THE PITFALLS OF ASSUMPTION Yoram Ettinger   2-19-16 http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=15309 Common sense suggests that simplistic and err oneous assumptions produce simplistic and erroneous policies, as has been the case with all U.S. initiatives on the Palestinian issue. This is because the U.S. foreign policy establishment has been erroneously perceiving the Palestinian issue to be the root cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence there was the initial U.S. opposition to the 1977 Israel-Egypt peace initiative and the attempt to inject the Palestinian issue into it on the eve of the 1979 signing ceremony; the 1987 U.S. recognition of the PLO, which rewarded and strengthened a role model of international terrorism; the passive U.S. role in the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace initiative; the U.S. endorsement of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat for the Nobel Peace Prize and the embrace of the self-destructive 1993 Oslo Accords; the failure to punish the Palestinian Authority for its hate-education and other systematic violations of the Oslo Accords; and the resounding failure of U.S. President Barack Obama's initiatives highlighting the Palestinian issue. Contrary to the U.S. foreign policy establishment's worldview, the 1948 Arab-Israeli war was not launched by Arab countries on behalf of Palestinian aspirations. The Arabs launched the war in order to advance their own -- not the Palestinians' -- interests through the occupation of the strategic area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. In fact, the Palestinians blame Arab leaders for what they term "the 1948 debacle." Moreover, the objective of the 1948 war was to prevent the establishment of an "infidel" Jewish entity on land that Muslims believe was divinely endowed to the "believers" (Waqf). Thus, during the October 1947 Pan-Arab Summit, then Arab League Secretary General Abdul Rahman Azzam stated: "The establishment of a Jewish state would lead to a war of extermination and momentous massacre, which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacre and the Crusades. ... This war will be distinguished by three serious matters: ... the shortest road to paradise … an opportunity for vast plunder … avenging the martyrdom of Palestinian Arabs." Jordan joined the 1948 war to expand its territory from the east bank of the Jordan River to the Mediterranean as a step toward dominating the Arab world. Egypt harbored similar ambitions and sought to foil Jordan's ambitious strategy. Egypt deployed some of its soldiers to the Jerusalem region to check the Jordanian military moves. Iraq aspired to control the 585-mile-long Iraq-Haifa oil pipeline, which extended from the oil fields in Kirkuk/Mosul through Jordan to the refineries in Haifa. Syria, for its part, considered the war an opportunity to conquer some southern sections of "Greater Syria." At the end of the 1948 war, Iraq occupied Samaria (the northern West Bank), but transferred it to Jordan, not to the Palestinians. Jordan occupied Judea (the southern West Bank) and in April 1950 annexed both areas (naming them the West Bank) to the Hashemite kingdom on the east bank of the Jordan River. The kingdom prohibited Palestinian activities and punished or expelled Palestinian activists. Egypt conquered the Gaza Strip and imposed a nightly curfew (which was terminated when Israel gained control of Gaza in 1967). Egypt prohibited Palestinian national activities and expelled Palestinian leaders. Syria occupied and annexed the al-Hama area in the Golan Heights. In 1948, the Arab League formed the "All Palestine Government" as a department within the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, and dissolved it in 1959. Independent of the Palestinian issue, the 1956 Sinai Campaign was triggered by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's megalomaniacal aspirations to rule the Arab world. Nasser concluded a major arms deal with Czechoslovakia and formed a joint Egypt-Syria-Jordan military command against his Arab rivals and Israel. He nationalized the British- and French-owned Suez Canal, supported the Algerian uprising against France, blockaded Israel's southern port of Eilat, and unleashed Gaza-based terrorism against Israel, aiming to occupy parts of the Negev in southern Israel. Irrespective of the Palestinian issue, the 1967 Six-Day War was launched by Israel in response to: Egypt's blockade of Eilat, the oil port of Israel; Egyptian deployment of troops in Sinai, in violation of the 1957 Sinai demilitarization agreement; the Egypt-Syria-Jordan Military Pact vowing Israel's destruction; the Syrian shelling of Israeli communities below the Golan Heights; and the Jordanian shelling of Jerusalem. Unrelated to the Palestinian issue, the 1967-1970 War of Attrition was conducted along the Suez Canal, as an extension of the 1967 war. Regardless of the Palestinian issue, and consistent with the goal to advance their national interests and eradicate the "infidel" Jewish state, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq initiated the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Arabs have systematically and traditionally provided a lot of rhetoric, but have supplied minimal financial resources and shed no blood for the Palestinians. The 1982 Lebanon War -- which pre-empted a massive PLO assault on northern Israel -- was the first war with no Arab military involvement. The war erupted on June 6, 1982, but the Arab League convened an emergency session only in September, after the PLO had already been expelled from Beirut. Moreover, the Arab oil-producing countries -- at a time when they controlled the oil market -- refused to flex any oil muscle on behalf of the PLO. Similarly, the 1987-1992 First Intifada and the 2000-2003 Second Intifada by Palestinians were not transformed into any Arab-Israeli war. There was no Arab military involvement. There was no financial walk, only talk. In fact, U.S. and West European financial aid to the Palestinians dramatically exceeded the Arab contribution. Israel's 2008, 2012 and 2014 wars against Gaza-based Palestinian terrorism were not top priorities for Arab leaders, most of whom blamed Hamas for the eruption of the 2014 war. Erroneous Western assumptions that the Arab-Israeli conflict was triggered by the Palestinian issue have led to erroneous policies. It's time for the "Palestine Firsters" to disengage from oversimplification and re-engage with the complex reality of the Middle East.

