Sunday, April 5, 2015


What Should Israel Do Now That Its Neighbors Are Collapsing?
Israel’s formerly quiet borders are now ungoverned zones filled with guerrillas. How should the Jewish state adapt?

Lazar Berman, news editor at the Times of Israel and a reserve infantry officer in the IDF, has written for the Journal of Strategic Studies, Commentary, and other publications.
Gidi Netzer, a colonel in the IDF reserves, is a long-time adviser to Israeli and non-Israeli political figures, military commanders, and intelligence services.

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his past January, an Israeli airstrike on the Syrian Golan Heights killed up to twelve enemy fighters. These were not conventional Syrian forces, of the kind stationed across the mainly quiet frontier for decades. Israel’s pilots were after something new and far more troubling: Hizballah men (including senior commanders) and an Iranian general believed to have been scouting the border area for opportunities to carry out kidnappings, rocket attacks, and infiltrations into northern Israel. Meanwhile, in the very same volatile region, al-Qaeda-affiliated guerrillas and moderate Syrian rebels have been engaging in pitched battles with Hizballah and other Iranian-backed forces.
No quieter is the region hugging Israel’s southern border. Also in January, jihadists launched a series of attacks against Egyptian security forces in the Sinai, killing at least 30. The Egyptian government accused the Palestinian terror group Hamas of involvement in the attacks.
At first glance, these two violent episodes seem unrelated, one the product of the civil war tearing Syria apart, the other the result of alliances between jihadist groups and tribes holding longstanding grievances against Cairo. On closer examination, however, both incidents, as well as other developments taking shape on Israel’s borders, can be seen as products of a larger process driving events in the region.
Since 2010, as a result of the Arab revolutions, sovereign state rule has been imploding. As it recedes, stretches of territory have emerged in which an array of forces, armed with advanced capabilities and led by religious sects, ethnic groups, and especially tribal entities, operates freely. Also moving into these essentially ungoverned zones are global jihadist entities like al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS). The phenomenon is occurring across the Middle East: in Syria, Iraq, the Sinai, Yemen, and potentially in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
The challenge presents unique issues for advanced conventional militaries like Israel’s—different from those posed by such familiar non-state adversaries as Hizballah and Hamas, both of which see themselves as national religious movements. Conventional armies have been drawn by the new actors into long wars of attrition and have yet to solve the problem of defeating them decisively.
This emerging reality demands a reassessment of Israel’s approach both to the security threats on its immediate borders and to those emanating from deeper inside hostile territory. Innovations in intelligence-gathering, technology, training, force structure: all are needed. And such innovations, to be effective, must emerge out of an understanding of the new trends sweeping the Middle East.
Israel’s broader region of strategic interest stretches well beyond the Middle East through a swath of Africa and Asia. From the Horn of Africa to Central Asia, from the Sahel to West Asia and the Hindu Kush, money, weapons and fighters flow to conflicts near Israel’s borders. There, as government control contracts or collapses, guerrilla campaigns, led mainly by tribes, are becoming the region’s dominant feature. Using terrorism as a core tactic, these groups enjoy the cooperation of other, like-minded organizations and the support of states like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.
The non-state actors operating in these ungoverned zones present no clear command or organizational structure. They, and often individual cells within them, decide independently when and where to initiate attacks. Growing and developing without ostensible logic, they spawn temporary, changing, and mobile formations that the most capable Western intelligence agencies have struggled to track. In addition, the deep cultural DNA of the tribal and ethnic fighters in these areas allows them to keep fighting indefinitely against far superior conventional forces.
The tribal and ethnic groups are not the only problem. Traditional powers can and do exploit the chaos to improve their own positions and move weapons and forces to the borders of enemy states. Foreign state actors can also manipulate guerrilla groups into forming confederations that serve their own interests.
With armed groups spread across national borders, the borders themselves have become increasingly meaningless. This, in turn, has enabled money, weapons, and fighters to flow to conflicts in close vicinity to Israel. On the frontlines of the battle against IS in November of last year, the Israeli journalist Itai Anghel reported being able to stroll back and forth across what was once the major border crossing between Syria and Iraq. If an Ashkenazi Jew from Tel Aviv can cross that border unnoticed, so can every type of weapon and fighter. The same goes for the Lebanese-Syrian frontier, blurred by Hizballah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war.

