the legal status of West bank territories under international law, beyond the political claims of the parties.

Keep in mind though, that the Court’s findings have no effect in international law. What they do, and it’s of the utmost importance, is to clarify the legal reality.

The Versailles Court of Appeal conclusions are as resounding as the silence in which they were received in the media: Israel has real rights in the territories, its decision to build a light rail in the West Bank or anything else in the area is legal, and the judges have rejected all the arguments presented by the Palestinians.

The Palestinian arguments

• The PLO denounces the deportation of the Palestinian population, and the destruction of properties in violation of international regulations. Relying on the Geneva and Hague Conventions and the UN resolutions, it considers that the State of Israel is illegally occupying Palestinian territory and is pursuing illegal Jewish colonization. 

Thus, construction of the light rail is itself illegal (1).

• The PLO adds that the light rail construction has resulted in the destruction of Palestinian buildings and houses, the almost total destruction of Highway 60, which is vital for Palestinians and their goods, and has conducted many illegal dispossessions. Therefore, several clauses from the annexed Regulations to the October 18, 1907 Fourth Hague Convention were violated (2).

• Finally, the PLO alleges that Israel violates the provisions relating to the « protection of cultural property » provided for in Article 4 of the Hague Convention of May 14, 1954, Article 27 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, Article 5 of the Hague Convention IX of 1907, and Article 53 of Additional Protocol No. 1 to the Geneva Conventions.

The Court of Appeal does not deny the occupation, but it destroys one after another all the Palestinian arguments

Referring to the texts on which the PLO claim is based, the Court of Appeal considers that Israel is entitled to ensure order and public life in the West Bank,therefore Israel has the right to build a light rail, infrastructure and dwellings.

Article 43 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 stipulates that « The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety ».

Israeli occupation does not violate any international law

« The Palestinian Authority misread the documents, they do not apply to the occupation »

The Court explains that the Palestinian Authority misinterprets the texts and they do not apply to the occupation:

• First of all, all the international instruments put forward by the PLO are acts signed between States, and the obligations or prohibitions contained therein are relevant to States. Neither the Palestinian Authority nor the PLO are States, therefore, none of these legal documents apply.

• Secondly, said the Court, these texts are binding only on those who signed them, namely the « contracting parties ». But neither the PLO nor the Palestinian Authority have ever signed these texts.

Propaganda is not international law

The Court, quite irritated by the presented arguments, boldly asserted that the law « cannot be based solely on the PLO’s assessment of a political or social situation.«

Humanitarian law was not violated

The PLO mistakenly refers to the wrong legal document because the Hague Convention applies in case of bombing. And … « Jerusalem is not bombed. »

The PLO invokes the violation of humanitarian law contained in the Geneva and Hague Conventions.

• But on the one hand, says the judges of the Court of Appeal, international conventions apply between States and the PLO is not a State: « the International Court of Justice has indicated that [the Conventions] only contain obligations for the States, and that individual have no rights to claim the benefit of those obligation for themselves ».

• Then the Court says that only the contracting parties are bound by international conventions, and neither the PLO nor the Palestinian Authority have ever signed any of them.

• The Court draw the conclusion that the PLO is mistakenly referring to the wrong legal document because the Hague Convention applies in case of bombing. And … « Jerusalem is not bombed.«

The PLO and the Palestinians were dismissed

The PLO cannot invoke any of these international conventions, said the Court.

« These international norms and treaties » does not give the « Palestinian people that the PLO says he represents, the right to invoke them before a court.«

The Court of Appeal therefore sentenced the PLO (and Association France Palestine Solidarité AFPS who was co-appellant) to pay 30,000 euros ($32,000) to Alstom, 30,000 euros to Alstom Transport and 30,000 euros to Veolia Transport.

Neither the PLO nor the Palestinian Authority nor the AFPS appealed to the Supreme Court, therefore the judgment has become final.

This is the first time that a Court has legally destroyed all Palestinian legal claim that Israel’s occupation is illegal.