Ha’aretz: Palestinians Can’t Afford to Give Up Israeli ‘Occupation’ (Analysis)

 JNi.Media  February 18th, 2016

http://www.jewishpress.com/news/haaretz-palestinians-cant-afford-to-give-up-israeli-occupation-analysis/2016/02/18/0/?print

Gadi Taub, a regular pundit on leftwing daily Ha'aretz, on Thursday suggested the termination of Israeli "occupation" of all or part of Judea and Samaria could prove too costly for PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and, for that matter, any PLO-based leader who would follow him. Taub cites a Palestinian journalist friend who asked him, "Why do you think we'll let you leave the territories? Who's going to look after us?"

A senior lecturer in the School of Public Policy and the Department of Communications at Hebrew University, Taub asks: why should Abbas want to sign a peace treaty with Israel in exchange for a state based on the 1967 border lines? Obviously, so he could liberate his people from the Israeli military rule and erect an independent national society. Except that within even the most liberal framework of talks conducted in the past 23 years, there's a permanent booby trap that makes peace with Israel a virtual death sentence to any Palestinian leaders who signs it. It's the part about giving up the Arab right of return to the Jewish State.

The right of return is at the foundation of Palestinian political consciousness, its raison d'être, the centerpiece of its entire agenda since the PLO came to life back in 1964. It is the reason why they turned their refugee problem into the only such problem in human history that hasn't been resolved one way or another, complete with three generations of Arabs from mandatory Palestine still living off handouts from UNRWA. It's also the singular unifying element for an otherwise tribal Arab society who gathered in that part of the world over a century from many points of origin in the Middle East.

Now, there's a catch-22 for you: they can't get a Palestinian State without giving up their right of return, and they can't have a Palestinian State without the right of Return.

Next huge problem is human rights, which are the foundation of Israel's left's campaign against the "occupation." The fact is that it would be next to impossible to govern a free Palestinian State without a strong secret police and uniformed police, just as the PA is being run today. Dissent cannot be tolerated, not because Abbas is necessarily a tyrant by nature, but because the last time the PA showed tolerance for human rights the Hamas dumped the bodies of their activists from Gaza rooftops and took permanent hold of the Gaza Strip. If they now permit Hamas activists to disseminate their messages freely in Ramallah, Jenin and Shechem, the new state would become Hamasnistan before its first day of independence.