A quick tour
of the ungoverned zones bordering Israel will give a sense of the gravity of the threat.
In the north, Syria has lost its coherence as a country. The Assad regime controls the Mediterranean coast and much of southwestern Syria. Kurds hold the northeastern corner bordering Iraq and Turkey. Meanwhile, across the ungoverned zones in much of central and eastern Syria, guerrilla armies have seized power. These are the poorest and most neglected regions of the country, where hostility to Assad and the Alawites runs high and where local tribes took an early role in protests and then in armed resistance against the regime. In this large area, with fighters largely dressed in civilian clothes and constantly battling each other as they move into new sectors, the IDF cannot readily identify the enemy.
Nor does this begin to account for the whole dizzying mix of organizations on both the pro- and anti-Assad sides of the conflict. They include Syrian Sunni jihadist groups like the al-Qaeda affiliate Jubhat al-Nusra, or Nusra Front; the nationalist Free Syrian Army (some groups within which are also supported by Islamists); the Lebanese Fatah al-Islam; the Muslim Brotherhood; Islamic State; and several Salafist organizations. All told, some 15,000 fighters from at least 80 countries have streamed into Syria, among them militants from North Africa, Turkey, Europe, and as far afield as Yemen, the Maghreb, the Horn of Africa, central Asia, and China.
Most of the Syrian Golan, on Israel’s border, is controlled by the Nusra Front, whose stronghold is the city of Daraa just north of Jordan. In the same region, the Assad regime still holds the Druze area of al-Hader, from which attacks on Israeli troops have originated.
The fighting in the Golan has also severely endangered the UN observer force on the Syrian-Israeli border, one of the few stabilizing influences in the region. In March 2013, 21 Philippine soldiers were kidnapped; six months later, the Irish contingent was attacked; in August 2014, 45 Fijian peacekeepers were seized by the Nusra Front, with dozens more fleeing into Israel. Since then, Austria, Japan, and Croatia have withdrawn their troops.
Iran and its proxy Hizballah, whose main role has been to prop up the Assad regime, have exploited the Syrian chaos to improve their position against Israel and create a forward base for Tehran. As arms transfers increase in both quantity and quality, Iran has managed to organize and direct into combat a force that includes Hizballah, conventional Revolutionary Guard troops as well as crack Quds fighters, homegrown Syrian militias, and unaffiliated Shiite combatants. Iran and Hizballah’s moves on the Golan Heights, temporarily stalled by the Israeli airstrike in January and a failed offensive by Hizballah, regime forces, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard advisers to take the area from the opposition, are clearly intended to open a Golan front against Israel.
Also to Israel’s north, the government of Lebanon has been able to exercise higher levels of control than does Syria’s, but rival elements in the country could push it into looking more like its neighbor to the east. Sectarian violence is common. Lebanon is home both to Palestinian terror groups and to global jihadi organizations, some affiliated with al-Qaeda. Many are taking an active part in the combat in Syria.
But the strongest actor in Lebanon is Iran’s proxy, Hizballah. Though it has suffered as a result of its participation in the Syrian civil war, having sacrificed more than 1,100 fighters and seen its support weaken as Lebanese parents lose children in Syria, the Shiite terror organization still controls both sides of the Lebanese-Syrian border, in the central portion of which it has established a permanent security zone. For now, it is unlikely that Hizballah will initiate a direct, sustained conflict with Israel, but it will continue to help other groups launch periodic attacks that remind Jerusalem of its presence. Such attacks could spread to the Israeli-Lebanese border as well.
Moving south, Israel’s long border with Jordan is relatively secure and stable, but there is no guarantee it will remain that way. Although Islamic State is not yet strong enough to invade Jordan as it did Iraq, it can spark unrest by carrying out terror attacks in the kingdom, where its fighters are already operating. Last August, Jordanian forces arrested 71 Islamist activists, including members of IS and the Nusra Front. IS’s horrific immolation of the Jordanian pilot Muaz Kasasbeh in February may well have been designed to drag Jordan deeper into a fight that could yet wash back across the kingdom’s borders.


As for the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, areas of prime concern to Israeli commanders and decision-makers, they are not ungoverned zones. Still, as we will soon see, developments in Gaza affect Sinai terrorism, and there are multiple terrorist groups operating in Gaza even as the territory as a whole is controlled tightly by Hamas—itself, of course, a terrorist organization pledged to Israel’s destruction. On the West Bank, Israeli and PA security services work to ensure that the area doesn’t disintegrate in a manner akin to the Sinai or Syria.
On Israel’s southern border lies Egypt’s Sinai peninsula, rapidly turning into an ungoverned zone dominated by a tribal guerrilla campaign. The actors there fall into five broad categories. First, there are the locals, mainly Bedouin tribesmen who initially turned to terrorism for economic reasons. Next, Palestinian terrorist groups, primarily from Gaza, have used the peninsula both as a safe zone that Israel dare not strike for fear of upsetting its peace with Egypt and as a launching pad for attacks on southern Israel. Then there are jihadist groups from the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa, followed by jihadist organizations like al-Qaeda from farther afield. Finally, Iran uses the peninsula as a smuggling route into Gaza and as part of the ring of hostility it has been working to create on Israel’s borders.
Sinai has long been a region of weak government control. Deposed Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak pushed Bedouin tribes away from the coast, locking them out of the lucrative tourism industry on the Red Sea. Their economic prospects damaged along with their honor, the tribes turned to terrorism against Egyptian security forces and infrastructure. After Mubarak’s fall from power in 2011, tribal fighters drove security forces out of northern Sinai, killing dozens, putting up roadblocks and checkpoints, attacking police stations, and repeatedly sabotaging the gas lines into Israel and Jordan.
In doing so, the Bedouin took advantage of existing family ties, used until then to facilitate smuggling. Then, as Salafist groups managed to make inroads among the tribes, and Palestinian organizations like Hamas and Islamic Jihad did the same, many young Sinai Bedouin started growing beards, wearing Salafi garb, and abandoning tribal norms in favor of Islamist principles. Attacks by jihadist groups are now often carried out entirely by members of Bedouin tribes. In the aftermath of a 2013 drone strike that killed four militants, a statement released by the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis terrorist group, many of whose fighters have pledged loyalty to Islamic State, identified all four dead as Sinai Bedouin from different tribes.
As for the Palestinian terrorist groups in the Sinai, their presence grew dramatically after the 2005 Israeli disengagement from Gaza, when IDF forces were removed from the Philadelphi corridor separating the Sinai from Gaza, thus freeing up the hundreds of cross-border tunnels that were Hamas’s primary smuggling route for arms and fighters. Treating the Sinai as its strategic hinterland, Hamas developed a network of intelligence operatives, recruiters, and safe houses. Weapons came from Iran, Sudan, and occasionally the Balkans, Maghreb, and the Horn of Africa.
President Abdel-Fatah El-Sisi, with Israeli consent, has increased Egyptian military activity in the peninsula. Last October, after the attacks by jihadists that left more than 30 Egyptian soldiers dead, Sisi redoubled his efforts, reinforcing the 12 battalions already stationed there with elite army units, including anti-terror battalions. But the problem is far from being solved, and the peninsula remains a terror hub that threatens Israel in a variety of ways. In June 2014, Egypt deployed several hundred soldiers at Taba to stop militants from firing missiles at Israeli airplanes in Eilat. As it happens, the attacks were carried out entirely by Sinai tribesmen, marking a break with the Bedouin policy up to that point of focusing their attacks on Egyptian targets. Rockets have also been fired numerous times at Eilat.
The rocket threat is likely to get worse, and not just from the Sinai and Gaza. Iran has an interest in seeing Israel surrounded by rockets targeting every inch of its territory, and is working to create that reality. Fighters in Syria have captured Scud missiles from overrun Syrian army bases; they could easily find their way into the hands of groups targeting Israel.
Nor are threats limited to ground-based weaponry and forces. Israeli ships could also see increased threats. In Yemen, the Shiite Houthi rebels backed by Iran, after capturing the capital of Sanaa, took control of the strategic Red Sea port of al-Hudayda, potentially giving Tehran a commanding position on Israel’s route to the Indian Ocean and its Asian markets beyond. Back in the 1970s, as Avi Issacharoff has noted in the Times of Israel, Palestinian terrorists used to attack Israeli ships passing through this waterway; Iran could well try to replicate those attacks today. Iran’s strategic position in Yemen has only improved over the ensuing months as daily flights from Tehran started landing in the country and its U.S.-supported president fled the capital.

