Friday, December 4, 2015


Photo
A Munich synagogue held the coffins of the victims of the attacks at the 1972 Olympics. Terrorists representing a branch of the Palestine Liberation Organization breached apartments housing Israeli athletes. CreditAssociated Press 
In September 1992, two Israeli widows went to the home of their lawyer. When the women arrived, the lawyer told them that he had received some photographs during his recent trip to Munich but that he did not think they should view them. When they insisted, he urged them to let him call a doctor who could be present when they did.
Ilana Romano and Ankie Spitzer, whose husbands were among the Israeli athletes held hostage and killed by Palestinian terrorists at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, rejected that request, too. They looked at the pictures that for decades they had been told did not exist, and then agreed never to discuss them publicly.
The attack at the Olympic Village stands as one of sports’ most horrifying episodes. The eight terrorists, representing a branch of the Palestine Liberation Organization, breached the apartments where the Israeli athletes were staying before dawn on Sept. 5, 1972. That began an international nightmare that lasted more than 20 hours and ended with a disastrous failed rescue attempt.
Photo
Ankie Spitzer, the widow of the fencing coach Andre Spitzer, at the Olympic Village in 1972. She said she and family members of the other victims learned the details of how the victims were treated only 20 years after the attack. CreditAssociated Press 
The treatment of the hostages has long been a subject of speculation, but a more vivid — and disturbing — account of the attack is emerging. For the first time, Ms. Romano, Ms. Spitzer and other victims’ family members are choosing to speak openly about documentation previously unknown to the public in an effort to get their loved ones the recognition they believe is deserved.
Among the most jarring details are these: The Israeli Olympic team members were beaten and, in at least one case, castrated.
“What they did is that they cut off his genitals through his underwear and abused him,” Ms. Romano said of her husband, Yossef. Her voice rose.
“Can you imagine the nine others sitting around tied up?” she continued, speaking in Hebrew through a translator. “They watched this.”
Ms. Romano and Ms. Spitzer, whose husband, Andre, was a fencing coach at the Munich Games and died in the attack, first described the extent of the cruelty during an interview for the coming film “Munich 1972 & Beyond,” a documentary that chronicles the long fight by families of the victims to gain public and official acknowledgment for their loved ones. The film is expected to be released early next year.
In subsequent interviews with The New York Times, Ms. Spitzer explained that she and the family members of the other victims only learned the details of how the victims were treated 20 years after the tragedy, when German authorities released hundreds of pages of reports they previously denied existed.
Ms. Spitzer said that she and Ms. Romano, as representatives of the group of family members, first saw the documents on that Saturday night in 1992. One of Ms. Romano’s daughters was to be married just three days later, but Ms. Romano never considered delaying the viewing; she had been waiting for so long.
Photo
Ilana Romano, left, the widow of the weight lifter Yossef Romano, with Spitzer in 2012. CreditJack Guez/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images 
The photographs were “as bad I could have imagined,” Ms. Romano said. (The New York Times reviewed the photographs but has chosen not to publish them because of their graphic nature.)
Mr. Romano, a champion weight lifter, was shot when he tried to overpower the terrorists early in the attack. He was then left to die in front of the other hostages and castrated. Other hostages were beaten and sustained serious injuries, including broken bones, Ms. Spitzer said. Mr. Romano and another hostage died in the Olympic Village; the other nine were killed during a failed rescue attempt after they were moved with their captors to a nearby airport.