So, there's your second catch-22: the only way to guarantee a modicum of human rights in Arab Judea and Samaria is by relying on the IDF to neutralize Hamas. A free Palestine without the IDF will have to degrade human rights, or disappear.

The third part, according to Taub, is truly amusing: the PA can't afford to become an independent state within the 1967 borders, because such a deal would free Israel of the political burden of the "occupation," release it from its pariah status globally, and, in days, practically, would catapult it to a new, world-power status economically, diplomatically, and — don't ever forget that part — militarily.

Think about it, how long before the Palestinian State is degraded to an in-name only power, living next door to an Israeli giant that's much bigger and stronger on a global scale? How long before Palestinian society demands to enhance its access to all that milk and honey, at the expense of the rulers in Ramallah, or even (God Forbid) the Palestinian capital in eastern Jerusalem?

How refreshing to read such an out-of-the-box view from a leftist pundit in a leftist paper, confirming that the reason you can't have a free Palestinian state is because such a state would be inherently much worse for the Arabs, including the PLO, than even the "occupation." 

Tarek Fatah on the Threats of Islamo-Facism (2011)

“The dangers we face; if we do not confront them today, our children will not forgive us tomorrow.” In his 2011 talk, activist Tarek Fatah joined us to deliver a powerful call to action against injustice and violence. Watch this talk and learn the difference between Islam as a faith and Islam as an ideology, draw parallels to our current global situations and be inspired to make a change.

http://www.ideacity.ca/video/tarek-fatah-threats-islamo-facism/

Obama's Foreign Policy Rebuked – by His Own Intel Chiefs

By William Tate AMERICAN THINKER 2-13-16

http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/02/obamas_foreign_policy_rebuked__by_his_own_intel_chiefs.html?utm_source=emailcampaign2658&utm_medium=phpList&utm_content=HTMLemail&utm_campaign=ISRAPUNDIT+DAILY+DIGEST+FEB+13%2F16

Barack Obama's foreign policy – and by extension Hillary Clinton's – received a stinging rebuke this week...from Obama's own intelligence chiefs.  Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, gave Congress an assessment of threats around the globe that amounted to a direct indictment of Obama's failed foreign policies.

Clapper called the dangers currently facing the United States "a litany of doom."  He told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "In my fifty-plus years in the intelligence business, I cannot recall a more diverse array of challenges and crises that we confront as we do today."

Where have Obama's policies failed?  You might as well put on a blindfold and throw a dart at a map of the world.

On the nuclear accord with Iran, which Obama seems to think is his crowning foreign policy accomplishment, Clapper said that Iran could begin construction of a nuclear weapons program at any time.  "Iran probably views the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a means to remove sanctions while preserving some of its nuclear capabilities, as well as the option to eventually expand its nuclear infrastructure."

And Clapper cast significant doubt on whether the mullahs will try to honor their part of the bargain.  "Iran's perception of how the JCPOA helps it achieve its overall strategic goals will dictate the level of its adherence to the agreement over time."

But surely Obama's Iran deal will improve relations with Tehran, right?  Not according to his own intelligence director.  "Iran's Supreme Leader continues to view the United States as a major threat. We assess that his views will not change."

Clapper warned that Iran is still "the foremost state sponsor of terrorism" and added, "Iran and Hezbollah remain a continuing terrorist threat to US interests and partners worldwide."

On the subject of terrorism, Obama has bragged that al-Qaeda has been decimated during his watch, but according to Clapper, "al-Qa'ida affiliates are positioned to make gains in 2016."

Obama shrugged off ISIS (or ISIL) as a "jayvee team."  Hardly, says Clapper.