What can Israel do
to cope with the high- and low-tech threats from these ungoverned zones, with the uncertain intelligence picture, and with the ability of traditional enemies like Iran to improve their position?
The overarching principle for Israeli military units tasked with fighting in these zones or on their edges should be to imitate the guerrillas’ strengths: to create uncertainty, as they do, by continuously changing tactics and shape and favoring multiple small-unit actions over heavier maneuver. And to move quickly: as targets present themselves only for brief periods of time, the “loop” from detection, to identification, to neutralization needs to be even faster than at present, especially since it will be impossible to pick up many operations while they are still in the planning phase.
The IDF has taken steps in the right direction. In 2013, recognizing that a conventional Syrian invasion of the Golan Heights was no longer a realistic prospect, Benny Gantz , then the IDF’s chief of staff, relieved the Israeli armored Division 36 on the Syrian border, replacing it with a new formation made up of rotating infantry units and focused on border security and surveillance. These units were the first in the IDF to operate “multi-sensor systems,” which pull together radar and visual data into one concrete warning. The border fence between Israel and Syria has also been completely overhauled; it is now fifteen feet high and can withstand anti-tank missiles.
Another useful step was the 2011 rejuvenation of the Depth Corps, which coordinates the IDF’s long-range operations and its capacity to strike deep inside enemy territory. This was not an entirely new idea. Back in 1991, when Saddam Hussein was firing Scud missiles at Tel Aviv, the IDF drew up plans to take over launch sites in western Iraq. One special-forces group tasked with playing a major role in the planned operation was the air force’s Shaldag (“Kingfisher”) unit, then commanded by Gantz himself.
Still, the upheavals of the last couple of years have created a demand for more drastic innovation. In the words of reservist Brig.-Gen. Gal Hirsch, deputy commander of the Depth Corps, Israel’s opponent “has become sophisticated, agile, and diversified, and has a faint intelligence signature. . . . [This] makes it extremely difficult for state security organizations to stay informed of the rate of his learning and evolution process.”
Writing in Israel Defense three years ago, Hirsch recommended that “in the face of our unique, irregular opponent, we should develop unique, irregular organizations and regard them as our main force for these times.” Hirsch foresaw new IDF formations: smaller, technologically more advanced, with enhanced capabilities and the freedom to exploit them. “These forces may operate under their own legislation and procedures,” he wrote. “They are educated to improvise, to develop relevant knowledge, to initiate and to evolve constantly.” Only thus, with “new players and new game boards,” could Israel change the rules of the game to its advantage.
It is inevitable, for example, that Israel will again be forced to operate inside neighboring territory. Instead of heavy tank and infantry maneuver, preference will have to be given to small, mobile units. In effect, it will be guerrilla vs. guerrilla, but ideally with an Israeli advantage in training, technology, intelligence, and numbers. Dozens of IDF columns will need to operate independently and simultaneously, converging on targets from different directions, then disappearing.
This, too, is not an entirely new concept; in some respects, it is a very old one. Jewish mobile commando units formed in pre-state Mandatory Palestine—notably, Orde Wingate’s “Special Night Squads” and the Haganah’s “Fosh” field companies—operated with great effectiveness against Arab insurgents.
Other pre-state models are also still relevant. Through tunnels and breaches of the border fence, Hamas and Hizballah already pose a threat to Israeli communities on the borders of Gaza and Lebanon, and Syrian rebels could soon turn their attention to Golan villages. The infiltration and capture of a border kibbutz, even for a few hours, would be a nightmare for Israel, with dozens of civilians killed or captured.
Unfortunately, in September 2013, the IDF decided to cease deploying soldiers inside 22 border communities, opting instead to focus on improved protection of the border itself. In today’s circumstances, as in yesteryear’s, a wiser policy would be to station IDF units within those communities, capable ofresponding independently without waiting for help to be summoned via a centralized command center.
Changes can also be made to protect the borders themselves. By their nature, borders favor static and predictable defensive actions. Fixed observation posts abound and patrols are often conducted on a predictable schedule and along a predictable route. Terrorists thus know what to expect: a no-man’s land, a smart fence, cameras, observation posts, mobile patrols. Nor is it difficult to develop a clear picture of how the defenders operate: just pay a few unarmed men to touch the fence or try to get over it, and you’ll gain a good idea of how long it takes for a response and where it arrives from.
Hizballah has enjoyed success against IDF patrols since Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon. That same year, it ambushed a patrol jeep, kidnapping and killing three soldiers. Six years later, it attacked two IDF armored Humvees on the border, killing five soldiers. The bodies of two of them were spirited into Lebanon in the incident that sparked the second Lebanon war. And attacks continue amid the present-day chaos. Last March, four Israeli soldiers were hurt in a blast along the Golan border fence south of Majdal Shams. In October, a Hizballah IED injured two soldiers in the Shebaa Farms area. In January of this year, an IDF soldier and officer were killed by a volley of Hizballah Kornet missiles that struck an Israeli convoy near Har Dov.
In response, Israel must become as unpredictable as the groups on its border, and there can be no clear line beyond which terrorists know they are safe.