It was not clear if the mutilation of Mr. Romano occurred before or after he died, Ms. Spitzer said, though Ms. Romano said she believed it happened afterward.
“The terrorists always claimed that they didn’t come to murder anyone — they only wanted to free their friends from prison in Israel,” Ms. Spitzer said. “They said it was only because of the botched-up rescue operation at the airport that they killed the rest of the hostages, but it’s not true. They came to hurt people. They came to kill.”
For much of the past two decades, Ms. Spitzer, Ms. Romano and Pinchas Zeltzer, the lawyer, mostly kept the grisly details to themselves, though at least one prominent report about the images surfaced. When Ms. Romano returned home that first night, she told her daughters the pictures were “difficult” but said they should not ask her more about them. Her daughters agreed.
At various points over the next 20 years, Ms. Romano said, she did make occasional references to the mutilation of her husband, but she always kept the photographs of the episode hidden.
According to Ms. Spitzer, confusion about what had happened to the victims existed from the beginning. The bodies of the victims were identified by family or friends in Munich — Ms. Romano said an uncle of her husband identified his corpse but was shown only his face — and, as per Jewish law, burials were held almost immediately after the bodies were flown back to Israel.
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Israeli and Olympics flags in 2002 near a plaque in honor of the members of the Israeli Olympic team killed during the 1972 Munich Olympics.CreditEnric Marti/Associated Press 
Since much of the attention from Israeli officials after the attacks focused on security breaches and mistakes by German and Olympic officials that had allowed the terrorists to strike, consideration of the plight of the dead victims had been a priority only to their families.
“We asked for more details, but we were told, over and over, there was nothing,” Ms. Spitzer said.
In 1992, after doing an interview with a German television station regarding the 20th anniversary of the attack in which she expressed frustration about not knowing exactly what happened to her husband and his teammates, Ms. Spitzer was contacted by a man who said he worked for a German government agency with access to reams of records about the attack.
Initially, Ms. Spitzer said, the man, who remained anonymous, sent her about 80 pages of police reports and other documents. With those documents, Mr. Zeltzer, the lawyer, and Ms. Spitzer pressured the German government into releasing the rest of the file, which included the photographs.
After receiving the file, the victims’ families sued the German government, the Bavarian regional government and the city of Munich for a “deficient security concept” and the “serious mistakes” that doomed the rescue mission, according to the complaint. The suit was ultimately dismissed because of statute-of-limitations regulations.
Nonetheless, the families have largely focused their efforts on ensuring a place for remembrance of their loved ones in the fabric of the Olympic movement. After decades of lobbying, the victims’ families were heartened when the International Olympic Committee, led by a new president, Thomas Bach, agreed this year to help finance a permanent memorial in Munich. There are also plans to remember the Munich victims at the 2016 Summer Games in Rio de Janeiro.
At the moment, the victims will be included in a moment of remembrance for all athletes who have died at the Olympics; Ms. Spitzer and Ms. Romano continue to press for the Israeli athletes from Munich to be remembered apart from athletes who died in competition, arguing that their deaths were the result of unprecedented evil.
“The moment I saw the photos, it was very painful,” Ms. Romano said. “I remembered until that day Yossef as a young man with a big smile. I remembered his dimples until that moment.”
She hesitated. “At that moment, it erased the entire Yossi that I knew,” she said.