"ISIL, including its eight established and several more emerging branches, has become the preeminent global terrorist threat. They've attempted or conducted scores of attacks outside of Syria and Iraq in the past 15 months. ISIL's estimated strength worldwide exceeds that of al- Qa'ida. ISIL's leaders are determined to strike the US homeland – beyond inspiring homegrown violent extremist attacks."

If that's the jayvee team, let's call off the varsity game.

Regarding the threat posed by North Korea, even Obama's current secretary of state, John Kerry, has admitted that Obama's – and Clinton's – approach hasn't worked.  And Clapper testified this week, "It [North Korea] is also committed to developing a long-range, nuclear-armed missile that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States, although the system has not been flight-tested."  The testimony came mere days after North Korea successfully launched a satellite into orbit.

Nor has Obama's – and Hillary Clinton's – policy of "leading from behind" worked so well in the Middle East, according to Clapper.

"In Libya, despite the December agreement to form a new 'Government of National Accord,' establishing authority and security across the country will be difficult to put it mildly, with hundreds of militia groups operating throughout the country. ISIL has established one of its most developed branch outside of Syria and Iraq in Libya."

Obama's policies haven't improved things in Afghanistan, either.  "Afghanistan is at serious risk of a political breakdown during 2016, occasioned by mounting political, economic, and security challenges. Waning political cohesion, increasingly assertive local powerbrokers, financial shortfalls, and sustained countrywide Taliban attacks are eroding stability."

And then there's Syria.

Obama infamously drew a red line against the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons.  (Assad has them, but Saddam didn't?)  But, as the Washington Post's David Ignatius told PBS's Frontline documentary series, "at the last minute, the president blinked."  As a result, the documentary concluded, "extremist groups, including what would eventually become ISIS, exploited the decision not to attack, gaining a foothold by promising Syrian locals what the U.S. had not: protection from the Assad regime."

Clapper testified this week that Assad has continued to use his chemical weapons, even after supposedly agreeing to give them up.  "Chemical weapons continue to pose a threat in Syria and Iraq. Damascus has used chemicals against the opposition on multiple occasions since Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention" (in October 2013, after Obama drew his red line, and after Syria supposedly handed over its chemical weapons).

The intel chiefs also contradicted Obama's prediction that Russia's intervention in Syria is doomed to fail, with General Stewart declaring, "The Russian reinforcement has changed the calculus completely."

Arkansas senator Tom Cotton asked the two intel chiefs a telling question regarding what seems to be the central tenet of Obama's foreign policy: "Is the Middle East a place that prizes concessions and negotiations or strength and toughness?"

The two intel chiefs looked at each other for a moment before Stewart replied, "I would argue that in almost all these cases, strength is preferred over signs of weakness."

Stewart, perhaps less vulnerable to political winds, later added:

I think that over the last several years there have been some concerns among our partners about our commitment to the region. Our willingness to employ the force where our interests, both national and strategic interest, lies. And I think that has caused just a little bit of concern among our partners about our commitment to the region.

In other words, the Russians have backed up their words with action.  Obama has backed up his words with...well, words.  And more words.

Obama derided Mitt Romney in the 2012 campaign for calling Russia a geopolitical foe, even as he pleaded for Vladimir Putin to allow him "flexibility."  Obama ridiculed Romney's more hard-line stance.  "[T]he 1980s, they're now calling to ask for their foreign policy back, because, you know, the Cold War's been over for 20 years."

Yet, after seven years of Obama's "flexibility" with Putin, Obama's intelligence chiefs are warning that the Cold War could be a very 21st-century thing.

"A lot of these aggressive things that the Russians are doing for a number of reasons, Great Power status, to create the image of being co-equal with the United States, etc. – I think could possibly go on," Clapper told the Senate committee this week, "and we could be in another Cold War-like spiral here."

That phone you hear ringing, Mister Obama?  It's the American people calling.  We want our 1980s president back.