Although the most pressing threats
are still on the border, that should not keep commanders from devoting particular attention to where many of those threats originate. Better and longer-range intelligence will enable Israel to counter weapons smuggling and the formation of plots before they reach the ungoverned zones close to home. Such intelligence has already been critical, for example, to intercepting Iranian weapons ships before they unload in Sudan for the trek across the Sinai to Gaza.
Many of the tools in this effort will be technological. Though traditional satellite reconnaissance over ungoverned zones is not an answer to tribal terrorism, it can help track the movement of weapons shipments and fighters. If armed groups decide on a major attack, and especially if they provide themselves with biological or chemical agents (“the poor man’s WMD”), sensors similar to those employed by the U.S. can provide early warning.
If technological intelligence is crucial, human intelligence is no less important. In zones with a multitude of actors and combatants, understanding the culture, norms, religious beliefs, and rationales of tribes and ethnic groups can offer insight into capabilities, tendencies, and shifting alliances. It can also open a window into possible opportunities for quiet partnerships. This can be used by both Israel and moderate governments like Egypt to wean tribes away from jihadi groups, as the ties remain in place only so long as tribal interests are met and honor protected. Israel’s ability to do this is limited by the fact that tribes operating in Egypt and Syria nurse grievances against the policies of the central government, not Israel. But by offering a range of assistance, Jerusalem can work to enlist groups who might ensure that when common enemies attack Israel, they will have to fend off local militias as well as the IDF.
And that brings us to the other side of the picture—where, amid the dizzying range of potential threats, opportunities emerge. Alarmed by Iran’s hegemonic ambitions and its steadily evolving nuclear-weapons program, and stunned by the brutal efficiency of Islamic State, Western-oriented Arab states are working together and in quiet cooperation with Israel to resist, contain, and, where possible, defeat common foes. Egypt and Israel are coordinating efforts to combat terrorism in the Sinai and smuggling into and out of Gaza, and Israel has acquiesced in the introduction of heavier Egyptian formations to conduct anti-terror campaigns in the peninsula. The IDF and Jordanian armed forces work together to keep terrorists from crossing Israel’s border.
In the face of Iran’s moves across the region, both in ungoverned zones and in more traditional areas, it became conceivable that Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the UAE would form a military alliance, and in fact such an alliance coalesced quickly in response to the Houthi takeover of Yemen. Led by Saudi Arabia (but not, notably, by America) and backed by Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, Morocco, and other Sunni states, it has carried out waves of airstrikes while readying a ground invasion. The coalition, whose interests align closely with those of Israel, the strongest military power in the region, will likely endure.
In this era of collapsing state control, Gal Hirsch has called upon Israel to develop new players and new game boards. But the enemies’ new game boards are already here, and so are the new and fiercely aggressive players. For the IDF, the key is to anticipate threats and to develop flexible approaches before those threats materialize. Doing so will take vision, creativity, and daring; fortunately, these are precisely the traits for which the IDF has long been known and feared.

Saturday, April 4, 2015



1400 Year History  of Islam in Europe (Dr Bill Warner)
... and how it effects us to this day. This  history based on numbers and facts on its doctrine and practice.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_Qpy0mXg8Y

Published on Aug 31, 2012



What Putin's Backing of Iran Nuke Deal Reveals
Owen Matthews    4-15



When Barack Obama goes to Congress to sell the nuclear deal thrashed out with Iran in Lausanne, Switzerland, he will likely replay his pitch that the agreement offers “a peaceful resolution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” To fiercely skeptical U.S. allies, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, the White House will likely say that this is a breakthrough opportunity for Tehran to shed its rogue status after 30 years of hostility between the U.S. and Iran. The underlying logic is that Iran, once it falls under international scrutiny, will become a U.S. ally against Sunni Islamist extremism. Another remarkable element of the deal is that it seems to have been the result of a joint effort between Washington and Moscow who, for all their bitter differences over Ukraine, have momentarily come together to work for peace in the Middle East.
If only the Iranians—and their Russian allies—saw things that way.

Instead, according to Iran’s Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan, “Iran and Russia are able to confront the expansionist intervention and greed of the United States through cooperation, synergy and activating strategic potential capacities.” When his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, traveled to Tehran in January to sign a comprehensive agreement on military cooperation between the two countries, he spoke of “Russia and Iran’s joint struggle with the intervention of outside forces in the region”—read the U.S.—and predicted that “a powerful Russia and a powerful Iran [will] jointly promote international security and regional stability.”
During those talks Russia offered Iran its latest Antey-2500 anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense system—an upgraded version of the S-300 system that international pressure persuaded Russia not to sell to the Iranians in 2010.
“Iran promises to suspend its [nuclear] weapons program—but at the same time is negotiating to buy a missile defense system that will protect its nuclear facilities from U.S. or Israeli attacks?” asks one retired Western ambassador with detailed knowledge of the Iran nuclear talks, who requested anonymity. “You can see why many are finding it hard to believe that [Tehran] is negotiating in good faith.”
Other reasons to distrust Iran include its support for Houthi insurgents in Yemen, fomenting of unrest among Shiites in Bahrain, supplying arms and aid to Hamas and Hezbollah, controlling Shiite militias in Iraq and propping up Bashar Assad in Damascus—all of which suggest to skeptics that Tehran is seeking to establish itself as an enemy of the West, Israel and the Sunni world. And Moscow has been Tehran’s willing partner in at least part of that endeavor. Russia has been working closely with Iran to support Moscow’s only other Middle Eastern ally to survive the Arab Spring—the Assad regime in Syria. Over the past four years Russia has provided Assad with assault weapons, grenades, tank parts, fighter jets, attack helicopters, military advisers, anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range air defense missiles that have downed at least one NATO plane: a Turkish F-4 fighter in 2012.

Members of the Ukrainian armed forces drive a tank in the settlement of Luhanske, Donetsk region, March 27, 2015. Oleksandr Klymenko/Reuters
Why has Russia spent so much money and diplomatic capital on interfering with a region so far from its borders? Because Russia, Iran and China represent the three world powers that are in different ways seeking to challenge the post–World War II, Western-led status quo, according to Walter Russell Mead of Bard College. “Russia wants to reassemble as much of the Soviet Union as it can.… Iran wishes to replace the current order in the Middle East, led by Saudi Arabia and dominated by Sunni Arab states, with one centered on Tehran,” argues Mead in an essay i n Foreign Affairs magazine. “Leaders in all three countries also agree that U.S. power is the chief obstacle to achieving their revisionist goals.”
In other words, the main wellspring of Moscow’s interest in arming Iran and backing Assad is to use that leverage to extract concessions from Washington for its own empire-building closer to home. “Moscow looks at its role in the Iran talks not so much in its own terms but in how it can play into issues of more central interest to itself,” says Mark Galeotti, a professor of global affairs at New York University. “The West is forced to recognize Moscow's status as a global power; Iran can feel it has been a good ally; and other current or potential Russian allies can be reassured.”
But what makes Russia’s role in pushing for the lifting of U.N. sanctions on Iran somewhat counterintuitive is that in practical terms such an outcome will be very bad news for Russia’s economy. “Iran needs cash and will not agree to hold back as part of an OPEC [oil] supply–reduction deal,” says analyst Chris Weafer of Macro Advisory. “While a deal with Iran regarding its nuclear program will open up the country's energy sector for investment and eventually lead not only to a restoration of the 1 million barrels of daily output lost since sanctions were tightened against Tehran, but will also lead to a longer-term rise in both oil and gas output.”
Iran’s supply of natural gas is enormous—and the most obvious market is Europe, via Turkey’s well-developed pipeline network, that feeds directly into the Balkans. That, of course, is also the heartland of Gazprom’s consumer base. Income from Russia’s state-owned gas giant accounts for over 20 percent of that country’s budget.