Thursday, December 3, 2015


Photo
A Shahab-3 missile on display in Tehran in 2008. Iranian scientists are alleged to have worked on two secret projects related to different technologies needed to design a nuclear warhead, including a detonation system to fit inside the nose cone of the Shahab. CreditHasan Sarbakhshian/Associated Press 
VIENNA — Iran was actively designing a nuclear weapon until 2009, more recently than the United States and other Western intelligence agencies have publicly acknowledged, according to a final report by the United Nations nuclear inspection agency.
The report, based on partial answers Iran provided after reaching its nuclear accord with the West in July, concluded that Tehran conducted “computer modeling of a nuclear explosive device” before 2004. It then resumed the efforts during President Bush’s second term and continued them into President Obama’s first year in office.
But while the International Atomic Energy Agency detailed a long list of experiments Iran had conducted that were “relevant to a nuclear explosive device,” it found no evidence that the effort succeeded in developing a complete blueprint for a bomb.
In part, that may have been because Iran refused to answer several essential questions, and appeared to have destroyed potential evidence in others.
The report, issued here Wednesday evening to the 167 countries that make up the board of the agency, is intended to complete a decade-long attempt to determine what kind of progress Iran made toward the technological art of designing a warhead that could fit atop a nuclear missile.
 
Continue reading the main storyVideo

Iran on U.N. Agency’s Nuclear Report

Abbas Araghchi, a deputy foreign minister and a senior nuclear negotiator, said the International Atomic Energy Agency report was generally favorable about Iran’s nuclear program.
 By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS on  Publish DateDecember 2, 2015.Watch in Times Video »
The completion of the report is one of the steps that Iran had to take — along with dismantling centrifuges and shipping nuclear fuel out of the country — before sanctions will be lifted under the nuclear deal.
Mr. Obama and his secretary of state, John Kerry, concluded this year that it was more important to secure a deal that will, if carried out fully, prevent Iran from gaining the material to build a bomb for at least 15 years than making it admit to past activities. So, the report’s publication allows the deal to go through, no matter how definitive or inconclusive the final result.
But Iran’s refusal to cooperate on central points could set a dangerous precedent as the United Nations agency tries to convince other countries with nuclear technology that they must fully answer queries to determine if they have a secret weapons program.
The agency’s bottom-line assessment was that Iran had made a “coordinated effort” to design and conduct tests on nuclear weapon components before 2003 — echoing a United States national intelligence estimate published in 2007 — and that it had conducted “some activities” thereafter.
“These activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies” and the acquisition of technical capabilities, the agency concluded. The efforts ended after 2009, or just as Mr. Obama was taking office and accelerating the sanctions and cybersabotage program against Iran’s nuclear facilities that ultimately brought Iranian officials to the negotiating table.
Tehran gave no substantive answers to one quarter of the dozen specific questions or documents it was asked about, leaving open the question of how much progress it had made.
The report, titled “Final Assessment of Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program,” will not satisfy either critics of the nuclear deal or those seeking exoneration for Iran. Instead, it draws a picture of a nation that was actively exploring the technologies, testing and components that would be needed to produce a weapon someday. However, it does not come to a conclusion about how successful that effort was.
The agency’s director, Yukiya Amano, said last week that the document would not be “black and white,” and that assessment proved correct.
Nothing in the report suggests that Iran will prevent the I.A.E.A. from monitoring its production of nuclear fuel for the next decade and a half, the crucial element of the July agreement. But Iran’s refusal to answer some of the questions also does not portend well for transparency about its activities.
At Iran’s Parchin complex, where the agency thought there had been nuclear experimental work in 2000, “extensive activities undertaken by Iran” to alter the site “seriously undermined” the agency’s ability to come to conclusions about past activities, the report said.
Diplomats familiar with the compilation of the report said the inspectors met “experts” in Iran, but would not say if they met the leader of the nuclear effort, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. (Other diplomats said Mr. Fakhrizadeh was definitely not among those the inspectors met.) One diplomat said Iran had said it feared that the scientists could be assassinated if they were identified. The agency said inspectors were able to visit two workshops.
Time and again, the I.A.E.A. seemed close to rejecting Iranian arguments that its experimentation was for civilian purposes. The inspectors found that Iran’s nuclear program was “suitable for the coordination of a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device” and that its experiments had “characteristics relevant to a nuclear explosive device.”
Continue reading the main story

Assessing Iran’s Progress 

Iran has disclosed new information on half of the dozen steps that it was alleged to have taken on a suspected nuclear weapons program. It has refused to provide new information to the International Atomic Energy Agency on three other steps. 
New Disclosures from Iran
No Additional Information Provided
NEUTRON INITIATOR
PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES
A spark plug at the core of some atom bombs, when compressed, fires bursts of subatomic
neutrons that help initiate the chain reactions.
Buyers acquire a range of devices, raw materials, specialty items and training needed for bomb development.
Iran confirms experiments but denies they were for a weapon.
Iran is alleged to have used ostensibly private companies as procurement cover.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
BOMB-FIRING TEST
Atomic design, manufacturing and testing require strong coordination and quality control. 
The underground test of an atom bomb requires long cables that carry high voltage to fire the sphere of detonators.
Iran admits to wide organization but denies it was for a bomb.