Iran Steps Up Malign Activities  from AIPAC Iran’s Supreme Leader has expressed his contempt for America by awarding “medals of conquest” to naval commanders who illegally detained 10 U.S. sailors last month. On the heels of Implementation Day, and in the run-up to Iran’s Majlis elections, Iran’s malign activity continues—overflying U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf, reiterating its denial of the Holocaust, and accelerating its illicit ballistic missile program. Tehran’s leaders are cementing their stronghold on Iranian society as they continue their appalling human rights abuses. Also, the regime has quashed any hopes for positive change in this month’s elections by disqualifying most pragmatic candidates. America must firmly oppose Tehran’s destabilizing activities in the Middle East in order to support U.S. allies and thwart Iranian ambitions.

Iranian Leader Gives Out Medals for Detention of U.S. Sailors The Times of Israel - Times of Israel Staff Jan. 31, 2016 Iran’s supreme leader on Sunday awarded “medals of conquest” to five naval commanders of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards for their arrest earlier this month of 10 U.S. sailors whose two vessels strayed into Iranian waters. Iran Says it has ‘Doubled’ Efforts to Develop Ballistic Missiles  The Times of Israel - Times of Israel Staff and Agencies Jan. 30, 2016  Tehran has doubled its efforts to develop its ballistic missile capabilities in reaction to US attempts to stop it, a top Iranian commander said Saturday. “We doubled our activities and the American demands from Iran had an opposite result,” the country’s Press TV quoted Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ (IRGC) Aerospace Force, as saying. Iran Flies Unarmed Military Drone Over U.S. Aircraft Carrier  The Associated Press – Nasser Karimi and Jon Gambrell Jan. 29, 2016  Iran flew a surveillance drone over a U.S. aircraft carrier and published video of the encounter Friday, the latest in a series of edgy naval incidents between the two countries in the Persian Gulf after the recent nuclear deal. Iran Coerces Afghans to Fight in Syria: HRW Agence France Presse Jan. 29, 2016  Iran's Revolutionary Guards has recruited thousands of Afghans, some by coercion, to fight in Syria's war alongside forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad, Human Rights Watch said Friday. Experts: Iran's Arrest of U.S. Sailors Broke International Law  Navy Times – David Larter Jan. 28, 2016  Iran’s supreme leader is hailing his hard-line paramilitary forces as heroes for their arrest of 10 American sailors at gunpoint, but an emerging consensus of U.S. legal experts believe the provocative act was a dangerous violation of international law that has so far gone without repercussions. New Details of Iran Ordeal Emerge From Former Prisoners The New York Times – Rick Gladstone Jan. 28, 2016  Two of the Americans freed by Iran in a January prisoner deal have provided new details about their time in captivity, saying they were told by Iranian interrogators that the United States had abandoned them and that they would never leave. One said he had been accused of plotting armed revolution. Khamenei Airs Holocaust Denial Video on International Remembrance Day  The Times of Israel - Times of Israel Staff Jan. 28, 2016  As the global community marked International Holocaust Remembrance Day Wednesday, Iran’s supreme leader uploaded a video to his official website questioning the magnitude of the Nazi regime’s mass murder campaign against the Jewish people during World War II. Iran Says Warns U.S. Warship to Leave Waters near Strait of Hormuz  Reuters Jan. 27, 2016  Iran's navy warned a U.S. warship on Wednesday to leave waters near the Strait of Hormuz where the Iranians were testing submarines, destroyers and missile launchers, news agencies reported. Iran Excludes Most Candidates in Elite Assembly Election  Reuters Jan. 26, 2016  Four-fifths of candidates for the body that will choose Iran's next Supreme Leader have withdrawn or been disqualified including a grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini close to reformist politicians, in a setback to President Hassan Rouhani. Iran Still a Leading Executioner of Minors, Report Says  The New York Times - Rick Gladstone Jan. 25, 2016  Iran is one of the leading executioners of juvenile offenders, despite its improved legal protections for children and a pledge more than two decades ago to end the death penalty for convicts younger than 18, Amnesty International said Monday.