Iran’s gas coming online will exacerbate the problems that have already taken Gazprom’s profits down some 30 percent over the past four years. Economic slowdown in Europe has meant falling energy consumption, the U.S. shale gas revolution has pushed down oil prices, and the spread of Liquefied Natural Gas technology is allowing gas from Qatar and the U.S. to reach Europe. More important still is the fear factor in the wake of Russia’s invasion of the Crimea in 2014 that has sent customers in former Soviet-bloc states such as the Baltics and Poland rushing for alternative energy sources.
Ukraine cut gas imports from Russia 44 percent to 14.5 billion cubic meters last year, according to its national pipeline operator, and it promises to reduce its dependence on Gazprom by 80 percent by the end of 2015. Iranian gas is now set to challenge Gazprom’s supplies to Turkey, one of Russia’s major energy markets, as well as Europe.
There is another factor in weighing Russia’s economic interests: Iran’s aggressive regional policies are fueling one growth industry in Russia—and that’s war. “I don't conceal it, and everyone understands this: The more conflicts there are, the more they buy weapons from us,” Sergei Chemezov, head of the Russian state arms industry conglomerate Rostec, told reporters in Tehran in January. “Volumes are continuing to grow despite sanctions. Mainly, it's Latin America and the Middle East.”
Being friends with Iran (and an Iran that will have more money to spend after sanctions are lifted) may be good for the Russian arms industry—last year Moscow sold more than $15 billion of military hardware around the world—as well as Russian companies rushing to build roads, pipelines and infrastructure. But those interests are dwarfed by the potential damage to Russia’s economy from falling oil prices and lost gas markets.
Russia’s veteran Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has been pushing long and hard for the lifting of sanctions on Iran. Why? One simple reason is habit: For most of the past two decades the U.S. has pushed for sanctions and, under a variety of administrations, Russia has felt the need to resist. But with a shift of policy in both Tehran and Washington toward rapprochement since 2012, Moscow has unexpectedly found itself on the same side as its archrival, the United States.
Russia’s behavior over the past year seems to way just me and in that geopolitics matter more to the Kremlin than economic self-interest. U.S. and European economic sanctions in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014—including an asset freeze on Chemezov and dozens of other Putin cronies—have put Russia’s economy into a tailspin, but that hasn’t made a difference to Putin’s support for rebels in Eastern Ukraine.
As the U.S.’s grand bargain with Iran enters its last and most painful stage, Moscow will certainly look to use any leverage in the Iran talks to forestall any expansion in the sanctions that really matter to Putin—those on Russia.
Fundamentally, Russia’s interest in the Middle East remains in “keeping the pot bubbling, but not boiling over…whether [ISIS] in Syria and Iraq, or the Yemen mess,” says Galeotti. “The more the Middle East is in chaos, the more the West—and Washington in particular—is focused on the region, and not on Ukraine or Eurasia in general.” 

 The diplomatic track to war
The world powers assembled at Lausanne, Switzerland, with the representatives of the Islamic Republic may or may not reach a framework deal regarding Iran’s nuclear program. But succeed or fail, the disaster that their negotiations have unleashed is already unfolding. The damage they have caused is irreversible.
US President Barack Obama, his advisers and media cheerleaders have long presented his nuclear diplomacy with the Iran as the only way to avoid war. Obama and his supporters have castigated as warmongers those who oppose his policy of nuclear appeasement with the world’s most prolific state sponsor of terrorism.
But the opposite is the case. Had their view carried the day, war could have been averted.