Reprint or redistribution of this copyrighted material is permitted with the following attribution and link: © Jean-Patrick Grumberg for www.Dreuz.info

• (1) The PLO relies on article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, which states that « the occupant power may not deport or transfer part of its own civilian population in the Territory he occupies », and article 53, which states that « the occupant Power is prohibited from destroying movable or immovable properties belonging individually or collectively to private people, to the State or to public authorities or social or cooperative organizations, except in cases where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary for military operations ».

• (2) The PLO refers to the Fourth Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949: ? Article 23 (g), which prohibits « the destruction or seizure of enemy properties except in cases where such destruction or seizure are imperatively ordered for the necessities of war. »

? Article 27 according to which « in the sieges and bombardments, all necessary measures must be taken to spare as much as possible the buildings devoted to worship, the arts, sciences, charitable institutions, historical monuments, and hospitals … »

? Article 46 which states that « private property can not be confiscated ».

http://www.dreuz.info/…/israel-is-the-legal-occupant-of-th…/

Israel is the legal occupant of the West Bank, says the Court of Appeal of Versailles, France

In a historical trial carefully « forgotten » by the media, the 3rd Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Versailles declares that Israel is the legal occupant of the West Bank*. When I first learned that the Court of Appeal of Versailles ruled that West bank settlements and occupation of Judea Samaria…

DREUZ.INFO

A New Strategy for Israeli Victory

 Daniel Pipes Commentary 12-14-16

  

https:www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/a-new-strategy-for-israeli-victory/

Israeli–Palestinian diplomacy sadly fits the classic description of insanity: “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” The identical assumptions—land-for-peace and the two-state solution, with the burden primarily on Israel—stay permanently in place, no matter how often they fail. Decades of what insiders call “peace processing” have left matters worse than when they started, yet the great powers persist, sending diplomat after diplomat to Jerusalem and Ramallah, ever hoping that the next round of negotiations will lead to the elusive breakthrough.

The time is ripe for a new approach, a basic re-thinking of the problem. It draws on Israel’s successful strategy through its first 45 years. The failure of Israeli–Palestinian diplomacy since 1993 suggests this alternative approach—with a stress on Israeli toughness in pursuit of victory. This would, paradoxically perhaps, be of benefit to Palestinians and bolster American support.

I. The Near Impossibility of Compromise

Since the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Palestinians and Israelis have pursued static and opposite goals.

In the years before the establishment of the new state, the mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini, articulated a policy of rejectionism, or eliminating every vestige of Jewish presence in what is now the territory of Israel.¹ It remains in place. Maps in Arabic that show a “Palestine” replacing Israel symbolize this continued aspiration. Rejectionism runs so deep that it drives not just Palestinian politics but much of Palestinian life. With consistency, energy, and perseverance, Palestinians have pursued rejectionism via three main approaches: demoralizing Zionists through political violence, damaging Israel’s economy through trade boycotts, and weakening Israel’s legitimacy by winning foreign support. Differences between Palestinian factions tend to be tactical: Talk to the Israelis to win concessions from them or not? Mahmoud Abbas represents the former outlook and Khaled Mashal the latter.

On the Israeli side, nearly everyone agrees on the need to win acceptance by Palestinians (and other Arabs and Muslims); differences are again tactical. David Ben-Gurion articulated one approach, that of showing Palestinians what they can gain from Zionism. Vladimir Jabotinsky developed the opposite vision, arguing that Zionists have no choice but to break the Palestinians’ intractable will. Their rival approaches remain the touchstones of Israel’s foreign-policy debate, with Isaac Herzog heir to Ben-Gurion and Benjamin Netanyahu to Jabotinsky.