www.aipac.org

MIDDLE EAST STRATEGIC OUTLOOK, FEBRUARY

 Shmuel Bar  2-7-16
February 7, 2016 at 6:00 am

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7380/middle-east-strategic-outlook-february

• The EU-Turkey agreement of 25 November, which provided Turkey with 3 billion euros over two years in order to stop the flow of refugees to Europe, has not achieved that goal. Speaking privately, EU officials complain that Turkey has not taken any concrete measures to reduce the flow of refugees. In our assessment, Turkey will continue to prevaricate on steps to stem the flow of refugees as pressure on the EU to give more concessions.
• During the coming year there will certainly be further terrorist attacks that will push European public opinion further to the right.
• We assess that Iran will continue in indirect channels with a parallel nuclear program, realized long before the 10-year target of the JCPOA.
• The demand for unification of Kurdistan -- Iraqi and Syrian -- will also begin to be heard. It is highly likely that Russia will take advantage of the trend and support the Kurds, effectively turning an American ally into a Russian one.

The announcement by the IAEA that Iran has fulfilled its obligations according to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has triggered "Implementation Day" and the removal of the nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. The JCPOA, however, did not deal with Iran's ballistic missile program, and the sanctions related to it are still nominally in force. These sanctions are minor and will not have any real effect on the Iranian missile program. The missile program will mature during this period and will include Ghadr missiles with ranges of 1,650-1,950 km, which may be capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

The question now is: whither the Iranian nuclear program? After the lifting of sanctions, and taking into account the impracticality of "snap-back" of sanctions, we assess that Iran will now initiate a parallel nuclear program. This will, of course, be far slower than the program that was dismantled by the JCPOA, but it will be realized long before the 10-year target of the JCPOA. One possibility for Iran to continue its nuclear program is through North Korea. The wording of the JCPOA is ambiguous on nuclear Iranian nuclear cooperation with other countries that are not a party to the agreement. North Korea could produce the whole chain of nuclear weapons and put it at Iran's disposal in return for Iranian funding. North Korea would certainly profit economically from such collaboration and would not risk further sanctions. Such cooperation would be difficult to detect, and even if detected, may not reach the threshold of a material breach of the JCPOA.

The most immediate reward that Iran will receive is the release of frozen Iranian funds ($100-$150 billion). In addition, Iran may now market oil stored offshore in tankers (about 50 billion barrels) and is preparing to increase its production by 500 thousand bpd (from 2.8 million bpd). It is doubtful that Iran can truly increase its production as planned. Even if it does, the addition of Iranian oil is likely to drive prices down even further, counter-balancing much of the potential profit. Sanctions relief also is not a quick fix for the Iranian economy. While it removes legal impediments for investment and business in Iran, the risks that Western companies will face due to residual non-nuclear sanctions (that may be enhanced and enforced by a future American administration), lack of government protection, corruption, and the weakness of the Iranian market cannot be removed by decree. Therefore, European banks and investors may not hurry to invest in Iran at the levels needed to jump-start the Iranian economy after years of sanctions.

The Iranian regime's goal is not only to block the path to the reformists or reformist-minded, but also to the extremists on the right to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Such a balance could help the Iranian system maintain its "centrist" orientation and guarantee the continuity in the event of Khamenei's death and the appointment of a new successor (or a triumvirate of several potential leaders). It will also facilitate the eventual takeover of the regime by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) after the demise of Khamenei. The backing that the Guardian Council received from the Supreme Leader for the results of its vetting process, in the face of Rouhani's condemnation of the disapproval of almost all reformists, is also indicative of the balance of power in the regime.