Through their nuclear diplomacy, Obama and his comrades started the countdown to war.
In recent weeks we have watched the collapse of the allied powers’ negotiating positions.
They have conceded every position that might have placed a significant obstacle in Iran’s path to developing a nuclear arsenal.
They accepted Iran’s refusal to come clean on the military dimensions of its past nuclear work and so ensured that to the extent UN nuclear inspectors are able to access Iran’s nuclear installations, those inspections will not provide anything approaching a full picture of its nuclear status. By the same token, they bowed before Iran’s demand that inspectors be barred from all installations Iran defines as “military” and so enabled the ayatollahs to prevent the world from knowing anything worth knowing about its nuclear activities.
On the basis of Iran’s agreement to ship its stockpile of enriched uranium to Russia, the US accepted Iran’s demand that it be allowed to maintain and operate more than 6,000 centrifuges.
But when on Monday Iran went back on its word and refused to ship its uranium to Russia, the US didn’t respond by saying Iran couldn’t keep spinning 6,000 centrifug
The US delegation willingly acceded to Iran’s demand that it be allowed to continue operating its fortified, underground enrichment facility at Fordow. In so doing, the US minimized the effectiveness of a future limited air campaign aimed at significantly reducing Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
With this broad range of great power concessions already in its pocket, the question of whether or not a deal is reached has become a secondary concern. The US and its negotiating partners have agreed to a set of understanding with the Iranians. Whether these understandings become a formal agreement or not is irrelevant because the understandings are already being implemented.
True, the US has not yet agreed to Iran’s demand for an immediate revocation of the economic sanctions now standing against it. But the notion that sanctions alone can pressure Iran into making nuclear concessions has been destroyed by Obama’s nuclear diplomacy in which the major concessions have all been made by the US.
No sanctions legislation that Congress may pass in the coming months will be able to force a change in Iran’s behavior if they are not accompanied by other coercive measures undertaken by the executive branch.
There is nothing new in this reality. For a regime with no qualms about repressing its society, economic sanctions are not an insurmountable challenge. But it is possible that if sanctions were implemented as part of a comprehensive plan to use limited coercive means to block Iran’s nuclear advance, they could have effectively blocked Iran’s progress to nuclear capabilities while preventing war. Such a comprehensive strategy could have included a proxy campaign to destabilize the regime by supporting regime opponents in their quest to overthrow the mullahs. It could have involved air strikes or sabotage of nuclear installations and strategic regime facilities like Revolutionary Guards command and control bases and ballistic missile storage facilities. It could have involved diplomatic isolation of Iran.
Moreover, if sanctions were combined with a stringent policy of blocking Iran’s regional expansion by supporting Iraqi sovereignty, supporting the now deposed government of Yemen and making a concerted effort to weaken Hezbollah and overthrow the Iranian-backed regime in Syria, then the US would have developed a strong deterrent position that would likely have convinced Iran that its interest was best served by curbing its imperialist enthusiasm and setting aside its nuclear ambitions.
In other words, a combination of these steps could have prevented war and prevented a nuclear Iran. But today, the US-led capitulation to Iran has pulled the rug out from any such comprehensive strategy. The administration has no credibility. No one trusts Obama to follow through on his declared commitment to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power.
No one trusts Washington when Obama claims that he is committed to the security of Israel and the US’s Sunni allies in the region.
And so we are now facing the unfolding disaster that Obama has wrought. The disaster is that deal or no deal, the US has just given the Iranians a green light to behave as if they have already built their nuclear umbrella. And they are in fact behaving in this manner.
They may not have a functional arsenal, but they act as though they do, and rightly so, because the US and its partners have just removed all significant obstacles from their path to nuclear capabilities. The Iranians know it. Their proxies know it. Their enemies know it.
As a consequence, all the regional implications of a nuclear armed Iran are already being played out. The surrounding Arab states led by Saudi Arabia are pursuing nuclear weapons. The path to a Middle East where every major and some minor actors have nuclear arsenals is before us.
Iran is working to expand its regional presence as if it were a nuclear state already. It is brazenly using its Yemeni Houthi proxy to gain maritime control over the Bab al-Mandab, which together with Iran’s control over the Straits of Hormuz completes its maritime control over shipping throughout the Middle East.
Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Eritrea, and their global trading partners will be faced with the fact that their primary maritime shipping route to Asia is controlled by Iran.
With its regional aggression now enjoying the indirect support of its nuclear negotiating partners led by the US, Iran has little to fear from the pan-Arab attempt to dislodge the Houthis from Aden and the Bab al-Mandab. If the Arabs succeed, Iran can regroup and launch a new offensive knowing it will face no repercussions for its aggression and imperialist endeavors.
Then of course there are Iran’s terror proxies.
Hezbollah, whose forces now operate openly in Syria and Lebanon, is reportedly active as well in Iraq and Yemen. These forces behave with a brazenness the likes of which we have never seen.
Hamas too believes that its nuclear-capable Iranian state sponsor ensures that regardless of its combat losses, it will be able to maintain its regime in Gaza and continue using its territory as a launching ground for assaults against Israel and Egypt.
Iran’s Shiite militias in Iraq have reportedly carried out heinous massacres of Sunnis who have fallen under their control and faced no international condemnation for their war crimes, operating as they are under Iran’s protection and sponsorship. And the Houthis, of course, just overthrew a Western-backed government that actively assisted the US and its allies in their campaign against al-Qaida.
For their proxies’ aggression, Iran has been rewarded with effective Western acceptance of its steps toward regional domination and nuclear armament.
Hezbollah’s activities represent an acute and strategic danger to Israel. Not only does Hezbollah now possess precision guided missiles that are capable of taking out strategic installations throughout the country, its arsenal of 100,000 missiles can cause a civilian disaster.
Hezbollah forces have been fighting in varied combat situations continuously for the past three years. Their combat capabilities are incomparably greater than those they fielded in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. There is every reason to believe that these Hezbollah fighters, now perched along Israel’s borders with Lebanon and Syria, can make good their threat to attack and hold fixed targets including border communities.
While Israel faces threats unlike any we have faced in recent decades that all emanate from Western-backed Iranian aggression and expansionism carried out under a Western-sanctioned Iranian nuclear umbrella, Israel is not alone in this reality. The unrolling disaster also threatens the moderate Sunni states including Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. The now regional war in Yemen is but the first act of the regional war at our doorstep.
There are many reasons this war is now inevitable.
Every state threatened by Iran has been watching the Western collapse in Switzerland.
They have been watching the Iranian advance on the ground. And today all of them are wondering the same thing: When and what should we strike to minimize the threats we are facing.
Everyone recognizes that the situation is only going to get worse. With each passing week, Iran’s power and brazenness will only increase.
Everyone understands this. And this week they learned that with Washington heading the committee welcoming Iran’s regional hegemony and nuclear capabilities, no outside power will stand up to Iran’s rise. The future of every state in the region hangs in the balance. And so, it can be expected that everyone is now working out a means to preempt and prevent a greater disaster.
These preemptive actions will no doubt include three categories of operations: striking Hezbollah’s missile arsenal; striking the Iranian Navy to limit its ability to project its force in the Bab al-Mandab; and conducting limited military operations to destroy a significant portion of Iran’s nuclear installations.
Friday is the eve of Passover. Thirteen years ago, Palestinian terrorists brought home the message of the Exodus when they blew up the Seder at Netanya’s Park Hotel, killing 30, wounding 140, and forcing Israel into war. The message of the Passover Haggada is that there are no shortcuts to freedom. To gain and keep it, you have to be willing to fight for it.
That war was caused by Israel’s embrace of the notion that you can bring peace through concessions that empower an enemy sworn to your destruction. The price of that delusion was thousands of lives lost and families destroyed.
Iran is far more powerful than the PLO. But the Americans apparently believe they are immune from the consequences of their leaders’ policies. This is not the case for Israel or for our neighbors. We lack the luxury of ignoring the fact that Obama’s disastrous diplomacy has brought war upon us. Deal or no deal, we are again about to be forced to pay a price to maintain our freedom.