Iran is alleged to have studied long-distance firing.

DETONATORS
FUSING, ARMING AND FIRING SYSTEM
Fired electrically, detonators can start a nuclear blast as well as aid in mining and explosive welding.
A complex system atop a missile arms and fires an atom bomb when it reaches the intended target.
Iran detailed this work but denied it was used for weapons.
Iran is alleged to have worked on a firing system.​

EXPLOSIVE LENSES
The detonators ignite explosives that focus the shock wave inward to compress bomb fuel, making a supercritical mass.
Judgement: False Claim by Iran
FUEL COMPRESSION TEST
Iran admits to developing these, but for conventional weapons.
Experiments with a mock core make sure the explosive compression of bomb fuel is highly uniform.
COMPUTER MODELING AND CALCULATIONS
Agency doubts Iran’s explanation.
Computers can model how a bomb core releases subatomic particles in chain reactions.
No Evidence of Iranian Activities
Iran disclosed doing this through 2009.
URANIUM-235 METAL CORE
RE-ENTRY VEHICLE ON SHAHAB-3 MISSILE 
Uranium purified in factories gets turned into metal for casting and machining into bomb cores.
A nose cone atop a missile shields the bomb during fiery re-entry through the Earth’s atmosphere.
Agency found no evidence of such activities.
Iran confirmed existence of this work for conventional warheads.
COVERT ACQUISITION OF BOMB FUEL
The Nonproliferation Treaty forbids secret work on the acquisition of bombs.
Agency found no evidence.

In one or two areas, notably a document provided by Western intelligence agencies indicating that Iran was looking at how to make uranium metal, a step needed for a weapon, it found “no indication of Iran having conducted activities” related to the document.
Recently, as the report’s publication approached, Iran’s position of complete denial that it had sought a bomb seemed to soften. In October, a former Iranian president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, told journalists in Tehran that the nation had considered making nuclear arms during its war with Iraq in the 1980s but backed away.
“We sought to have that possibility for the day that the enemy might use a nuclear weapon,” he was quoted as saying. “That was the thinking. But it never became real.” He said nothing about what happened up to 2004 or the more sporadic efforts beyond.
The issues the I.A.E.A. addressed in Wednesday’s report date back a decade. Starting around mid-2004, thousands of pages of detailed evidence of Iran’s suspected research on how to design a weapon were collected by intelligence agencies in the United States, Israel and Europe, and eventually turned over to the agency’s inspectors here in Vienna.
Some of the evidence came from a laptop computer smuggled out of Iran by a person American and German officials identified as an Iranian technician, who had access to some of the most sensitive results from two secret Iranian nuclear projects. Both appeared related to different technologies needed to design a nuclear warhead, including the vital process of building a detonation system to fit inside the nose cone of Iran’s Shahab-3 missile, Persian for “shooting star.”
Iran claimed that the documents were fabrications, part of a Western conspiracy to set the groundwork for bombing the country’s nuclear facilities or overthrowing the government. The technician apparently never made it out of the country; he remained in Iran after sending the laptop out with his wife and family.
“We never figured out if he was imprisoned or executed,” a former intelligence officer involved in the operation said in an interview in 2008.
The year before that interview, however, American intelligence experts told the Bush administration about a surprising finding: While Iran once had a full-scale weapons development effort underway, it suspended the project sometime in late 2003, shortly after the American invasion of Iraq.
“Prior to 2003 they had a full-scale Manhattan Project,” said Gary Samore, Mr. Obama’s top nuclear proliferation expert in the first term. After that, he said, the effort was sporadic, even as Iran pressed ahead to build the facilities to produce uranium fuel — the program that was rolled back and frozen by the agreement reached in July.
Even after the 2007 report, though, I.A.E.A. inspectors pressed Iran to address the questions raised in the documents. In 2008, the agency’s chief inspector gathered officials from around the world into a large auditorium here and displayed the evidence to them. This included memos signed by Mr. Fakhrizadeh, the elusive academic who ran the program for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Iranian videos appearing to show how to detonate a weapon in an “air burst,” much as the bomb exploded high over Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945.
In 2011, frustrated that Iran had failed to honor several agreements to answer questions and turn over documents, the atomic agency published a list of a dozen issues — “possible military dimensions,” in bureaucratic jargon — that it had to clear up before it could close Iran’s file.
But as the deal got closer last spring, Mr. Obama and Mr. Kerry had to make a crucial decision: whether it was worth jeopardizing the deal by insisting that Iran must admit to its past activities. From all indications since then, the president seems to have decided that it was more important to get commitments about limiting future activities than to force Iranian officials to admit to a past the country insists never happened.
Mr. Kerry, pressed on the question of Iranian disclosure of past activities by Judy Woodruff on “PBS NewsHour,” said: “They have to do it. It will be done. If there’s going to be a deal, it will be done.” But weeks later, he said United States intelligence agencies already had “perfect knowledge” of Iran’s activities, suggesting that a public confession was not necessary.
The result was a carefully designed diplomatic compromise. Iran had to meet deadlines to turn over documents, but the agreement did not specify how complete the disclosures had to be, whether important scientists had to be interviewed or whether inspectors had to be allowed into the sensitive research sites, including some universities, where the work took place.
Correction: December 2, 2015 
An earlier version of this article misspelled the given name of the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He is Yukiya Amano, not Yukia.
THINGS-THE-US-GETS-WRONG-ABOUT-ISRAEL-AND-THE-MIDDLE-EAST ["mis-reading the Middle East, again"]