These two pursuits—rejectionism and acceptance—have remained basically unchanged for a century; today’s Palestinian Authority, Hamas, Labor, and Likud are lineal descendants of Husseini, Ben-Gurion, and Jabotinsky. Varying ideologies, objectives, tactics, strategies, and actors mean that details have varied, even as the fundamentals have remained remarkably in place. Wars and treaties came and went, leading to only minor shifts. The many rounds of fighting had surprisingly little impact on ultimate goals, while formal agreements (such as the Oslo Accords of 1993) only increased hostility to Israel’s existence and so were counterproductive.

Palestinian rejection or acceptance of Israel is binary: yes or no, without in-betweens. This renders compromise nearly impossible because resolution requires one side fully to abandon its goal. Either Palestinians give up their century-long rejection of the Jewish state or Zionists give up their 150-year quest for a sovereign homeland. Anything other than these two outcomes is an unstable settlement that merely serves as the premise for a future round of conflict.

The “Peace Process” That Failed

Deterrence, that is, convincing Palestinians and the Arab nations to accept Israel’s existence by threatening painful retaliation, underlay Israel’s formidable record of strategic vision and tactical brilliance in the period from 1948 to 1993. Over this time, deterrence worked to the extent that Israel’s Arab-state enemies saw the country very differently by the end of that period; in 1948, invading Arab armies expected to throttle the Jewish state at birth, but by 1993, Arafat felt compelled to sign an agreement with Israel’s prime minister.

That said, deterrence did not finish the job; as Israelis built a modern, democratic, affluent, and powerful country, the fact that Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, and (increasingly) the left still rejected it became a source of mounting frustration. Israel’s impatient, on-the-go populace grew weary with the unattractive qualities of deterrence, which by nature is passive, indirect, harsh, slow, boring, humiliating, reactive, and costly. It is also internationally unpopular.

That impatience led to the diplomatic process that culminated with the handshake confirming the signing of the Oslo Accords on the White House lawn in September 1993. For a brief period, “The Handshake” (as it was then capitalized) between Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin served as the symbol of successful mediation that gave each side what it most wanted: dignity and autonomy for Palestinians, recognition and security for Israelis. Among many accolades, Arafat, Rabin, and Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres won the Nobel Peace Prize.

The accords, however, quickly disappointed both sides. Indeed, while Israelis and Palestinians agree on little else, they concur with near-unanimity on Oslo having been a disaster.

When Palestinians still lived under direct Israeli control before Oslo, acceptance of Israel had increased over time even as political violence diminished. Residents of the West Bank and Gaza could travel locally without checkpoints and access work sites within Israel. They benefited from the rule of law and an economy that more than quadrupled without depending on foreign aid. Functioning schools and hospitals emerged, as did several universities.

Yasir Arafat promised to turn Gaza into “the Singapore of the Middle East,” but his despotism and aggression against Israel instead turned his fiefdom into a nightmare, resembling Congo more than Singapore. Unwilling to give up on the permanent revolution and to become the ordinary leader of an obscure state, he exploited the Oslo Accords to inflict economic dependence, tyranny, failed institutions, corruption, Islamism, and a death cult on Palestinians.

For Israelis, Oslo led not to the hoped-for end of conflict but to inflamed Palestinian ambitions to eliminate the Jewish state. As Palestinian rage spiraled upward, more Israelis were murdered in the five years after Oslo than in the 15 years preceding it. Rabble-rousing speech and violent actions soared—and continue unabated 23 years later. Moreover, Palestinian delegitimization efforts cost Israel internationally as the left turned against it, spawning such anti-Zionist novelties as the UN World Conference against Racism in Durban and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.

From Israel’s perspective, seven years of Oslo appeasement, 1993–2000, undid 45 years of successful deterrence; then, six years of unilateral withdrawals, 2000–2006, further buried deterrence. The decade since 2006 has produced no major changes.

The Oslo exercise showed the futility of Israeli concessions to Palestinians when the latter fail to live up to their obligations. By signaling Israeli weakness, Oslo made a bad situation worse. What is conventionally called the “peace process” would more accurately be dubbed the “war process.”

The False Hope of Finessing Victory

Why did things go so wrong in what seemed so promising an agreement?