Thursday, April 2, 2015


Iran's Charmer in Chief Wins Again 
BLOOMBERG  NEWS  Eli Lake 3-31-15


Now is the time to praise Javad Zarif. Whatever you might think of Iran's foreign minister, he knows how to bargain. 
With a final announcement due any moment from negotiations over Iran's nuclear program in Lausanne, Switzerland, Iran appears to be doing quite well for itself.  
After all, before the real negotiations began, Iran won vague recognition -- from the U.S. and five other great powers -- that it has a right to enrich uranium. Between 2008 and 2012, the United Nations Security Council passed five resolutions sanctioning Tehran for violating the nuclear non-proliferation treaty by operating centrifuges at facilities it had not bothered to tell the International Atomic Energy Agency about. 

Now, if press leaks turn out to be correct, Iran is on the brink of securing an agreement to allow it to keep thousands of those centrifuges, and also to operate its laboratory at Fordow, a facility burrowed deep into a mountain for the production of what Zarif assures us are medical isotopes. When U.S. spies smoked out that facility in 2009, Obama demanded that Iran come clean about all of its past nuclear activities. Last week, the IAEA reported that Iran continues to stonewall the agency on the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program before 2003. 
Zarif's ability to negotiate concessions despite Iran's shaky past would be impressive enough for any foreign minister. But consider that he was able to do so even as his bosses in Tehran waged a successful proxy war against Western allies throughout the Middle East. In Yemen, a pro-American government fell this month to Iranian backed Houthi fighters, and prompted Saudi Arabia to launch an air war to beat them back. In Syria, Iranian support has been vital to the survival of Bashar al-Assad, the dictator Obama used to say had to go.
How does Zarif do it? Part of the answer is personal charm. He has for more than a decade cultivated Washington policy elites the way an aspiring presidential candidate works over local party activists in Iowa and New Hampshire. Just as local county commissioners are lucky to just get some face time with national political figures, Zarif, who was ambassador to the United Nations from 2002 to 2007, became the one Iranian official who bothered responding to e-mails from journalists, analysts and members of Congress happy to have the access.
"He makes himself accessible," Ray Takyeh, an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, told me. "When he was ambassador, he was willing to debate and have a conversation. Given the fact that there are not too many Iranian ambassadors to the United Nations who have been willing to do so, the fact that he does that is important."
Zarif has had some help in this charm offensive. E-mails that surfaced from a defamation lawsuit brought by Swedish-Iranian activist Trita Parsi against an Iranian emigre, Hassan Dai, show that Zarif has worked closely with Parsi and the organization he founded, the National Iranian American Council.
For example, they show that in 2006, Zarif and Parsi tried to persuade journalists to write about a peace offer Iran had supposedly offered the George W. Bush administration after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Yet according to senior Bush administration officials, that 2003 offer was not a serious piece of diplomacy, and was not made through the channels by which the Bush administration communicated with Iran. Nonetheless, the narrative stuck that the Bush team blew a chance at a breakthrough in 2003. On the eve of the current negotiations in 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry repeated Zarif's talking point about the 2003 offer in an interview with ABC's "This Week." (The Washington Post judged the claim as dubious, earning it three Pinocchios).
It should be noted that when Zarif was cultivating these relationships out of the U.N., the FBI was investigating him for his alleged role in controlling a charity called the Alavi Foundation. The Justice Department claimed that the group --with several hundred million dollars in assets -- was secretly run on behalf of the Iranian government to fund university programs and launder money to evade U.S. sanctions. Last year, the foundation settled a lawsuit with the U.S. government to forfeit a 36-story office building in Midtown Manhattan. 
Yet Zarif's reputation remained untarnished. After leaving the U.N. post in 2007, Zarif largely stayed out of government during the presidency of the stridently anti-American Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But after the election of Hassan Rouhani in 2013, Zarif ascended to his role as foreign minister. At the time, he gave an interview with Iranian TV on his hope to sow discord on Washington's Iran policy. "Despite AIPAC's pressure, twenty lawmakers refused to vote for the latest sanctions against Iran," he said, according to a translation by Dai.  "These divisions over Iran provide us with opportunities to maneuver in Washington and advance our interests. The Iranian community can play an important role to combat AIPAC and defend our interests." 
On a personal level, Zarif's rise within Iran is remarkable. According to an excellent profile in the New Republic last year, during the 1979 revolution Zarif wasn't in Iran, but continued his studies in the U.S. Yet experience in America didn't moderate him: He attached himself to the new revolutionaries and his political fortunes rose with them.
Today, Zarif appears to be on top of the world. In interviews he has been downright brazen with his liberal interpretations of Iran's history. Earlier this month, he told NBC's Ann Curry that Iran -- throughout its history -- has been a savior of the Jewish people. This would seem more credible if Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, wasn't tweeting out his fervent wish to see the world's only Jewish state destroyed.
Zarif's contentions on his country's nuclear program also strain credulity. In an interview with C-Span in February 2000, Zarif said, "Iran has opened its doors with regard to inspections of nuclear technology." Three years later, Iran admitted to having hid a secret uranium enrichment facility in Natanz.  
Zarif is fond of saying that Iran's nuclear program has been inspected more than any other country's on the planet, with the exception of Japan. Yet not only did Iran hide the facilities at Natanz and Fordow, it still won't allow IAEA inspectors access to any military installations. Zarif's statements about inspections "are more for political consumption," said Olli Heinonen, a former deputy director general at the IAEA: "Their attitude towards the IAEA has not changed in 10 years. There is a change in tone, but no change in policy." 
But Zarif gets away with it. One of his greatest assets is plausible deniability -- he says he doesn't actually know all of the details of his country's nuclear program, and there is no reason to disbelieve him. The Islamic revolutionaries make war and build nuclear weapons, while the diplomats can say they are seeking peace.  
This diplomatic advantage is perhaps best explained by a long-forgotten episode from the early 2000s. Malcolm Hoenlein, the executive vice chairman of the Conference of Major American Jewish Organizations, remembers pressing Zarif about the case of eight Iranian Jews from Shiraz who had gone missing in 1994.  "He has charm," Hoenlein told me. "He was gracious. He invited us to his home."
But at the end of the day, Zarif's personal qualities masked an inability to help the Jewish leaders find the men, who ranged in age from 15 to 36. "He kept promising us on the missing young people, but we never ended up getting any information," Hoenlein told me. "We gave him the information on where they were seen, in jail, we communicated this to him, and asked him to look into the fate of these young boys. But in the end the answer was, 'we don't know, we have no information.' "
Last year, the Israeli government made public a report that its intelligence service, the Mossad, had learned the missing boys were captured, jailed and murdered by Iranian authorities. It's worth asking whether Zarif knows anything more about the fate of the Iranian Jews than he does about his country's nuclear intentions. In either case, he's sure to have a smooth answer. 