Dennis Ross:             December 1, 2015      "Misreading the Middle East, Again: The U.S. keeps making three fundamental mistakes regarding Israel and its Arab neighbors" [USNews]

http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/12/01/3-things-the-us-gets-wrong-about-israel-and-the-middle-east




It seems that in the Middle East everywhere one looks there is conflict and turmoil. The Arab state system itself is under assault. Islamic State group challenges every Arab regime and rejects all Shia. For its part, Iran and its Shia proxies threaten the authority of Sunni-dominated Arab countries. Understanding the nature of the threats and what is, in truth, a struggle over who will define and shape the identity of the region is the first requirement for fashioning a successful strategy.
Interestingly, given the circumstances in the area, Israel will stand in stark contrast to the rest of the Middle East, and continue to be a natural partner for the United States. It is not just that Israel is the only democracy in the region. It is that Israel is the only country whose institutions and rule of law – with elections where the loser accepts the outcome – permits it to cope with its problems. Those problems, ranging from the conflict with the Palestinians to its Arab minority and secular-religious divide, are real. But because it is a genuine democracy, Israel has the wherewithal to adjust – even if the adjustment often proves difficult to make.

It is harder to say that about other countries in the region. The American track-record in understanding the region – and the countries in it – is not great. In looking at the U.S.-Israeli relationship under presidents Harry Truman through Barack Obama in my new book, "Doomed to Succeed," it became apparent that in every administration three interrelated assumptions were embedded in the national security apparatus. First, if we distanced from Israel we would gain with the Arabs. Second, if we cooperated with Israel, we would lose with the Arabs. And third, if we wanted to transform our position in the region – and transform the region itself, we needed to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All three of these assumptions were fundamentally flawed.