Moral responsibility for the collapse of Oslo lies with Yasir Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, and the rest of the Palestinian Authority leadership. They pretended to abandon rejectionism and accept Israel’s existence but, in fact, sought Israel’s elimination in new, more sophisticated ways, replacing force with delegitimization.

This said, the Israelis made a profound mistake, having entered the Oslo process with a false premise. Yitzhak Rabin often summed up this error in the phrase “You don’t make peace with friends. You make it with very unsavory enemies.”² In other words, he expected war to be concluded through goodwill, conciliation, mediation, flexibility, restraint, generosity, and compromise, topped off with signatures on official documents. In this spirit, his government and all its successors agreed to a wide array of concessions, even to the point of permitting a Palestinian militia, always hoping the Palestinians would reciprocate by accepting the Jewish state.

They never did. To the contrary, Israeli compromises aggravated Palestinian hostility. Each gesture further radicalized, exhilarated, and mobilized the Palestinian body politic. Israeli efforts to “make peace” were received as signs of demoralization and weakness. “Painful concessions” reduced the Palestinian awe of Israel, m–ade the Jewish state appear vulnerable, and inspired irredentist dreams of annihilation.

In retrospect, this does not surprise. Contrary to Rabin’s slogan, one does not “make [peace] with very unsavory enemies” but rather with former very unsavory enemies—that is, enemies that have been defeated.

This brings us to the key concept of my approach, which is victory, or imposing one’s will on the enemy, compelling him through loss to give up his war ambitions. Wars end, the historical record shows, not through goodwill but through defeat. He who does not win loses. Wars usually end when failure causes one side to despair, when that side has abandoned its war aims and accepted defeat, and when that defeat has exhausted the will to fight. Conversely, so long as both combatants still hope to achieve their war objectives, fighting either goes on or it potentially will resume.

Thinkers and warriors through the ages concur on the importance of victory as the correct goal of warfare. For example, Aristotle wrote that “victory is the end of generalship” and Dwight D. Eisenhower said: “In war, there is no substitute for victory.” Technological advancement has not altered this enduring human truth.

Twentieth-century conflicts that ended decisively include World War II, China–India, Algeria–France, North Vietnam–United States, Great Britain–Argentina, Afghanistan–U.S.S.R., and the Cold War. Defeat can result either from a military thrashing or from an accretion of economic and political pressures; it does not require total military loss or economic destruction, much less the annihilation of a population. For example, the only defeat in U.S. history, in South Vietnam in 1975, occurred not because of economic collapse or running out of ammunition or battlefield failure (the American side was winning the ground war) but because Americans lost the will to soldier on.

Indeed, 1945 marks a dividing line. Before then, overwhelming military superiority crushed the enemy’s will to fight; since then, grand battlefield successes have rarely occurred. Battlefield superiority no longer translates as it once did into breaking the enemy’s resolve to fight. In Clausewitz’s terms, morale and will are now the center of gravity, not tanks and ships. Although the French outmanned and out-gunned their foes in Algeria, as did the Americans in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan, all these powers lost their wars. Conversely, battlefield losses suffered by the Arab states in 1948–82, by North Korea in 1950–53, and by Iraq in 1991 and 2003 did not translate into surrender and defeat.

When a losing side preserves its war goals, the resumption of warfare remains possible, and even likely. Germans retained their goal of ruling Europe after their defeat in World War I and looked to Hitler for another try, prompting the Allies to aim for total victory to ensure against the Germans trying a third time. The Korean War ended in 1953, but North and South have both held on to their war goals, meaning that the conflict might resume at any time, as could wars between India and Pakistan. The Arabs lost each round of warfare with Israel (1948–49, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982) but long saw their defeats as merely transient and spoiled for another try.

II. The Hard Work of Winning

How might Israel induce the Palestinians to drop rejectionism?