The Iranian seizure of two US Navy patrol boats on January 12 and the publication of drone pictures of a US Navy aircraft carrier underlined the sense of immunity that Iran has achieved. These actions should be seen in the context of Iran's attempt to change the rules of the game in the Persian Gulf, while testing the waters of American tolerance and sending to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States an indirect message that Iran is ready and willing to risk conflict with the US and that the US is a paper tiger that cannot be relied upon in a confrontation between the Gulf States and Iran. In our assessment, Iran will continue with shows of force such as seizing of naval vessels of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, stop and search operations of commercial vessels en route to the Gulf States, naval exercises -- including missile tests close to Gulf sea-lanes and to the territorial waters of the Gulf States -- in international waterways that implicitly interrupt and threaten shipping in the Gulf, "spooking" of Gulf aircraft and even false flag operations of mining, piracy or attacks by proxies in the Gulf and the Red Sea along the Yemeni coast. We may expect as a result possible frontier skirmishes on the shared littoral borders of Iran and Saudi Arabia, gas fields and disputed islands and in the international waters of the Gulf.

Saudi Arabia is drawing up its own map of interests and areas of influence that it is projecting as "no-go zones" for Iran -- a Saudi "Monroe Doctrine" for the region. The most critical of these are: Yemen (due to the potential for threatening the Bab al-Mandeb Straits), subversion in the Gulf States (primarily Bahrain), the Strait of Hormuz and the international waters of the Gulf. To this list one must add the obvious: any Iranian-inspired or -planned attack on the Saudi homeland itself -- government facilities, oil installations etc. -- would be perceived as crossing a red line. While neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran is interested in direct conflict, and both would prefer to continue to work through proxies and in areas outside their respective sovereign territories, the dynamic nature of the situation can easily lend itself to misreading of such red lines and such miscalculation may lead to direct confrontation between them. While all-out direct war between Iran and Saudi Arabia remains a low probability, this assessment should be revisited again in the near future.

In Syria, American positions have undergone a strategic shift that reflects the new balance of power created by the Russian intervention. On the military side, the Russian presence imposes a heavy constraint on the American activities, and U.S. officials caution that the success of the Ramadi operation will not be followed by a concerted effort to roll back the "Islamic State" in the Syrian theater. In regards to a political solution, the US has accepted the Russian-Iranian four-point-plan that envisages Bashar al-Assad remaining in office during a transition period and being allowed to run for President in "internationally supervised elections". In our assessment, the Syrian opposition and their Arab supporters cannot accept any blueprint that would leave any doubt regarding Bashar al-Assad relinquishing power before any process begins. These developments will only feed the sense of the Sunni Arabs that the United States has turned its back on them and is supporting Iranian-Russian hegemony in the region. On this background, the prospects that the Syrian "peace talks" in Geneva will achieve any progress towards resolution or even mitigation of the civil war are close to nil.

Last month's visit by Chinese President Xi Jin Ping to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran was the first such visit of a Chinese President in the region since 2002, and the first foreign head of state to visit Iran since the announcement of "Implementation Day" of the JCPOA. The Chinese emphasis in all the visits was on economic cooperation, development and stability, but above all -- in an implicit stab at the US and Russia -- emphasizing that China does not seek proxies, to fill a power vacuum or hegemony in the region. The leitmotif of the visit was the integration of the Middle Eastern partners (i.e. the Arabs in general and Iran) into China's "Belt and Road Initiative." In spite of the inclusion of Iran in the visit, President Xi took care not to offend the Arabs. The agreements with Saudi Arabia included nuclear cooperation in a scope far greater than that which was offered to Iran, and the joint statement reflected the Saudi position on Yemen, stating, "both sides stressed support for the legitimate regime of Yemen."

The "Arab Policy Paper" published on the eve of the visit stresses China's commitment to "non-intervention and opposition to interference in the affairs of other countries". This is seen by the Arab policy communities as a sign of implicit Chinese support for their position vis-à-vis Iran's activities in the region, though they would have welcomed more explicit statements of support. There is no expectation in the region that China is going to play the "Big Power" card in the region. Taking sides in this conflict would be out of character for China. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states will attempt to convince China to refrain from demonstrations of rapprochement with Iran and to support the Arab positions vis-à-vis Iranian provocations in the Gulf, Syria and Yemen. While China may show a slight implicit leaning towards the Arab position on these issues, it is not likely to take a clear anti-Iranian/pro-Arab position in the near future.