As for the first, the Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter, Bush 41 and Obama administrations all distanced from Israel, expecting Arab responsiveness. None responded favorably to our distancing. Nixon went so far as to suspend the sale of F-4 Phantom planes to Israel in March of 1970 hoping that Egypt's then-president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, would respond. What made the Nixon gesture all the more remarkable is that he suspended the aircraft at the very moment the Soviet Union, for the first time in their history, was deploying its military personnel outside the Soviet bloc to Egypt. Nasser's response to Nixon was to increase his demands that we do more to cut Israel off.
The assumption that cooperation with Israel would cost us with the Arabs was just as off-base. President John Kennedy's administration was the first to provide modern weapons to Israel. He faced real opposition within his administration to doing so, with his secretary of state, Dean Rusk, arguing that to provide arms to Israel would set a terrible precedent and cause us grave damage with the Arabs. Yet when he met with Saudi Crown Prince Faisal the same day that the news of the sale leaked out, Faisal was focused on the coup in Yemen backed by Nasser, not our weapons to Israel. This, he said, posed a threat to Saudi Arabia and it needed U.S. arms and assurances. A week later, when Faisal met Kennedy, Faisal's focus remained on Egypt, not Israel, and he argued that our outreach and economic assistance to Egypt constituted a threat to the region: It was freeing up Egyptian resources to threaten U.S. friends and shift the regional balance of power against Saudi Arabia and the other western-oriented states in the Middle East. Once again, Faisal asked for U.S. arms and commitment to Saudi security.
History does have a way of repeating itself, and the arguments that Faisal made to Kennedy are the same ones that first King Abdullah and now King Salman of Saudi Arabia have made to President Obama about Iran. The Saudis and the other Gulf Arab states have repeatedly emphasized their concerns about the Obama administration's outreach to Iran and the consequences of the sanctions relief that will result from the Iran nuclear deal. Once again, the Saudis fear that a country they define as a regional trouble-maker – in the 1960s Egypt, today Iran – is going to benefit from our outreach.
What emerges from these examples, and others I outline in going through each administration, is that we have consistently misread the priorities of Arab leaders. It is not Israel; it is instead their security and survival. Regional rivals constitute the threats that they are preoccupied with, and they count on us to be the guarantor of security. Given that, they will never make their relationship with us dependent on our relationship with Israel.
In fact, it is our reliability that matters to them. If they perceive us as less reliable – which, fairly or not, they do today – that is what will affect their ties and responsiveness to us. And here we see the flaw in the last of the assumptions, the centrality of the Palestinians conflict to the region and our position in it. Most Arab leaders don't see it fundamentally affecting their security.
That does not mean they are indifferent to the Palestinian conflict. They know that it historically has resonated with their publics as an issue of injustice that needs to be righted. But today it tends to take a backseat with Arab publics to other conflicts – the Syrian civil war and the threats from Islamic State group and Iran.

So what does all this mean for U.S. policymakers? For starters, we need a clear concept guiding our strategy. It is natural that defeating the Islamic State group would seem to be our priority, but for that we need the Sunni states – only the Sunni states and tribes can discredit the Islamic State. That rules out partnering with Bashar Assad or the Iranians in Syria even as we seek to build our collective leverage on the ground to shape a political process that at some point can bring that civil war to an end.
Ironically, today most of the Arab Sunni states see Israel as a bulwark against both the Iranians and Islamic State and groups claiming loyalty to it. While they may keep their cooperation largely private – given public sensitivities about the Palestinian issue – the scope of what Israel is now doing with a number of Arab states on security is unprecedented. That is one area we should emphasize, particularly given the value it would have in convincing our traditional friends in the region that we understand the threats that worry them most. Demonstrating that, and restoring the image of American reliability, will make it easier to ask more of our regional partners in countering the Islamic State group and Iran's destabilizing actions in the region. Ultimately, debunking assumptions that have misled us in the region is a must for any strategy to be successful. 