For starters, a colorful array of (mutually exclusive) plans to end the conflict favorably to Israel have appeared through the decades.³ Going from softest to toughest, these include:

• Territorial retreat from the West Bank or territorial compromise within the West Bank.
• Leasing the land under Israeli towns on the West Bank.
• Finding creative ways to divide the Temple Mount.
• Developing the Palestinian economy.
• Encouraging Palestinian good governance.
• Deploying international forces.
• Raising international funds (on the Marshall Plan model).
• Unilateralism (building a wall).
• Insisting that Jordan is Palestine.
• Excluding disloyal Palestinians from Israeli citizenship.
• Expelling Palestinians from lands controlled by Israel.

Trouble is, none of these plans addresses the need to break the Palestinian will to fight. They all manage the conflict without resolving it. They all seek to finesse victory with a gimmick. Just as the Oslo negotiations failed, so too will every other scheme that sidesteps the hard work of winning.

This historical pattern suggests that Israel has just one option to win Palestinian acceptance: a return to its old policy of deterrence, punishing Palestinians when they aggress. Deterrence amounts to more than tough tactics, which every Israeli government pursues; it requires systemic policies that encourage Palestinians to accept Israel and discourage rejectionism. It requires a long-term strategy that promotes a change of heart.

Inducing a change of heart is not a pretty or pleasant process but is based on a policy of commensurate and graduated response. If Palestinians transgress moderately, they should pay moderately; and so on. Responses depend on specific circumstances, so the following are but general suggestions as examples for Washington to propose, going from mildest to most severe:

When Palestinian “martyrs” cause material damage, pay for repairs out of the roughly $300 million in tax obligations the government of Israel transfers to the Palestinian Authority (PA) each year. Respond to activities designed to isolate and weaken Israel internationally by limiting access to the West Bank. When a Palestinian attacker is killed, bury the body quietly and anonymously in a potter’s field. When the PA leadership incites violence, prevent officials from returning to the PA from abroad. Respond to the murder of Israelis by expanding Jewish towns on the West Bank. When official PA guns are turned against Israelis, seize these and prohibit new ones, and if this happens repeatedly, dismantle the PA’s security infrastructure. Should violence continue, reduce and then shut off the water and electricity that Israel supplies. In the case of gunfire, mortar shelling, and rockets, occupy and control the areas from which these originate.

Of course, these steps run exactly counter to the consensus view in Israel today, which seeks above all to keep Palestinians quiescent. But this myopic viewpoint formed under unremitting pressure from the outside world, and the U.S. government especially, to accommodate the PA. The removal of such pressure will undoubtedly encourage Israelis to adopt the more assertive tactics outlined here.

True peacemaking means finding ways to coerce Palestinians to undergo a change of heart, giving up rejectionism, accepting Jews, Zionism, and Israel. When enough Palestinians abandon the dream of eliminating Israel, they will make the concessions needed to end the conflict. To end the conflict, Israel must convince 50 percent and more of the Palestinians that they have lost.

The goal here is not Palestinian love of Zion, but closing down the apparatus of war: shuttering suicide factories, ending the demonization of Jews and Israel, recognizing Jewish ties to Jerusalem, and “normalizing” relations with Israelis. Palestinian acceptance of Israel will be achieved when, over a protracted period and with complete consistency, the violence ends, replaced by sharply worded démarches and letters to the editor. Symbolically, the conflict will be over when Jews living in Hebron (in the West Bank) have no more need for security than Palestinians living in Nazareth (in Israel).

To those who hold Palestinians too fanatical to be defeated, I reply: If Germans and Japanese, no less fanatical and far more powerful, could be defeated in World War II and then turned into normal citizens, why not the Palestinians now? Moreover, Muslims have repeatedly given in to infidels throughout history when faced with a determined superior force, from Spain to the Balkans to Lebanon.

Israel enjoys two pieces of good fortune. First, its effort does not begin at null; polls and other indicators suggest that 20 percent of Palestinians and other Arabs consistently accept the Jewish state. Second, it need deter only the Palestinians, a very weak actor, and not the whole Arab or Muslim population. However feeble in objective terms (economics, military power), Palestinians spearhead the war against Israel; so when they abandon rejectionism, others (like Moroccans, Iranians, Malaysians, et al.) take their cues from Palestinians and, over time, will likely follow their lead.