The European Union-Turkey agreement of 25 November, which provided Turkey with 3 billion euros over two years in order to stop the flow of refugees to Europe, has not achieved that goal. Speaking privately, EU officials complain that Turkey has not taken any concrete measures to reduce the flow of refugees. In our assessment, Turkey will continue to prevaricate on steps to stem the flow of refugees as pressure on the EU to give more concessions. Turkey has already signaled that the sum will not suffice for the task of maintaining the refugees inside Turkey alone, and certainly not for other security measures such as blocking the border with Turkey to prevent passage to and fro of "Islamic State" foreign fighters.

Aside from the 3 billion euros, the EU commitments will also not be easily implemented; visa waivers for Turkish citizens in general will encounter massive opposition within the EU. The road to Turkish accession to the EU must also go through complex negotiations on various aspects of compatibility of Turkey to the standards of the EU. All these discussions will encounter a veto by Cyprus, pending a peace deal with Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus. This veto may be resolved if a referendum on unification of Cyprus takes place and supports re-unification later this year. However, the real obstacle towards Turkish accession is not technical or due to the Cyprus question; it revolves around the shift in European public opinion towards absorption of immigrants from Muslim countries. During the coming year, there will certainly be further terrorist attacks that will push European public opinion further to the right. Under these circumstances, Turkish accession or even visa waiver will be very unlikely.

In our assessment, the trend towards Kurdish independence will eventually lead to an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. The events in Syrian Kurdistan will also affect the pace and direction of the independence movement in Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Unification of the parts of Syrian Kurdistan in the face of Turkish opposition and under Russian protection will give impetus to the demand to create a political fait accompli of independence in Iraqi Kurdistan. As the principle of Kurdish independence in Iraq gains more and more support and becomes a reality, the irredentist demand for unification of Kurdistan -- Iraqi and Syrian -- will also begin to be heard. This is the fulfillment of the Kurdish nightmare that Turkey has always feared. With the deterioration of relations between the AKP government and the Turkish Kurds inside Turkey, such a political reality of independent Kurdistan will add fire to the flames of the Kurdish rebellion in southern Turkey. It is highly likely that Russia will take advantage of the trend and support the Kurds, effectively turning an American ally into a Russian one. If this happens, the US will have lost an important potential ally in the new map of the Middle East.

The large number of players on the ground that may take a part in the campaign for Mosul will only complicate the campaign further and -- if the city or part of it is retaken, will increase the chances of internal fighting between the components of the ad-hoc alliance of Iraqi government forces, Shiite militias, Sunni militias, Kurdish Peshmarga, Turks and American forces.

On this background, the Syrian "Peace Talks" in Geneva started (29 January) as "proximity talks" in which the UN representatives shuttle between the rooms of the opposing parties. The Saudi supported High Negotiations Committee (HNC) of the Syrian opposition ceded their original conditions -- cessation of the attacks on civilians -- though they refuse to meet with the regime representatives while the latter refuse to meet with "terrorists". The Syrian regime representation is low-level as an indication that there is no intention to hold real negotiations. Furthermore, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), whose military wing, the YPG, is the most effective fighting force on the ground against the "Islamic State," were not included in the opposition delegation because of the Turkish threat to boycott the Geneva negotiations if it participates. Under these conditions, the prospects that the talks will achieve any progress towards resolution or even mitigation of the civil war are close to nil.

update of the AJC guide “ Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Brief Guide for the Perplexed. “ PDF LINK

To Staff of MIL-ED: We appreciate that the  General Officers  Council has endorsed the update  of the AJC guide “ Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Brief Guide for the Perplexed. “ Here is the PDF for your reading convenience.