Wednesday, December 2, 2015

The US never really expected Iran to come totally clean about a key element of its nuclear program {illustrations may be truncated}






The Iran nuclear deal will clear a crucial milestone on December 15, when the International Atomic Energy Agency submits a report on the extent of Iran's previous nuclear-weaponization activities.
The completion of that investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMDs) of Iran's nuclear program is one of the major prerequisites for the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the landmark nuclear deal that Iran and a US-led group of six countries signed in July.
In theory, the JCPOA won't be implemented unless Iran complies with a separate "roadmap" agreement with the IAEA. That agreement, which was signed the same day as the JCPOA, lays out the parameters of the agency's weaponization investigation. The JCPOA isn't supposed to go into effect unless the sides "fully implement" that roadmap agreement.
But "full implementation" doesn't really have a fixed meaning within the JCPOA, an agreement that is voluntary and non-binding. And according to an Associated Press analysis out Monday, the IAEA's investigation is likely going to have inconclusive results.
As the AP notes, the head of the IAEA has "been careful to diminish expectations, describing his upcoming report last week as 'not black and white.'" And according to the AP, Iranian officials have spoken about the IAEA probe using similar language, "suggesting they already know that the agency's conclusions won't be damning."
Iran has already threatened that it simply won't comply with the JCPOA if it's dissatisfied with the IAEA's report. That might be more than just an empty ultimatum, since according to the AP the announcement is consistent with what Iranian diplomats are saying behind closed doors as well.
"Two Western diplomats familiar with the issue say those same threats have been made in negotiations with IAEA officials," the AP reported.
The weaponization report is considered crucial to the successful implementation of the nuclear deal, as it will be used to formulate an inspection baseline for Iran's nuclear program. There is extensive evidence that Iran had a nuclear weapons program until as late as 2003.  The IAEA needs to be able to identify key personnel, facilities, supply chains, and past activities to establish exactly how far along Iran's weaponization activities really are and to recognize whether those activities have been restarted.
But as the AP's analysis suggests, the roadmap is also contentious — and perhaps even inconvenient, given its potential to interrupt the smooth implementation of a deal that Iran and the US-led group spent nearly two years negotiating. There are already signs that the US wants to get past the investigation as smoothly as possible — even if the IAEA's "roadmap" doesn't result in Iran's full disclosure of its past weaponization work.
screenshot 2015-07-29 14.34.19.png
REUTERS

Business Insider has obtained a State Department document submitted to congressional offices during the Congress's review of the JCPOA in July.
The 18-page document, a "verification assessment report" that is essentially the department's outline of the nuclear deal's various stipulations, is unclassified. But congressional staffers were only allowed to read it inside of a SCIF, or a special area for viewing and storing classified or compartmentalized information.
The section entitled "Addressing 'Possible Military Dimensions'" discusses the US' interpretation of the IAEA "roadmap" and its requirements.
"Iran's implementation of its commitments under the Roadmap will bring to an end the years-long delay in the IAEA's ability to address PMD [Possible Military Dimensions] issues," the document reads.
Two paragraphs later, it explains that even with this high level of confidence that the IAEA investigation will resolve the PMD issue, the US' standards fall somewhat short of full Iranian disclosure on weaponization-related matters.
"An Iranian admission of its past nuclear weapons program is unlikely and is not necessary for purposes of verifying JCPOA commitments going forward," the report reads. "US confidence on this front is based in large part on what we believe we already know about Iran's past activities"
"The United States has shared with the IAEA relevant information, and crafted specific JCPOA measures that will enable inspectors to establish confidence that previously reported Iranian PMD activities are not ongoing," it continued. "If credible information becomes available regarding any renewed Iranian efforts, it would be shared with the IAEA as appropriate, whether involving previous people, locations, entities, or otherwise. We believe other IAEA member states will do the same."
This report was circulated in Congress not long after the deal was signed. From a relatively early stage, the State Department believed that the IAEA was capable of monitoring Iran's nuclear program without Iran fully disclosing its past activities.
This wasn't because of any particular US trust in the Iranians. Rather, it was due to State's confidence that US intelligence already knew enough about the extent of Iran's weaponization program to make such an admission of past weaponization work unnecessary.

Even so, State apparently never expected full Iranian transparency on weaponization. And the Obama administration believed that Iran had no responsibility to admit to a past weaponization program under the JCPOA.
Washington always intended to give Iran a pass on full disclosure — and the result may be a watered-down IAEA investigation that's treated more as a formality than as an integral element of an arms control agreement designed to last for decades.