Palestinians Would Benefit from Their Defeat

However much Israelis gain from ending their residual Palestinian problem, they live in a successful modern country that has absorbed the violence and delegitimization imposed on them.⁴ Surveys, for example, show Israelis to be among the happiest people anywhere, and the country’s burgeoning birth rate confirms these impressions.

In contrast, Palestinians are mired in misery and constitute the most radicalized population in the world. Opinion surveys consistently show them choosing nihilism. Which other parents celebrate their children becoming suicide bombers? Which other people gives higher priority to harming its neighbor than improving its own lot? Hamas and the Palestinian Authority both run authoritarian regimes that repress their subjects and pursue destructive goals. The economy in the West Bank and Gaza depends, more than anywhere else, on free money from abroad, creating both dependence and resentment. Palestinian mores are backward and becoming more medieval all the time. A skilled and ambitious people is locked into political repression, failed institutions, and a culture celebrating delusion, extremism, and self-destruction.

An Israel victory liberates Palestinians. Defeat compels them to come to terms with their irredentist fantasies and the empty rhetoric of revolution. Defeat also frees them to improve their own lives. Unleashed from a genocidal obsession against Israel, Palestinians can become a normal people and develop its polity, economy, society, and culture. Negotiations could finally begin in earnest. In all, given their far lower starting point, Palestinians would, ironically, gain even more from their defeat than the Israelis would from their victory.

That said, this change won’t be easy or quick: Palestinians will have to pass through the bitter crucible of defeat, with all its deprivation, destruction, and despair as they repudiate the filthy legacy of Amin al-Husseini and acknowledge their century-long error. But there is no shortcut.

The Need for American Support

Palestinians deploy a unique global support team consisting of the United Nations and vast numbers of journalists, activists, educators, artists, Islamists, and leftists. No obscure African liberation front are they, but the world’s favored revolutionary cause. This makes Israel’s task long, difficult, and dependent on stalwart allies, foremost the U.S. government.

For Washington to be helpful means not dragging the parties back to more negotiations but robustly supporting Israel’s path to victory. That translates into not just backing episodic Israeli shows of force but a sustained and systematic international effort of working with Israel, select Arab states, and others to convince the Palestinians of the futility of their rejectionism: Israel is there, it’s permanent, and it enjoys wide backing.

That means supporting Israel’s taking the tough steps outlined above, from burying murderers’ bodies anonymously to shuttering the Palestinian Authority. It means diplomatic support for Israel, such as undoing the “Palestine refugee” farce and rejecting the claim of Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital. It also entails ending benefits to the Palestinians unless they work toward the full and permanent acceptance of Israel: no diplomacy, no recognition as a state, no financial aid, and certainly no weapons, much less militia training.

Israeli–Palestinian diplomacy is premature until Palestinians accept the Jewish state. The central issues of the Oslo Accords (borders, water, armaments, sanctities, Jewish communities in the West Bank, “Palestine refugees”) cannot be usefully discussed so long as one party still rejects the other. But negotiations can re-open and take up anew the Oslo issues upon the joyful moment that Palestinians accept of the Jewish state. That prospect, however, lies in the distant future. For now, Israel needs to win.

1 I analyzed this topic for Commentary in December 1997 in “On Arab Rejectionism.”

2 Which, curiously, paraphrased the statement of a PLO leader, Said Hammami, 15 years earlier.

3 I reviewed these proposals in detail for Commentary in February 2003 in “Does Israel Need a Plan?”

4 Injuries and deaths from traffic accidents in Israel in the period 2000-2005, for example, came to 30,000 while terrorism-related injuries amounted to 2,000.

Egyptian Daily Close To Egyptian Intelligence Reveals Minutes Of Secret Palestinian Authority Meeting With John Kerry, Susan Rice; U.S.-Palestinian Coordination On UNSC 2334 [Summary & Excerpts]

In mid-December 2016, a Palestinian Authority (PA) delegation met in Washington with officials from the outgoing Obama administration for secret talks.

 On December 27, 2016 the Egyptian daily Al-Youm Al-Sabi', which is close to Egyptian intelligence services, published an exposé of the minutes of the secret talks. 

 The Palestinian delegation included PLO Executive Committee secretary and negotiating team leader Saeb Erekat; Palestinian general intelligence chief Majid Faraj; Husam Zomlot, strategic affairs advisor to Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud 'Abbas; Palestinian Foreign Ministry official Dr. Majed Bamya; Palestinian negotiations department official Azem Bishara; Palestinian intelligence international relations department chief Nasser 'Adwa; and head of the PLO delegation to Washington Ma'an Erekat.

 “The Palestinian side began its meetings on December 12, 2016 when Saeb Erekat and Majid Faraj met with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. The next day, the two met with National Security Advisor Susan Rice. The entire delegation met with an American team that included four representatives of the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, for a six-hour political-strategic meeting. Majid Faraj concluded his visit with a lengthy meeting with the CIA chief."

The minutes of the "top secret" meeting of Kerry, Rice, Erekat, and Faraj reveals U.S.-Palestinian coordination leading up to the UN Security Council vote on Resolution 2334 regarding Israel's settlements, which was adopted December 23,2016.

It states that the sides "agreed to cooperate in drafting a resolution on the settlements" and that the U.S. representative in the Security Council was "empowered" to coordinate with the Palestinian UN representative on the resolution.

The meeting also was aimed at coordinating Kerry's attendance at the upcoming international Paris Conference set for January 15, 2017, in order to promote a further international move regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Kerry offered to propose his ideas for a permanent arrangement "provided that they are supported by the Palestinian side."

Also Erekat warned that if the U.S. Embassy was moved to Jerusalem, the Palestinians would call to expel U.S. Embassies from Arab and Muslim capitals, the report said.

The report added that Kerry and Rice had fulsomely praised 'Abbas's policies and how he handled matters, and harshly criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying that he "aims to destroy the two-state solution."

...

"They praised the substantial efforts of the Palestinian security apparatuses, specifically Palestinian [general] intelligence, led by Majid Faraj, as part of what they called 'the struggle against terrorism.' [The two] maintained that Palestinian-American collaboration in this area is among the closest of all the coordination between American apparatuses and security forces in the region."

...

"The Palestinian delegation thanked Kerry and Rice, and expressed Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas's esteem for the views of U.S. President Barack Obama, Advisor Rice, and Secretary Kerry, and particularly for Kerry's speech at the Saban Forum in early December," the report added that the two U.S. officials had congratulated 'Abbas "for his stunning success at Fatah's Seventh General Conference and for his long and courageous speech (like those given by the late Cuban ruler Fidel Castro), during which he reiterated his positions and founding principles regarding his adherence to the peace process and his opposition to violence and terrorism in all forms." 

…

They also "praised 'Abbas's courage, positions, leadership, and adherence to the culture of peace and to peace as a strategic option, in addition to his opposition to violence and terrorism, to the ongoing security coordination, and to his being considered a uniquely strategic and courageous leader in the Middle East. The success of [Fatah's] Seventh General Conference. they [said], had effectively ended attempts by Muhammad Dahlan and others to weaken President 'Abbas, who must now act to tighten his relationship with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt."

…

"Rice asked the Palestinian delegation to convey U.S. President Barack Obama's gratitude to Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas for honoring all his commitments to him, and added: 'Abbas was open and honest regarding all his commitments, especially regarding [Palestine] refraining from joining the 16 international organizations [as a member state].'"

…

Kerry and Rice stressed that "Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu aims to destroy the two-state solution, and ..that all Netanyahu has to offer is maintaining the status quo, in addition to guarantees to improve [Palestinian] living conditions.”