Wednesday, April 1, 2015


How to end the ME conflict in four easy steps
By Ted Belman
Dennis Ross and David Makovsky in Israel’s Drive Toward Self-Destruction, argue that Netanyahu must offer up hope to Palestinians or face a revived de-legitimization movement. They’re certainly right to point out that the delegitimation movement will grow, but they are wrong to suggest that the answer is for Israel to offer hope to the Palestinians. How facile is that? They argue that what Israel needs to do is begin capitulating even before the negotiations commence, let alone, conclude. They want Israel to give up its bargaining chips for nothing in return.
The Palestinians don’t hope to be given a state, they hope to destroy a state, namely Israel.
It’s not Israel that needs to prove its bona fides, it’s the Palestinians that need to.
The problem with the Ross/Makovsky recommendations is that they are put forward to achieve a pre-ordained (at least by the international community) solution, namely two states for two people based on the '67 lines plus swaps, a divided Jerusalem and "just solution"  for the Palestinian refugees, of which there are few (60,000), and their descendants.

And the recommendations ignores the many threats to Israel along its borders. Ross and Makovsky assume that these threats will eventually evaporate but offer no arguments why this will be so. Yet they want Israel to put herself in jeopardy by offering “hope”. The greatest of these threats, Iran, is now becoming greater due to the deal being negotiated by the Obama administration that will, in Netanyahu’s words, pave the way to them getting the bomb.

On March 31/15, the Times of Israel, reported, Iran militia chief: Destroying Israel is ‘nonnegotiable’

“The commander of the Basij militia of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said that “erasing Israel off the map” is ‘nonnegotiable,’ according to an Israel Radio report Tuesday.

“In 2014, Naqdi said Iran was stepping up efforts to arm West Bank Palestinians for battle against Israel, adding the move would lead to Israel’s annihilation, Iran’s Fars news agency reported.

“’Arming the West Bank has started and weapons will be supplied to the people of this region,’ Naqdi said.

“’The Zionists should know that the next war won’t be confined to the present borders and the Mujahedeen will push them back,’ he added. Naqdi claimed that much of Hamas’s arsenal, training and technical knowhow in the summer conflict with Israel was supplied by Iran.”

There is a major war looming, aided and abetted by the Obama administration, yet Ross and Makovsky ignore Israel’s reality and peril.

Israel National News reports on April1/15, IDF Scenario for Next Hezbollah War: 1,500 Missiles Per Day

“Army updates estimates for damages in possible northern war, expects dozens or hundreds of lives lost per day.

“IDF experts estimate that the number of missiles to hit northern Israel on a given day would be 1,000-1,500, and the number of people killed daily will be in double or even triple digits.

Of course Obama’s new bedmate, Iran, is responsible for providing Hezbollah with an enormous arsenal of rockets, reputed to exceed 60,000, with which to wreak havoc on Israel. Ross and Makovsky make no mention of this threat.

Furthermore, the international community is responsible for the lack of a solution because it keeps supporting the weaker side. Normally, a labor dispute, in which the workers have stuck, is settled when one side decides to compromise their demands because of economic necessity. In the "peace process" the Palestinians are supported at every turn, both politically and financially, and are held blameless. So they have no reason or necessity to compromise.

This support has thwarted the intent of the Oslo Accords. Rabin once said that the Palestinians would have to bend to the will of Israel because Israel is the stronger party and holds all the cards or something to that effect. What he did not factor in, was that the international community would bolster the Palestinians, making a settlement impossible.

So my first recommendation would be to set aside the pre-ordained solution. Instead, let the only parameter be UNSC Res 242.

Secondly leave the parties to their own devices. Stop supporting the Palestinians financially or politically.

Thirdly, UNWRA should be done away with and all so called refugees should be resettled like all refugees are resettled. UNGA Resolution 393 provides for this.

" 4. Considers that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement, is essential in preparation for the time when international assistance is no longer available, and for the realization of conditions of peace and stability in the area"

Thus it recommends "reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East either by repatriation or resettlement". There is no reason why these "refugees" can't also be resettled throughout the world just as the Syrian refugees are being resettled. Or just normalize them where they are by giving them citizenship. If the host countries refuse to do this then they must be resettled in countries that will.  It would help considerably if the standard definition of what a refugee is, be applied rather than to consider their descendants as refugees also.

I should point out that the "right of return" derives from Res 194, which, like all UNGA resolutions is a recommendation only.

The world community, by maintaining the refugee status of these people, is contributing to the impasse in the "peace process". By maintaining the "right of return" they are adding to the insolubles.

Fourthly, support the emigration of Palestinians from Judea and Samaria and from Gaza, (rather than rebuilding Gaza). There are currently about 3.5 million Arabs living there. If the world would absorb 2 million of them, Israel would extend its sovereignty over these lands and offer citizenship or autonomy to the remaining Arabs. Thus the conflict would be over.

In summary, if the west wants to end the conflict, it should resettle the "refugees" and absorb 2 million Palestinians. It’s that easy.

Instead, Ross and Makovsky prefer to demand Israel accept the deal that they have pre-ordained, at their peril, which Israel isn't about to do.

Ironically, just as Obama is reconsidering his options on how to impose a solution, support for a “two-state solution” to solve the Israel-Arab conflict is less popular in the United States than it has been in at least two decades, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll.